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In this thesis I will present an attempt to understand the structural and functional 
substrate of human attention and emotions by means of explicit neural modelling. 
The basic architecture employed to model attention is CODAM (COrollary 
Discharge of Attention Movement) developed by analogy to motor control models 
in the brain. CODAM draws on the principles of engineering control theory thus 
invoking such concepts as forward and inverse models to explain the swift and 
efficient movement of attention. A reduced version of CODAM has been 
successfully used for a series of simulations of attention paradigms (in particular 
motor attention) as part of my MSc thesis. Here CODAM is explored further and 
more fully to account for conditions where attention partially fails. Such a condition 
is the well-known psychological paradigm termed the 'attentional blink' where 
attention (or some attention-based processes) reaches its full capacity and therefore 
struggles to function properly leaving subjects short of awareness of incoming 
stimuli. Simulations are presented in this thesis that can reproduce the basic features 
of the attentional blink and suggestions for modelling more intricate features are 
made. CODAM is then extended to include modules that represent components of 
the limbic and paralimbic systems that are known to be involved in the experience 
of emotions in the brain. Thus a global architecture of the cognitive and emotional 
systems is presented which is then applied to simulate a series of psychological 
experiments that investigate the interaction of emotions and attention under 
demanding tasks. Finally, as part of the ERMIS project in which I have been 
involved, an artificial neural network architecture is extracted from the global 
cognitive/emotional architecture. This neural network, termed ANNA for Artificial 
Neural Network for Attention to Emotion, was designed to perform emotion 
classification on a multimodal sensory input (text, speech, faces) using attention- 
driven feedback modulation of the input nodes. Results are presented on standard 
ANN datasets as well as ERMIS generated datasets. 
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Computational modelling of higher brain 
functions 
Recent advances in the field of experimental neuroscience and in particular those in 
brain imaging have yielded a wealth of data that is beginning to bridge the micro- 
level of the neurons in the brain to the macro-level of human behaviour. This 
enrichment of our knowledge and understanding of the brain has inspired a large 
amount of theoretical and computational modelling of a variety of brain functions 
with the aim to propose some plausible mechanisms, which underlie these 
functions, that are not directly accessible to experimental probing. Any such model 
of brain functions has to be able to reproduce the basic features of these functions by 
means of matching (or approximating) the existent experimental data while also 
being able to make predictions about modified operational conditions not yet tried 
experimentally. There exist two approaches to modelling brain functions: one is top- 
down and the other is bottom-up. In the top-down approach one uses all the 
knowledge from the behavioural and neuroirnaging data that is available for a 
function and, based on this, makes assumptions about what components of the 
brain are involved in this function and which role they play in it. Then, one builds 
these assumptions into the model via its neuronal structure and connectivity until 
the desired behaviour is reproduced successfully. In this approach physiological 
realism at the neuron level can vary but usually one employs simplified neurons, 
synapses and so on to avoid computational load and complexity. On the other hand, 
I'lleoreticall qn(" fr7nd emothOns 'a. oe .11. Ir, I11 16 
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in the bottom-up approach one is not allowed to use high-level information about 
the function which is being modelled but at the neuron level all physiological 
constrains must be adhered to and as little simplification as possible must be made. 
This approach is useful when modelling a function which doesn't involve a global 
network of brain areas but only a local one and in particular an area where a lot of 
physiological knowledge is available. Even then successful results are not 
guaranteed but can provide significant insight when they are. 
For the construction of the models used in this thesis a top-down approach has 
been adopted. Thereby, for modelling the functions of attention and emotions in the 
brain all available experimental data from the psychological paradigms designed to 
probe these functions were utilised to help us infer the mechanisms that link the 
localised activities of the neurons involved to the global behavioural expression 
recorded in the paradigms. These data consist mainly of behavioural performance 
results, EEG and MEG recordings, fMRI scans and in the case of animals even single 
cell recordings during performance of the tasks of the paradigms. Moreover, for the 
modelling of attention the methodology of engineering control theory was applied 
by associating sections of the brain with well-formalised functional components of 
engineering control theory. This technique has already been successfully applied in 
motor control models in the brain so we have developed our attention model by 
analogy. For the modelling of emotions and their interaction with attentional 
mechanisms the attention model was extended by including emotional components 
which correspond to limbic and paralimbic structures known to be involved in the 
processing of emotions in the brain. Thereby, a global architecture has been formed 
that begins to explain some features of this interaction of cognitive and emotional 
functions. At the neuronal level the simplest possible implementation of neurons 
and synapses was used to avoid increased complexity and computational load 
thereby providing fast and transparent results of the high-level operations of the 
model's components. 




1.2 Overview of the thesis 
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Chapter 2 begins with a general discussion on the nature of attention from the 
point of view of psychology and neuroscience. Special focus is given to a series of 
recent findings from neuroimaging experiments that attest to the existence of a 
network that issues control signals for the movement of attentional focus and, 
moreover, is found to be separate from the network that is modulated by these 
control signals. We deem these findings very important in that they motivated us to 
turn to a theoretical framework designed especially for the analysis of systems that 
comprise a part which is being controlled by another part that aims to maintain the 
controlled part within a prescribed state. This theoretical framework is known as 
engineering control theory. Ours is not the first application of engineering control 
theory to modelling neural mechanisms. Very efficient engineering control models 
have been developed to simulate human motor control. An overview of these 
models is given and their components are outlined. We then present our 
engineering control model of attention (CODAM) and describe the various 
components as well as their possible siting in the brain. We then briefly discuss a 
series of successful applications of CODAM in modelling attentional paradigms 
such as the famous Posner benefit paradigm. A review of other computational 
models of attention from the literature is presented next and a comparison of these 
models to CODAM is given. We then turn to examine a recent proposal of the 
existence of a separate network for motor attention analogous to that of visual 
attention and lateralised to the left hemisphere. Inspired by this idea we extend 
CODAM to include a motor attention system with components analogous with the 
visual attention system. We also include a rudimentary motor control system in 
order to ultimately put together a joint visuomotor model. This visuomotor model is 
introduced and its components described. The visuomotor model is employed to 
simulate two paradigms that require a separate motor attention system, one of 
Theoretical 17-rlft COHITU"ational modellinc? ot'attenti ý'ms in, the brobl, ?0; on and CrNoth'. 18 
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which is notably the motor equivalent of the Posner benefit paradigm. Finally, the 
results of these simulations are presented and discussed. 
Chapter 3 describes the application of CODAM to modelling the well-known 
phenomenon termed the 'attentional blink, observed when a subject is exposed to a 
rapid stream of stimuli, and required to monitor for two successive targets in the 
stream. The 'blink' occurs when the time between the first and second targets is 
about 200-500 msecs, when there is reduced accuracy for report of the second target 
conditioned on correct report of the first target. We begin the report of our 
modelling effort by examining the behavioural and neuroimaging findings from the 
wealth of attentional blink experiments published in the literature. We then describe 
how CODAM can be employed to model the attentional blink with the various 
functions assigned to its components derived from what is suggested by the 
numerous theoretical and experimental investigations of the phenomenon. We then 
briefly discuss the nature of attentional control as implemented in CODAM as well 
as how the various simulated stimuli and their representations are coded in the 
various nodes of the model components. The activity flow within and across the 
components of the attentional blink model is then presented and analysed followed 
by the presentation of the main mechanisms we propose give rise to the attentional 
blink effect as well as the support for the existence of these mechanisms from the 
experimental evidence. We then turn to present the main results of the attentional 
blink simulation that show we can effectively reproduce the basic features of the 
attentional blink; the drop of the second target's detection accuracy (conditioned on 
correct report of the first target) when presented within 200-500 ms from the first 
target, the 'sparing' of the second target when presented directly after the first one 
(about 100 ms after) and the attenuating effect on the 'blink" magnitude of the 
removal of the first target's mask. The importance of the corollary discharge 
component of the CODAM/attentional blink model in achieving the desired results 
is discussed and explicitly demonstrated by its removal. Finally, the relation of the 
CODAM model to other theoretical models as well as computational models of the 
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attentional blink is discussed and further support is given for the CODAM model 
from the experimental evidence. 
Chapter 4 deals with the interaction of attention and emotion in the brain. The 
main issue of this chapter is whether and how the emotional charge of a stimulus 
can drive attention toward or away from that stimulus. The reciprocal relation is 
also considered, namely the effect of the attentional condition on the emotional 
evaluation of a stimulus. The chapter begins by examining the hypothesis that 
emotions can be processed automatically and what this might mean. So features like 
speed of processing, level of awareness and attentional resources required for 
processing are investigated through a review of the relevant literature. From the 
latter we can derive considerable support for the automatic emotional encoding 
hypothesis, though without it being indubitable. Given that the emotional value of a 
stimulus is registered (automatically or not) we then explore how this can influence 
the direction of attention regarding this stimulus. We thus review carefully the 
evidence from the literature that supports the idea that the emotional charge of a 
stimulus can strongly attract attention to that stimulus. Evidence also exists that in 
some cases emotional charge (especially aversive) can divert attention away from 
the stimulus. In any case, emotion seems to be an important factor in the guidance 
of the attentional system. The possible neural mechanisms that bring about this 
emotion/attention interaction are examined next. At least two mechanisms are 
identified mostly from the findings of neuroimaging studies, one being by means of 
direct projections of the amygdala (a crucial component of the emotion circuitry) 
onto the sensory areas and the other being through a complex interplay of the 
emotional and the cognitive regions of the frontal cortex causing the alteration of the 
direction of attention by means of top-down control. We then present a general 
model of the emotion/attention network based on a well-known model of 
depression as well as on a wealth of experimental data. We subsequently employ 
this model to qualitatively account for the findings of a series of experimental 
paradigms that involve the interplay between emotion and attention. Finally, we 
.......... 
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present an implementation of the general emotion/attention model as an extension 
of the CODAM model with the addition of limbic and paralimbic components. This 
model is employed to quantitatively reproduce behavioural and neuroimaging 
findings from a series of emotion/attention studies. 
Chapter 5 deals with emotion recognition particularly in the context of human- 
computer interaction. This chapter is based on relevant work carried out as part of 
my working in the EC project ERMIS (for Emotionally Rich Man-machine Intelligent 
System). The aim of this project is the development of an automatic system capable 
of classifying the emotional state of a person speaking to a microphone and viewed 
by a camera. In more abstract terms the ERMIS system is meant to be able to 
transform/translate a multimodal input stream (consisting of vocal and facial 
features as well as the actual words) into an output stream that represents the 
emotional state corresponding to the input stream. We begin this chapter by listing 
some of the potential applications of a system like the ERMIS system. We then 
proceed to review the psychological literature on emotions in search of clues and 
guidelines that will help us shape the architecture of the emotion recogniser. We 
thus review the proposed theories especially with regard to the nature, the size and 
the hierarchical structure of the emotional space, as well as the origin of emotions in 
the brain. We then discuss some issues that arise from the psychological studies that 
complicate the formulation of the input-output relationship of the automatic 
emotion recogniser. This discussion is followed by an examination of the features in 
the various modalities that are reported in the literature to be correlated with the 
emotional state of the feature carrier. An overview of the computational studies that 
deal with the extraction and exploitation of these features for emotion recognition is 
given next. After that, we give an outline of the neural sites that receive and process 
these features as documented mostly in the neuroimaging literature. We then 
discuss the material available for training and testing an automatic emotion 
recognition system as well as the specific training/testing databases developed 
especially for ERMIS. This is followed by the introduction of an artificial neural 
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network architecture, called ANNA, designed to carry out emotional state 
classification based on a multimodal input. The novel feature of this neural network 
is that it employs a feedback loop from the emotion classification layer back to the 
input layer through a control layer. This feedback loop encapsulates the attentional 
feedback modulation known to occur in the brain when salient stimuli are presented 
as discussed in the previous chapter. Finally, we present the results of training 
ANNA on the databases compiled for ERMIS. 
Chapter 6 summarises the results of this thesis and describes future work. 
1.3 Summary of main contributions 
One of the main and unique contributions of this thesis is the application of 
engineering control theory to modelling the attentional system. The model, 
termed CODAM, employs components also found in engineering control 
neural models of motor control but now their functionality is defined in the 
context of attentional control. Valid support from psychological and brain 
imaging studies is provided for the existence of brain areas that play such a 
role in the attentional system as the components of the model play in our 
simulated attentional system. Furthermore, the model incorporates a 
contrast gain modulation mechanism known from the literature to be the 
type of modulation used by the human attentional system. 
The effect of attention on motor performance has been extensively 
investigated and measured in psychology but ours is the first attempt to 
model this computationally by means of a unified visual/motor attention 
and motor control model. This model is not only able to reproduce 
behavioural results of attentional motor tasks from the literature but also to 
provide some validation for the proposed existence of a motor attention 
system that is analogous to the visual system and contralateral to it. 
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We were able to model the attentional blink effect and effectively 
reproduce the basic behavioural features as reported in the literature. We 
were also able to reproduce electrophysiological measurements recorded 
experimentally during the attentional blink by relating the activation levels 
of the model's neurons to electrical scalp activity. Moreover, we were able 
to provide plausible sites in the brain for the components of the model and 
provide a novel interpretation of the limited capacity of the attentional 
system by means of the main mechanisms responsible for the creation of 
the blink. 
We presented a global brain model that combines the cognitive and the 
emotional networks and is consistent with findings from psychological and 
brain imaging studies as well as theoretical models of mental disorders 
such as depression. With this model we were able to qualitatively explain 
the findings of series of studies of the interaction of attention and emotion. 
Furthermore, this global brain model was implemented as an extension of 
the CODAM model of attention with the addition of limbic and paralimbic 
components and was able to reproduce behavioural and brain imaging 
results reported in attention/emotion studies. Using the same model we 
were able to mediate between and fuse the standard view of automatic 
emotional encoding and the contradicting view of attention-demanding 
emotional encoding by considering the particularities of each task and 
adapting our model's parameters accordingly. 
9 We introduced a novel artificial neural network architecture designed to 
provide classification of a multimodal feature input into an emotional state 
represented in two continuous dimensions. This neural network employs a 
feedback loop that reflects the attentional feedback modulation seen clearly 
in humans to occur when salient features are presented to the sensory 
system. This feedback loop gives the neural network a Hopfield net quality 
making initial relaxation a requirement before training. Following 
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relaxation, standard gradient descent on the quadratic error surface is 
performed. Due to the feedback loop, however, very complex equations for 
the learning rules are derived. This neural network is shown to be very 
efficient in separating the salient from the non-salient features from the 
whole input feature set without the need for a large number of hidden 
nodes. 
Finally we indicated much future work to be done using the engineering 
control approach to attention. Control theory has enormous flexibility, and 
as such contains both all the earlier models as well as a wealth of new 
models, depending on the inclusion of various state estimation modules 
and predictors. The detailed final attention control model used by the brain 
is still to be discovered. What has been hoped is that this thesis contributes 
to the advancement of this project. 
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Attention has long been a topic of interest in psychology with various definitions 
and descriptions given for it by psychologists throughout history. One of the most 
pristine definitions to date, however, can be found in William James"s Principles of 
Psychology, written in 1890: "It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and 
vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains 
of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It implies 
withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others" (James, 1890). 
The attentional system can be seen to comprise several subsystems with distinct 
functions assigned to them. We can thus identify an alerting, an orienting and a 
holding subsystem of the overall attentional system. The alerting subsystem is 
responsible for modifying the internal state in preparation for any task-relevant or 
novel stimuli or events. The orienting subsystem is responsible for the selective 
focusing on one or a few components of the entire input. Therefore it is closely 
related to the conventional concept of selective visuospatial attention reflected in 
William James' quote above. We will also henceforth equate attention to its 
orienting component. The holding subsystem is responsible for holding information 
in mind that is task-relevant or generally salient. It is thus akin to the concept of 
working memory which we also incorporate as a component of the attentional 
system. 
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Recently, scientists from the cognitive and the neuro- sciences, armed with new 
experimental tools (such as EEG, MEG, PET and fMRI) to probe the human brain, 
have converged to untangle the phenomenon of attention. Through this effort, a 
new understating of the function of attention has emerged, indicating that attention 
should be regarded as a distinct control mechanism with a specific localization in 
the brain, rather than as an indefinite, global property of the brain, as has been 
suggested earlier. Moreover, the sites of the brain where this attentional control 
emerges from have been found to be dissociated (in terms of localization and 
function) from the sites being controlled. An overview of significant theories of 
attention suggested within the last 20 years with a focus on the aforementioned 
recent outlook and its neuroscientific evidence is presented in the section that 
follows. 
The concept of attention as a control system has provided the motivation to 
model attention using engineering control theoretical tools, such as inverse model 
controllers, forward model controllers and plants. The justification for such an 
approach lies within the extraordinary ability of control theory to model systems 
that operate with high speed and efficiency, as notably so does the human motor 
system. The standard neural network modelling approach of training neural 
networks organized in a set of modules with no a priori connectivity fails to capture 
the explicit functionality assigned to the various modules that correspond to the 
brain regions involved in the control of attention. Engineering control theory, on the 
other hand, with the utilisation of various sorts of controllers engaging in feed- 
forward and feedback loops, provides the appropriate framework for the 
development of a model comprising discrete modules with a specific functionality 
assigned to each of them. In later sections we will present the various modules of 
our model and propose for each module one or more possible sites in the brain that 
appear to perform the same function as this module in our model performs based 
on evidence from the literature. While in a theoretical or computational model it is 
easy to assign a specific function to each of the modules that comprise the model, it 
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is not trivial to do the same in the brain. Nevertheless, evidence exists that most 
areas in the brain do specialise in one or more functions so we can hazard relating 
the modules of our model to certain brain areas not necessarily in a one-to-one 
correspondence. The question of how this functional specialisation arises in the 
brain is one that is still quite open to debate. Some areas of the brain appear to have 
an evolutionarily imposed predisposition to perform one function or another while 
other functions seem to be learned by some brain area(s) during one"s lifetime, 
mostly in the early stages of life. 
So to begin to describe our control theoretical approach to modelling attention, 
we can, at first glance, specify two principal modules: 
0 The plant, i. e. the controlled object, consisting, in the case of visual 
information processing, of early cortical sites where feature analysis and 
object coding occur, or, in the case of motor response, of motor cortex sites. 
(We will not examine other modalities, such as hearing, somatic sensation, 
olfaction and taste, here) 
The controller, which dispatches control signals upon the plant, consisting 
of frontoparietal sites. 
This control scheme for attention was originally proposed by Taylor (2000,2001, 
2002,2003) and it has already been successfully applied to attention paradigms 
(Taylor & Rogers, 2002). In particular, it was applied to explain various quantitative 
features of the Posner benefit paradigm which illustrates how, in a visual response 
task, paying attention to valid cues appearing prior to the targets can speed-up the 
response, whereas attention to invalid cues can cause delays in the response. The 
Taylor & Rogers (2002) simulations will be further discussed in a later section. The 
results from this effort reaffirm the appropriateness of this control scheme for 
modelling attention and has provided the basis for the integrated model of 
attentional control in motor performance also presented later. A detailed analysis of 
the modules comprising the model will be given in section 2.5. 
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2.2 The nature of attention 
The brain's limited capacity for concurrent information processing indicates choices 
in resource allocation need to be made, in accordance with behavioural imperatives. 
That is, a selected component of the information flow has to be extracted, amplified 
and processed at the expense of other components being, temporarily or altogether, 
disregarded so as to fulfil the behavioural requirement attached to the selected 
component. This mechanism is the crux of attention. 
Depending on the type of information and, furthermore, on the criteria for the 
selection, one can identify different types of attention, as both psychological and 
neuro-scientific evidence reaffirm. In this sense, when information is visual, 
attention is termed visual, which is, subsequently, classified as spatial, if the location 
of the visual object is the criterion, or object-based, if the object's features is the 
criterion, and, when information concerns motor action, attention is termed motor. 
Other classes of attention can be identified as well, such as, attention to particular 
instants in time (time attention) or attention to ideas, but these will not concern us in 
this thesis. 
An ample amount of knowledge has been amassed with regard to the human 
visual system and its various pathways, and a reasonably good understanding of 
this domain has ensued from it. However, only early visual processing stages seem 
to be lucidly explained and their contribution well accounted for, whereas, the later 
stages of processing and, in particular, their integration with higher cognitive 
processes are, still, somewhat ambiguous and vague as to their contribution in the 
overall function of the brain. It is, nevertheless, these later stages that pertain to 
attentional control and will, primarily, concern us in this thesis; therefore, we will 
only briefly describe the early stages and focus more on the later ones. 
Upon presentation of visual stimuli to the eyes and activation of the 
photoreceptor populations, the signals generated by the later go through the retina 
where intense signal processing and information compression takes place by means 
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of contrast enhancement, i. e. intensification of signal changes rather than their 
absolute values. From the retina, this dimensionally reduced information goes 
through the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) of the thalamus where it gets re- 
organized so that the (temporal) dynamic aspects of the visual information emerge 
and is then relayed to the visual cortex. It is worth mentioning that some attentional 
features have been attributed to the thalamus as numerous backprojections from the 
visual cortex back into the thalamus have been recorded. These backprojections 
would enable the thalamus to exert competition-based attentional control since it 
very conveniently keeps all the visual information concentrated in a small region 
ready to process and collate with any potential backprojected data (LaBerge, 1990). 
After thalamic processing, visual information enters area VI of the primary 
visual cortex where a topographic map of the visual stimuli is compiled by means of 
the retinotopic organization of the V1 cells, that is, each V1 cell representing a site 
on the retina and, thus, a locality of the visual world. Beyond area V1, it was initially 
suggested by Ungeleider & Mishkin (1982) that there is a split into two separate 
streams each processing a different aspect of the visual information. In particular, 
one stream described as a ventral 'what" pathway processes object-based and 
feature-related information contained in the visual stimuli (i. e. shape, form, etc of 
the object), and the other stream described as a dorsal 'where' pathway processes 
spatial information (i. e. location of the object). The ventral pathway consists of areas 
V2 and V4 of the visual cortex along with inferior temporal cortex (IT) areas, while 
the dorsal pathway includes various areas in parietal lobe along with posterior 
parietal areas. More recently, however, Goodale & Milner (1992) provided a re- 
interpretation of the distinction between these two streams based not on the aspect 
of information they process, but on the function they serve, that is, the ventral 
stream helps create a conceptual representation of the visual world, while the dorsal 
engages in on-line visual control of action by processing information about the 
objects with respect to the effector being used. 
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Two of the most influential models of visual attention, that of Posner & 
Petersen (1990) and that of Desimone & Duncan (1995), implicate the two visual 
streams in their attempt to explain the modulatory effect of attention on the visual 
system. However, the form of the two models differs in that Posner & Petersen 
suggested a distinct mechanism of attention consisting of three dissociable 
components (disengage, move, engage), whereas Desimone & Duncan suggested 
attention being "an emergent property of many neural mechanisms working to 
resolve competition for visual processing and control of behaviour". Moreover, 
Posner & Petersen proposed a localization of the three components in the brain; in 
particular, the disengagement of attention from its current focus involving parietal 
lobe areas, the movement of attention to a new location or object involving the 
superior colliculus and the engagement of attention on the new location or object 
involving the thalamus. 
Nevertheless, whether regarded as the effect of separate components of a 
distinct mechanism or as the result of a biased competition between objects for 
processing capacity, focus of attention acts upon both visual streams via their 
balanced interplay. That is, activation in a specific location in the spatial pathway 
should expedite the processing of objects appearing within that part of space and 
hinder processing of objects away from that and, conversely, a specific object in the 
object pathway becoming active should enhance activity in its location. Indeed, the 
later condition has led to the formulation of an object-based attention concept where 
the identity of an object is used to select its location in an array of objects (van der 
Velde & de Kamps, 2001). 
Recent experiments using global brain imaging techniques (PET and fMRI) 
have shown the existence of a distinct fronto-parietal network involved in 
dispatching attentional control signals upon the network involved in processing the 
input being attended to, namely, the aforementioned visual streams (ventral, 
dorsal), in the case of visual input, and, in the case of motor response, the motor 
cortical network. This dissociation of the network controlling from the network 
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being controlled by attention, was emphasized in the work of Kastner, Ungerleider 
and colleagues (Kastner et al., 1999) who reported attentional modulation of activity 
(a, so called, baseline shift) during expectation of visual stimuli being substantially 
higher in fronto-parietal regions than in retinotopic cortex, indicating that these 
regions provide control signals that bias neural activity in the visual cortex. Ia in 
follow-up article they concluded that "attention- related activity in frontal and 
parietal areas does not reflect attentional modulation of visually evoked responses, 
rather it reflects the attentional operations themselves" (Kastner & Ungerleider, 
2000). This concept has been further explored in Hopfinger et al. (2000) and, also, 
Corbetta et al. (2000) who reported similar parietal and frontal areas being activated 
by attentional cues, using event-related fMRI. The locations implicated in attentional 
control in these studies are compliant with the findings of Posner & Petersen (1990) 
mentioned above. 
A very important issue emerging from this new role of attention as a control 
mechanism is how, exactly, this control is implemented. That is, how do the control 
signals affect the neuronal response of the areas processing the stimulus? Ample 
evidence, both from PET and fMRI data in attention paradigms (e. g. Desimone, 
1999; Hillyard et al., 1999) and from single cell recordings in monkey visual cortex 
(e. g. McAdams and Maunsell, 1999; Reynolds et al., 1999) indicates that attention 
modulates the gain of the neuronal response of the input sites. In other words, the 
effect of attention on the response of stimulus processing neurons can be regarded 
as multiplication by some gain factor. Rather than this multiplicative effect, an 
additive effect of attention via baseline shift (i. e. increase of neuronal response of a 
population being attended to compared to not being attended to, without 
presentation of any stimulus) has been reported in attention paradigms like in 
Kastner et al. (1999), but the relationship between the two effects is not clear. It could 
be that different neural populations respond differently to attentional control, either 
by gain modulation or by baseline shifts. The selectivity property of attention 
indicates that it should, in addition to the enhancing effect on the selected stimulus 
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described above, have a suppressive effect on the irrelevant or distracting stimuli, 
inhibiting their representation. This is in concord with Desimone & Duncan's 
biased-competition theory whereby enhancement of a selected object occurs with 
collateral suppression of processing in the neural populations representing features 
of different objects. Although there hasn't been conclusive evidence for such an 
inhibitory effect of attention, some fMRl studies have suggested it implicitly, and, it 
could be the case that different attentional mechanisms exert enhancing or 
suppressive control over the input sites. 
Another significant operational distinction of attentional control is that it arises 
by two mechanisms: one is termed 'bottom-up' and the other 'top-down'. These two 
mechanisms encompass much more than the difference in direction of the 
attentional control signals. Specifically, bottom-up attentional control, also termed 
'fexogenous', reflects the attention-grabbing effect of an abrupt, unexpected stimulus 
or a novel, uncommon one whose processing proceeds in a feedforward fashion 
through behavioural correlation, towards motor output. This mechanism runs 
automatically. Top-down attentional control, on the other hand, reflects cognitive 
factors, such as knowledge, goals and objectives, and involves feedback information 
flow from higher cognitive areas to lower ones. Such attentional-control feedback 
has, in fact, been reported in attention experiments in which detailed timing 
analysis of EEG and fMRI data was performed revealing increased neural activity in 
V1 attributed to reentrant signals from higher extrastriate cortical areas (Martinez et 
al., 2001). Top-down attentional control is voluntary. Onset and decay times differ, 
as well, in the two mechanisms, with exogenous attention rapidly reaching its 
maximum effect and equally rapidly reducing, and, endogenous engaging at a 
significantly later time to the cueing and rising gradually. Moreover, exogenous 
attention causes a prolonged inhibition at the cued location (called 'inhibition of 
return') after early facilitation (Klein, 2000). Despite their differences, however, the 
two mechanisms are not entirely dissociable, at least not at a cognitive level, in the 
sense that goals and objectives, inducing top-down attentional control, can 
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modulate the sensory salience of visual objects which determines the dispatch of 
bottom-up attentional control signals. Thus, the bottom-up and top-down signals 
for different object features, combined in 'salience' maps, could specify which 
objects are selected for recognition and action (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). 
2.3 Motor control models in the brain 
2.3.1 Engineering control theory 
A control system is a means by which a variable quantity or set of variable 
quantities is made to conform to a prescribed norm. It either holds the values of the 
controlled quantities constant or causes them to vary in a prescribed way. Control 
systems are intimately related to the concept of automation, but the two 
fundamental types of control systems, feed-forward and feedback, have classic 
ancestry. The loom invented by Joseph Jacquard of France in 1801 is an early 
example of feed-forward; a set of punched cards programmed the patterns woven 
by the loom; no information from the process was used to correct the machine's 
operation. Similar feed-forward control was incorporated in a number of machine 
tools invented in the 19th century, in which a cutting tool followed the shape of a 
model. 
Feedback control, in which information from the process is used to correct a 
machine's operation, has an even older history. Roman engineers maintained water 
levels for their aqueduct system by means of floating valves that opened and closed 
at appropriate levels. The Dutch windmill of the 17th century was kept facing the 
wind by the action of an auxiliary vane that moved the entire upper part of the mill. 
The most famous example from the Industrial Revolution is James Watt's flyball 
governor of 1769, a device that regulated steam flow to a steam engine to maintain 
constant engine speed despite a changing load. 
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The first theoretical analysis of a control system, which presented a differential- 
equation model of the Watt governor, was published by James Clerk Maxwell in the 
19th century. Maxwell's work was soon generalized and control theory developed 
by a number of contributions, including a notable study of the automatic steering 
system of the U. S. battleship "New Mexico, " published in 1922. The 1930s saw the 
development of electrical feedback in long-distance telephone amplifiers and of the 
general theory of the servomechanism, by which a small amount of power controls 
a very large amount and makes automatic corrections. The pneumatic controller, 
basic to the development of early automated systems in the chemical and petroleum 
industries, and the analogue computer followed. All of these developments formed 
the basis for elaboration of control-system theory and applications during World 
War 11, such as anti-aircraft batteries and fire-control systems. 
The systems, or processes, to which control theory is applied, have the 
following structure. The state of the system at each instant of time t can be described 
by n quantities, which are labelled xi(t), X2(t), ..., Xn(t). For example, the system may 
be a mixture of n chemical substances undergoing a reaction. The quantities xi (t), ... 
, Xn(t) would represent the concentrations of the n substances at time t. At each 
instant of time t, the rates of change of the quantities xi (t), .. 
*, x"(t) depend upon the 
quantities xi(t), Xn(t) themselves and upon the values of k so-called control 
variables, ui(t), Uk(t), according to a known law. The values of the control 
variables are chosen to achieve some objective. The nature of the physical system 
usually imposes limitations on the allowable values of the control variables. In the 
chemical-reaction example, the kinetic equations furnish the law governing the rate 
of change of the concentrations, and the control variables could be pressure and 
temperature, which must lie between fixed maximum and minimum values at each 
time t. To restate the control problem in more compact mathematical form we could 
say that the dynamic system to be controlled is typically described by a vector of an 
internal state, x, a state equation, i=f (x, u), and an output equation, y= g(x, u), 
where u is the control vector. The state equation describes the change in the state 
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variables as a function of the current state and the control input. The output 
equation describes the output as a function of the state and possibly of the control 
input. 
We will now focus on control by means of internal models which has proven to 
be very efficient in maintaining a system close to the desired state in the presence of 
noise and disturbances, such as in the case of human motor control that will be 
discussed in the next section. Although the concept of internal models has its roots 
in engineering control theory and robotics, it has more recently been applied in 
neural network modelling and computational neuroscience, thus extending the 
concept as well as enriching the choice of designs and architectures. Therefore 
instead of presenting the formal mathematical foundation of internal-model-based 
control we will introduce the main components of internal-model-based control 
models in their generic form that encompasses the conceptual influences of the 
aforementioned applications. 
The main component of intemal-model-based control models is the inverse 
model controller which given the desired state of the plantXd(t) and the actual state 
of the plant x(t) calculates the control signal u(t) that will modify the state of the 
plant toward the desired state. This calculation is an inversion of state coordinates 
back to control coordinates hence the name of this controller. The magnitude of the 
control signal u(t) is obviously proportionate to the discrepancy between the actual 
state of the plant x(t) and the desired oneXd(t). 
A further component is the forward model or the so-called observer. This 
component can represent the plant's state in response to a control signal. Thus it can 
provide an estimate of the plant state at the next time step x(t+l) given the plant's 
current state x(t) and the control signal u(t) applied to it. The estimated state can 
then be used to correct the control signal u(t) of the inverse model controller if the 
latter is predicted to produce a plant state that deviates significantly from the 
desired one. 
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The state of the plant is typically deduced from the sensory feedback by the 
various sensors as direct observations of the plant state are of limited form. It is 
therefore useful to include a component that can transform the estimated state of the 
plant (given by the forward model) into an estimate of the sensory feedback 
produced by that state. This component is called a forward output model as it is 
cascaded with the forward model. The estimate of the sensory feedback can be 
compared to the actual sensory feedback and the difference used for correcting any 
other controlling component. 
Finally, a relevant component, which has been implied above, is an error or 
monitor component that can be used for training the inverse model controller. The 
output produced by this component can be the difference (error) between the 
desired and the actual state or between the desired and the estimated state of the 
plant. It can also be the difference between the estimated sensory feedback and the 
actual sensory feedback. 
Although the components mentioned above are only a few of the basic 
components encountered in internal-model-based control models, they can be 
combined in a significant number of architectures where they can play different 
roles depending on how they are connected to each other. Moreover the internal 
structure of these components is dictated by the modelling task in the sense that the 
modelling task specifies the nature of the input and output signals as well as the 
calculations that are performed between them by the various components. So we 
will next examine what the form of these relationships are when the concept of 
internal models is applied to motor control and then proceed to present an internal- 
model-based model of attention developed in analogy. 
2.3.2 Application to motor control in the brain 
Motor control is, effectively, a transformation of sensory inputs to motor commands. 
The sensory inputs are accessed by means of an efference copy of the descending 
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motor commands, that is, signals from motor axon collaterals to an earlier point in 
the circuit. This sensorimotor transformation comprises a kinematic and a dynamic 
component. Such transformations are formally governed by the laws of physics; the 
internal representation of these transformations are given by internal models. 
Forward models capture the causal relationship between inputs to the motor system 
and the outputs, and can predict the sensory consequence of an action, i. e. predict 
the next state given the current state and the motor command (Miall & Wolpert, 
1996). In contrast, inverse models provide the motor command that will cause a 
desired change in state and are, therefore, well suited to act as controllers (Kawato et 
al., 1987). 
Motor learning can be regarded as the acquisition of the appropriate forward 
and inverse models for the task in the given environment. The functional imperative 
of inverse model controllers is evident as they provide the motor commands 
necessary to achieve the desired change in state. On the other hand, the need for 
forward models is not entirely obvious as they apparently reproduce signals about 
movements that are already available from an automatic sensitivity mechanism of 
the body that relays information about the position of body parts to the CNS, called 
/proprioception'. One suggestion is that forward models can provide crucial fast 
state estimates in cases where long processing and transduction delays occur in 
informing the CNS about state changes, such as in visually guided tracking tasks or 
fast arm movements (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Sabes, 2000). 
An issue of how to train the inverse dynamics model is raised, inasmuch as the 
motor command error is not directly available to the CNS, rather the movement 
error represented in sensory coordinates is. Kawato has proposed a feedback-error 
learning scheme to resolve this (Kawato, 1990). In particular, the employment of a 
feedback controller which transforms the movement error, in sensory terms, into 
feedback motor command, provides this training signal for the inverse model, 
which, in turn, outputs the feedforward motor command. The sum of feedforward 
and feedback motor command then acts on the controlled object. 
.................. . ......... ............ 
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This hybrid motor control architecture incorporating a forward internal model 
and an inverse internal model trained within the proposed feedback-error learning 
scheme is able to efficiently guide accurate motor behaviour. However, were it the 
case that this architecture comprised a single forward and a single inverse model 
controller, then they would have to be extremely complex in structure, in order to 
cope with the different motor tasks and their variations and, moreover, with the 
different environments these tasks would have to be carried out in. This would 
impair the control accuracy introducing latency and performance errors. Instead, a 
modular approach has been proposed in which multiple controllers co-exist, with 
each controller dedicated to a subset of the aggregate of possible task-environment 
combinations, i. e. to a subset of contexts (Wolpert & Kawato, 1998). These 
controllers are combined in forward-inverse model pairs, with each pair 
constituting a separate module within the control architecture; which of these 
modules are called upon to act on a particular task is decided by an estimator that 
assigns responsibility for this task to a specific module or set of modules 
(responsibility estimator) according to the task and its context. Such an approach 
appears to achieve a good representation of the physical world, which can be 
regarded as being itself of a modular nature. 
2.4 A control model of attention movement 
2.4.1 The basic control model 
It is intuitively perceived as well as systematically confirmed experimentally that 
the focus of attention constantly moves from one sensory item to another in an effort 
to isolate and absorb only those items that are relevant (in whatever context). Thus 
the focus of attention forms a trajectory whether it is in the spatial dimension (e. g. in 
spatial visual search) or in the temporal dimension (e. g. in item detection in a serial 
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item array presentation). The trajectory formed by the movement of the focus of 
attention can be explicit as when there is collateral physical movement of the 
sensory apparatus (e. g. eye movements and saccades) or it can be implicit as when 
attention focus moves covertly across internal representations of external sensory 
items. Moreover, the focus of attention being a localised modification of the 
responsiveness of sensory areas is now known, as discussed above, to be controlled 
by a separate network of areas (fronto-parietal). So we could argue that we have a 
control system where the controlled object (plant) is sensory areas with the 
controlled parameter being the responsiveness of those areas to external stimuli. 
The trajectory of the movement of the focus of attention can thus be seen as the 
dynamic variation of the components of the sensory responsiveness hyper-vector. 
This hyper-vector can have topographically continuously organised components or 
discrete object-related components or a combination of both in a bimodal space. 
Furthermore, this hyper-vector is controlled by a dedicated control hyper-vector 
(possibly with similar organisation of its components) stemming from the control 
sites and shaped by the desired attentional focus movement trajectory stored in the 
goals areas. This interpretation of the movement of attention focus motivated us to 
apply engineering control theoretical principals to the modelling of attention as well 
as more specifically use the ideas of motor control essentially by analogising the 
movement of limbs and so on to the movement of the focus of attention. 
The control components we employ for our attention model as well as their 
functional assignment in the specific context of the attention control system are 
illustrated in the following figure and discussed further in the following section. 
.......... . 
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Figure 2.1. The generic attention control model with the correspondence between 
control components and functional attentional components. 
Note that not all connections drawn in thisfigure between the components of the model need 
to be usedfor a specific implementation of the attention control model. Rather they are 
drawn to illustrate the wealth o available architectures and theflexibility of the control- 
theoretic approach. For the same reasons, neither the direction of the connections nor their 
inhibitorylexcitatory character is specified as they can vary depending on the architecture 
employed. 
2.4.2 The components of the control model 
Let us now consider the components of Fig. 2.1 separately: 
0 Plant: This component in the context of attention represents the sites under 
attentional control, namely the sensory and the associative cortices. As 
mentioned before, feature- or object-related activity in these cortices is 
enhanced for relevant features or objects and suppressed for the distracting 
ones. Ample evidence from brain imaging as well as single cell analyses 
exists for such amplification/reduction of attended/unattended inputs 
(Reynolds et al., 1999; Treue and Maunsell, 1999; Mehta et al., 2000a, 2000b) 
supporting the assignment we propose. 
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0 Inverse model controller (IMC): This component controls the sensory and 
the associative cortices (the plant) via gain modulation of the attended sites 
and inhibition of the adjacent sites activated by distractor inputs. It is sited 
mainly in the right posterior parietal cortex with a variety of components in 
it. It could have sub-components in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) or 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) implicated in spatial attention studies with 
hemi-spatial neglect subjects. Also, it could have sub-components in the 
superior parietal lobule (SPL) engaged in frequent attention shift tasks 
(Vandenberghe, 2001), and in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) as indicated by 
target discrimination response tasks (Nobre et al., 1997; Gitelman et al., 
1999). Finally, sub-components could be found in the precuneus (preC) 
involved in object- or feature-based attention. 
0 Goals: This component encodes the goals or rules of the task and is used to 
bias the IMC in applying the appropriate (for the task) control signals on 
the plant. It is sited in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), with sub-components in 
the dorsolateral area (DLPFC) and in the frontal eye fields (FEF). 
0 Forward model/Corollary discharge: We propose in our model that an 
efference copy of the attention movement signal from the IMC (a corollary 
discharge) is used to construct a forward model that can provide a quick 
estimate of the resulting attentional state. This estimate can then be used to 
correct the IMC signal through a monitor that compares the estimated to 
the desired state. It is known that corollary discharges of saccadic motor 
commands are generated in the superior colliculus that travel back up 
through mediodorsal thalamus to the frontal eye field in prefrontal cortex 
(Wurtz and Sommer, 2004). These are used to stabilise and smooth the 
saccadic movements before the somewhat belated proprioceptive feedback 
becomes available. One of the criteria proposed for the identification of 
corollary discharges is that they originate in an area that is involved in 
generating the movement commands themselves. Under the assumption 
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that the attention movement signal is generated by the IMC sited in parietal 
areas we would expect the corollary discharge component of our attention 
model to have similar siting. 
Monitor: This is an important component of the attentional control system 
as it allows for a fast correction of the attentional movement control signal 
issued by the IMC in the event of a discrepancy being detected between the 
forward model's attention movement prediction (coded as the corollary 
discharge) and the desired attention movement coded in the goals. 
Cingulated cortices are a possible site for this component as the caudal 
cingulate has been implicated in conflict resolution (Botvinick et al., 2001) 
while the rostral cingulate has been known to be involved in error 
correction (Kiehl et al., 2000). 
0 State estimator: This module provides an estimate of the -attention state' in 
engmeermg control terms and would correspond to the sensory working 
memory in psychological terms. Thus items arriving here are available for 
report by the subject. The network that supports and maintains 
representations in working memory in the brain involves prefrontal as well 
as parietal areas (Courtney et al., 1997; Ungerleider et al., 1998; Marshuetz et 
al., 2000). 
2.4.3 Simulations of attention control 
Simulations have been performed to demonstrate that data from various attention 
paradigms can be explained by the control architecture of Fig. 2.1. In particular, 
paradigms concerning the effects of the top-down modulatory attention signals to 
lower sites (Reynolds et al., 1999) and of the dependence of the Posner benefit 
(Posner, 1980) on cue-target asynchrony have been carried out (Taylor and Rogers, 
2002). In particular, the Posner benefit shows the value of using a control approach 
to attention. 
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The Posner benefit involves measuring the benefit, in speeded reaction time, 
obtained by directing attention to a target input, as compared to when the input is 
not being attended to. Thus, a subject is asked to fixate a central cross. Their 
attention is then directed to one or other side of the viewing screen, to an outlined 
target box, by an exogenous signal (sudden brightening of the target box) 
(exogenous cueing) or by a central arrow cue directing attention to be moved in the 
direction of the arrow (endogenous cueing). A target then appears some hundred or 
so milliseconds later in either the cued target box (valid case) or in the un-cued box 
(invalid case). The differences of the reaction times of the subject to the invalid 
target (say recognition as to the target being an x rather than a +) as compared to the 
valid target are denoted as the attention benefit. This has been studied under a 
variety of situations and in its dependence on the cue-target time difference 
(CTOA). 
A simulation was constructed and reported in (Taylor and Rogers, 2002) of the 
dependence of the attention benefit on the CTOA. It was a very simple simulation, 
able to take account of both the exogenous and endogenous cue cases. The model 
consisted of a goals module, for directing attention to the visual space, an inverse 
controller to move attention to left, right or central positions, and an input module 
for these three regions. Each module was taken to contain only three neurons, as 
dedicated nodes, these being average firing rate neurons with a sigmoid response 
function, with corresponding temporal sensitivity. Inhibition was taken to exist 
between the neurons in the attention movement controller, so slowing down 
attention movement in the invalidly cued case. Results from the simulation, in the 
two cases of exogenous and endogenous invalid cueing, are shown in Fig. 2.2a and 
b, respectively. In the first case, the CTOA was chosen to be 0.8 s, the second 0.2 s. 
As seen in Fig. 2.2a there is a rise of the incorrect (left-most) IMC neuron, directing 
attention incorrectly to the right. The correct right IMC neuron is then activated by 
the target input; this neuron then causes the incorrect IMC left-most neuron to be 
turned off by lateral inhibition. It also amplifies the input to the right plant neuron, 
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so leading to recognition response. In the endogenous case (Fig. 2.2b), the incorrect 
IMC neuron is more rapidly turned off (due to the shorter CTOA), and the resulting 
plant neuron is turned on (and stays on, due to the goal module working memory). 
Varying the CTOA for the exogenous and endogenous cases leads to the two curves 
shown in Fig. 2.2c; these curves give a result close to that observed in humans 
(Wright and Ward, 1998). 
.............. . 
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Figure 2.2. The results of 
a simulation of the 
attention benefit 
valid/invalid cue 
paradigm, using the 
control model of Fig. 2.1 
(Taylor and Rogers, 
2002). 
(a) The temporal 
b 
1t 
development of activity in 
the neurons of the IMC 
and the visual cortex, in 
the invalidly cued case, for 
an exogenous cue with 
CTOA = 500 ms. (b) Ditto, 
I 
but nowfor the 
endogenous case, with 
CTOA = 200 ms. (c) The 
dependence of the attention 
benefit (invalid cue RT - 
valid cue RT) for different 
CTOAs, and separatelyfor 
the exogenously and 
endogenously cued cases. 
Note the close similarity of 
this result to thatfor 
humans (Wright and 
Ward, 1998). 
widel of! "i th"'I 11, ""Oil ,, 110, ý ............... ................................................................................................. ................. ................... -. - ...................................... .......... 
7,11coiletical and c')II"p"'I'tational moddlin,,, ofatterlion t7nd, emotho'ns in the bram, 45 
CW5,1, r CAW t 
PIOVOIýf Atten. tio. ri A conffol ýoll 4, .................................... I-- ........... ................................................ .............. ............... I.......... I .................... ................................................................................... ....................... I ............ I.... ............ -1 ............................ 
2.4.4 Review of other models of attention 
The following models will be briefly discussed as indicating all recent models come 
under the heading of control theory: 
1. Selective Attention for Identification Model (SAIM) (Heinke & Humphreys, 
2003) 
2. Guided Search 2.0 (Wolfe, 1994) 
3. Saliency Map-based Model of Attention (Itti & Koch, 2000) 
4. Multiple Object Recognition and Attentional Selection (MORSEL) (Mozer & 
Sitton, 1998) 
Biased Competition Model of Attention (Deco & Rolls, 2004) 
6. Object Based Attention (van der Velde & de Kamps, 2001) 
7. The Hamker Model of Attention (Hamker, 2004) 
So let's begin by outlining the main features of the above models: 
1. Selective Attention for Identification Model (SAIM) 
The SAIM architecture comprises 6 modules: 
0 Visual Field, coding for retinal input 
M Selection Network, performing competition among objects in the 
Visual Field for selection 
M Contents network, multiplexing Visual Field objects with Selection 
Network winners 
0 Focus of Attention (FOA), receiving the selected object from the 
Contents network and relaying/relating it to the Knowledge 
Network 
m Knowledge Network, represents known objects and biases the 
Selection Network by top-down signals 
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m Location Map, shifting attention focus serially by inhibiting the 
sites of successfully recognised targets (inhibition of return) 
0 Selection Network achieves object selection by means of a constraint 
satisfaction net 
0 Main constraint is only one object achieves non-zero activation 
(Winner-Take-All) 
Contents Network contains sigma-pi units that ensure any unit in the 
Visual Field can be mapped to the FOA as long at its Selection 
Network node is active 
0 Knowledge network compares internal templates with the FOA 
Guided Search 
0 The model assumes a two-stage model of visual selection: 
The first, pre-attentive stage of processing is held to be spatially 
parallel and to involve the computation of simple visual features 
The second stage, in contrast, is held to be attentional in nature, to 
be spatially serial and it enables more complex visual 
representations (involving combinations of features) to be 
computed 
4P This model comprises 2 main modules: 
0 Feature Maps, coding individual features of objects in the visual 
scene 
0 Activation Map, summing activation from all Feature Maps and 
comparing the sums to decide if target has been detected or not 
In the Feature Maps dissimilarity of a feature with neighbouring 
features enhances activation of that feature 
This effect decreases with neighbours' spatial distance 
A feature that matches a top-down target feature is also enhanced 
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0 Activation from all Feature Maps is topologically summed within the 
Activation Map (a saliency map) 
0 Visual attention serially processes all items in the Activation Map 
above the activation threshold starting with the item with the highest 
activation and continuing in decreasing order of activation 
40 If visual attention processes the target, then the model correctly 
identifies the location of the target (even if it had initially elicited a 
lower response than a distractor) 
0 If the target is not processed, then the model guesses among all the 
unprocessed items (those above and below activation threshold) 
3. Itti & Koch (Saliency Map-based Model of Attention) 
0 Similar to guided search, this model comprises a pre-attentive parallel 
stage where basic object feature are processed and an attentive serial 
stage where salient objects 'pop out' 
Thus, again, two main modules exist: 
0 Feature Maps, coding for colour, orientation, intensity, motion etc. 
a Saliency Map, coding for the saliency (or conspicuity) at every 
location in the visual scene 
0 The saliency map is sequentially scanned by attention through the 
interplay between a winner-take-all network (which detects the point 
of highest saliency at any given time) and inhibition of return (which 
suppresses the last attended location from the saliency map, so that 
attention can focus onto the next most salient location). 
4. Multiple Object Recognition and Attentional Selection (MORSEL) 
* MORSEL comprises two main modules: 
0 f-%l- C., bject Recognition (or BURNET), responsible for object feature 
binding in a hierarchical coding schema 
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a Attentional Map, modulating activity in the feature maps of the 
Object Recognition module according to top-down goals 
0 The Object Recognition module uses stored knowledge to delineate the 
feature combination process so that valid and coherent objects are 
'pulled-out' from the net 
0 This process is further supported by the Attentional Map which 
amplifies (by multiplication) activity in the lower-level feature maps in 
the location where attention is directed by the endogenous goals 
5. Deco & Rolls (Biased Competition Model of Attention) 
0 This model implements the idea of Desimone & Duncan of attention 
being a biased competition of objects competing for attentional 
resources 
0 The model comprises several modules that play the role of object and 
spatial maps 
0 All these maps are endowed with local lateral inhibition among their 
constituent nodes whether those nodes code for low-level features, or 
objects, or location in the visual field 
0 Top-down attentional control is represented by an additive bias to the 
competition among the map nodes stemming from PFC 
6. van der Velde & de Kamps (Object Based Attention) 
0 Information about the location of the objects in the object array is 
processed in the dorsal (or 'where-) stream, which runs from V1 to the 
parietal cortex 
0 Information about the identity of the objects in the object array is 
processed in a feedforward manner in the ventral (or 'what') stream. 
This stream runs from Vl to TE or AIT, passing through V2, V4, and 
TEO or posterior inferotemporal cortex (PIT). 
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0 Feedback activation in the ventral stream carries information about the 
identity of a selected object (target). 
0 In the retinotopic areas of the ventral stream (V2-PIT), an interaction 
occurs between feedforward activation and feedback activation. On the 
basis of this interaction, information about the location of the target is 
retrieved in the ventral stream. Transmitted to the dorsal stream, this 
information directs spatial attention to the location of the target in the 
object array. 
The Harnker Model of Attention 
0 The Hamker model comprises 4 types of maps: 
Low-level feature maps (in V4) 
High-level feature maps (in IT) 
Perceptual map (in fronto-parietal cortex) 
Premotor map (in premotor cortex) 
0 The high-level feature maps in IT are under strong competition and are 
biased by prefrontal goals for attention 
0 In turn they feedback to the low-level feature maps in V4 gain- 
modulating their response accordingly 
0 Perceptual maps combine the activity across dimensions to determine 
behaviorally relevant locations 
0 Such locations feed a premotor map responsible for action preparation, 
which only encodes the most likely locations under strong competition 
0 Notably, all processing in the Hamker model is completely parallel 
All computational models of attention presented above include a bottom-up 
selection mechanism usually in the form of winner-take-all competition. Some 
include top-down attentional control usually in the form of a high-level stemming 
bias of the bottom-up competition. Thus the site of competition for attentional 
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resources is the same as the site(s) for selection of features, objects and location 
(with the exception of MORSEL which utilises a dissociate attentional map and, 
perhaps, in Hamker's model). Moreover the type of top-down modulation used is 
usually an additive factor to the lateral inhibition that enhances one node against 
the others (again with the exception of MORSEL and Hamker's model that use gain 
modulation). 
In contrast, the CODAM model (Taylor 2000,2001,2002,2003) explicitly 
embodies both 'bottom-up' attentional mechanisms and 'top-down' ones. Bottom- 
up attention in CODAM is guided by the exogenous goals that are rapidly activated 
by the onset of salient stimuli and are then used to bias the attention controller 
(IMC) that modulates responses in the sensory and association areas accordingly. It 
is thus important to note that in CODAM the areas that issue the modulatory 
attentional signals are separate to the areas under attentional control in line with 
recent evidence from experimental neuroscience (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). 
Moreover, the type of modulation applied to the controlled areas is contrast gain 
modulation also in accord with the evidence from literature (Reynolds et al., 1999; Di 
Russo et al., 2001; Carrasco et al., 2004). Top-down attention is guided by the 
endogenous goals that provide a constant reference signal for the movement of 
attention representing the task demands. This signal is used to ensure that sufficient 
attentional resources are being allocated to the correct components of the sensory 
input and can only be turned off when the representations of those components are 
strong enough to be properly maintained in the working memory circuits. This 
supervising operation is mediated by the monitor which allows for fast correction of 
misdirected attentional control signals. Finally, CODAM introduces a novel 
component of attentional control in the form of a corollary discharge of the attention 
movement signal. This corollary discharge plays a double role in CODAM, one 
being to preactivate the representation of a successfully attended object in the 
working memory maintenance circuitry and the other to provide a fast reference 
signal representative of the movement of attention signal issued by the attention 
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controller (IMC). The latter can be used as an indication of what has actually been 
achieved by the attention controller and can be compared in the monitor to what 
should have been achieved (expressed by the endogenous goals). The monitor can 
then, as mentioned above, compensate for any discrepancy between the actual and 
the desired attention movement. These novel features of CODAM will be further 
elucidated through their use in the modelling of the attentional blink paradigm in 
the following chapter where it will also be shown how they allow for complex 
characteristics of the attentional system to be explained. 
2.5 Control of motor responses through 
attention 
2.5.1 A separate control system for motor attention 
Everyday life experience indicates that under circumstances of intending to perform 
some motor action either prompted by external instructions or by internal volition, 
our mind prepares for it in advance of its execution. For instance, when having 
stopped the car at a red light we await the green light to come on, our mind 
prepares the appropriate action, i. e. accelerating the car by pressing on the gas 
pedal. When the yellow light comes on, our mind attends to the coordination of the 
limbs required to accelerate the car and executes this plan only at the onset of the 
green light. This attention to an intended motor action is termed motor attention. 
It has been suggested by Rushworth and colleagues (Rushworth et al., 2001) that 
a distinct mechanism of motor attention exists localized in the anterior parietal 
cortex. This mechanism should, possibly, involve premotor areas that control limb 
movements, and parietal areas, such as the supramarginal gyrus (SMG), where 
effector-centered, rather than head-centered, visuospatial representations can form. 
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Most of the experiments exploring visual attention seem to converge to a 
concordant pattern of activity in brain areas that include predominantly the 
posterior parietal cortex around the intraparietal sulcus and prefrontal areas such as 
the frontal eye fields (Nobre, 2001). Moreover, a right hemisphere bias has been 
reported in the case of spatial orienting tasks (Nobre et al., 1997; Corbetta, 1998). 
On the other hand, Rushworth and colleagues found motor attention related 
activity not only to be localized anterior to the area concerned with orienting, but, 
also, lateralised to the left hemisphere. They concluded this by comparing the 
results of the use of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to interfere 
with subjects' right or left hemisphere. 
It is, admittedly, difficult to distinguish the concept attention from that of 
intention, both in semantics and in neurophysiological terms. There is, in fact, a 
chicken-and-egg relationship between them in the sense that it could be that 
intentions guide attention or the other way round. 
Andersen & Buneo (2002), who define intention as an early plan of a movement, 
reported the existence of intention-specific neurons in the lateral intraparietal (LIP) 
area and in an area they refer to as the parietal reach region (PRR), which appear to 
encode these plans of movements. This result came from experiments specially 
designed to separate spatial attentional effects from those of intention (Snyder et al., 
1997). 
2.5.2 A general model of motor attention 
2.5.2.1 Introduction 
After the presentation of the theoretical background for the control model, we turn 
to describe the model itself as it was originally proposed by Prof. J. G. Taylor in 
personal communication. This model is, subsequently, used to run the simulations 
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of the motor response paradigms chosen for testing it. We must note that these 
paradigms were chosen for their simplicity and explicitness, so as to illustrate the 
appropriateness of the control-theoretic approach to motor learning under 
attentional control, without, at least in this first effort, engaging in very complex 
structures. Thus, the model we present here can be regarded as a reduction of a 
general model that, we propose, could account for intricate motor tasks equally 
well, with the addition/modification of the modules comprising it. This is discussed 
in the section about future work. 
The following figure shows the overall architecture of our model as it is used in 
the simulations that are presented in following sections. 
i 
VISUAL ATTENTION 
GOALS P. imc o OBJECTS 
MOTOR CONTROL 
IMC 10 PLANT 
Figure 2.3. The visuomotor control model. 
INPUF 
The input activates the visual attention goals as well as the object map. Activity in the object 
map is modulated by the visual attention controller (IMC) so that the activity representing 
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the desired visual object is selectively enhanced. The selected visual object is combined with 
the appropriate motor response in the motor attention controller (IMC) according to the 
motor response rules coded in the motor attention goals. The visuomotor combination is then 
passed on to the motor control IMC that issues the motor command on the motor plant. Any 
erroneous response is registered in the monitor that compares the visual input to the motor 
output. The monitor then issues a correcting signal that regulates learning in the motor 
attention IMC. 
As shown in this diagram, we assume that in the pathway of the visual input- 
to-motor response there are three stages of processing. These are: 
a. visual/sensory attention deciding where/what to attend to, 
b. motor attention specifying where/what to act on and 
c. motor control implementing the motor action. 
The modules comprising each processing stage will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
2.5.2.2 The Visual Attention modules 
The visual attention modules used for the model of Fig. 2.3 are the plant, the IMC 
and the goals. The function of these models as well as their siting in the brain was 
discussed in section 2.4.2. 
2.5.2.3 The Motor Attention modules 
0 The inverse model controller (IMC) module: This module receives the 
object data selected and amplified in the visual attention processing stage 
and combines it with the motor response, in order to guide the motor 
control IMC. It is biased by the goals module and monitored by the 
monitor module so as to learn the appropriate visuomotor responses. It is 
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sited in the left posterior parietal cortex (PPC), possibly in the anterior 
inferior parietal lobule in the supermarginal gyrus (SMG) and/or adjacent 
anterior intraparietal sulcus (AIP), where neurons responsive to the sight of 
3D objects have been found (Sakata et al., 1999). 
The goals module: This module contains the proper visuomotor 
combinations according to the rules of the task and is used to bias their 
learning within the IMC. It is likely sited in the ventral premotor cortex 
(PMv) that contains neurons tuned to particular types of hand movements 
(di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Luppino et al., 1999; Rizzolatti et al., 1988). 
The monitor module: This module checks for errors by comparing the 
motor output with the visual input, and then sends a training signal to the 
IMC which increases the learning when the error rate rises and decreases 
the learning when the error rate falls. It is sited, possibly, in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) involved in conflict-monitoring (Botvinick et al., 
2001; also in Posner & Petersen, 1990). 
2.5.2.4 The Motor Control modules 
" The inverse model controller (IMC) module: This module is driven by the 
motor attention IMC via control signals that correspond to the motor 
response selected in the motor attention processing stage, which it 
translates into a motor command that controls the motor plant. It is sited in 
the cerebellum. 
" The plant module: This module is the controlled object of the motor system 
and it is sited in the motor cortex or within the corticospinal system. 
We must note here that the motor control system of our model appears over- 
reduced compared to the motor control models discussed in section 2.3.2. However, 
it is the nature of the motor response tasks that we have chosen that allows us this 
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oversimplification. This will become clear from the description of the tasks and their 
simulations that follow. 
2.5.3 Simulating specific motor attention tasks 
We will describe here simulations of two psychological paradigms using the 
visuomotor control model of Fig. 2.3 that were carried out for my MSc Thesis and 
were subsequently presented at IJCNN 2003 (Taylor and Fragopanagos, 2003). In 
the first paradigm (Schluter et al., 2001), subjects where asked to view objects 
(different shapes in sets of four) appearing on a screen and respond according to 
two different response tasks: in the choice reaction time task subjects were asked to 
respond with the first finger if presented with one of two shapes, and with the 
second finger if presented with one of two other shapes whereas in the simple 
reaction time task they were asked to respond with the same finger regardless of the 
stimulus presented. One shape was presented on each trial and the interval between 
trials was 3.75s for both response tasks. The main behavioural finding of this 
paradigm which we tried to explain by means of the visuornotor control model of 
Fig. 2.3 was a significant difference in reaction time between the choice reaction time 
task (-570 msecs) and the simple reaction time task (-210 msecs). 
For the modelling of the choice reaction time task we used all the components 
of the model of Fig. 2.3, that is, the visual attention and motor attention components 
as well as the motor control components. Visual attention, we presume, is needed in 
this task to achieve efficient visual object classification and so is motor attention to 
efficiently combine the classified visual objects with the correct motor responses 
which will ultimately be transformed into motor commands in the motor control 
subsystem. We included learning of the correct visuomotor combinations in the 
motor attention subsystem based on the response error registered in the monitor. 
This learning mechanism allows for improvement of performance with repetition of 
the task. The specific architecture used for modelling this task is shown in Fig. 2.4 
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and briefly described in the caption. Further details of this model can be found in 
the Appendix. 
1234 
Figure 2.4. The visuomotor control model used for the simulation of the choice 
reaction time task of the Schluter et al., 2001 paradigm. 
White-filled circles codefor visual objects, grey-filled circles codefor visuomotor 
combinations and black-filled circles codefor motor commands. Also black lines denote 
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excitatory connections whereas light grey lines denote inhibitory connections. In the task, 
thefour possible visual objects need to be classified into two response classes, one that 
requires a response with thefirstfinger and one that requires response with the second 
finger. In this simulation input objects I and 3 require response withfinger I and objects 2 
and 4 require response with finger 2. The visual attention subsystem facilitates the object 
classification by modulating the responses in the visual object map according to the two 
classes that are encoded in the visual attention goals. There is strong lateral inhibition 
between the visual attention IMC nodes as well as the visual object nodes (in pair wise 
fashion). The motor attention subsystem combines the classified objects with the correct 
motor response supported by the spontaneous biasing activity of the motor attention goals 
that encode the correct visuomotor combinationsfor the task. The visuomotor combination 
signalfrom the motor attention IMC is transformed into a motor command in the motor 
control subsystem that controlsfinger movement. In the event of an erroneous response 
(mismatch of visual object class andfinger response) an error signal is generated by the 
monitor that increases the weights in the motor attention IMC that codefor the correct 
visuomotor combinations and reduces the weights that codefor the incorrect ones. 
For the modelling of the simple reaction time task we omitted all the visual and 
motor components of Fig. 2.3 as no visual object classification or visuomotor 
combination is required for this task. Therefore our model for this task includes only 
the input and the motor control subsystem to which all inputs are fed (to one finger 
node only) without any prior discrimination. This bypass of the attentional 
subsystems resulted in significantly reduced reaction times compared to those of the 
choice reaction time task. These simulated reaction times are listed in table 2.1 
against the experimentally observed reaction times from Schluter et al. (2001). We 
were thus able to explain the experimentally reported difference in the reaction time 
between the choice reaction time task and the simple reaction time task as the extra 
time required for the complex visual classification task (requiring visual attention) 
as well as for the execution of the visuomotor combination (requiring motor 
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attention). Furthermore, we showed how learning of the correct visuornotor 
combination in the motor attention subsystem driven by an error signal generated 
by the monitor can result in the improvement of performance in the choice reaction 
time task (see Fig. 2.14 and Fig. 2.15 in the Appendix). 
Table 2.1. Results from the simulations of Schluter et al. 
choice RT task simple RT task 
simulation results 544 ± 51 ms 265 ±2 ms 
l hl S 
right hand 573 ± 26 ms 211 ± 9.81 ms 
. c uter et a left hand 572 ± 24.4 ms 210 ± 8.04 ms 
In order to further test our visuomotor control model of Fig. 2.3 we examined 
whether performance deficits caused by various brain lesions could be simulated 
through our model by means of suitable degradation of components with functional 
correspondence to the lesioned areas. We thus turned to reproduce the behavioural 
results of the study of Rushworth et al. (2001) that tested the performance of right 
hemisphere patients and left hemisphere patients against normal subjects on a 
motor extension of the Posner paradigm. In this paradigm, a cue is given to prepare 
the subject to make a cue-dependent motor action, but the cue itself may be valid or 
invalid, i. e. appearing at the same location as the target or not. When a valid cue 
precedes the target there is a speed-up of the motor response to the target whereas 
when an invalid cue precedes the target there is retardation of the response. In the 
Rushworth et al. (2001) paradigm subjects were seated in front of a colour monitor 
and asked to fixate a small white cross in the centre of the screen. At equal distances 
below and above the centre appeared the cues which were two hexagons each with 
a fairly thick white border that served as precue appearing some time before them. 
The time between the presentation of the precue and the presentation of the cue, 
referred to as the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), was a random mixture of 0.4 
and 0.85 sec intervals. The border of the hexagons turning red was the precue that 
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prepared subjects for the onset of the cue which was the hexagon turning green. In 
80% of the trials the precue was valid, i. e. the hexagon whose border had turned red 
as a precue turned green to indicate the cue, and in 20% of the trials the precue was 
invalid, i. e. the cue appeared in the opposite position to the precue. While subjects 
were instructed not to move until the presentation of the cue, once the later 
appeared they were to respond with the index finger to cues in the upper position 
and with the middle finger to cues in the lower position. 
For this paradigm, we used an architecture very similar to the one used for the 
simulation of the Schluter et al. (1997) paradigm described above, the details of 
which can be found in the Appendix. So we again employed the visual attention 
subsystem to delineate whether the cue appeared at the top or the bottom position 
and the motor attention subsystem to combine the selected visual object with the 
appropriate motor (finger) response. The latter visuomotor combination was 
eventually transformed into a motor (finger) command in the motor control 
subsystem that controls finger movement. As mentioned above, the objective of this 
simulation was to confirm that the functional assignment and localisation of the 
various components of our visuomotor control model can be justified. Based on 
evidence discussed in previous sections of a differential lateralisation of the visual 
attention network and the motor attention network, the former to the right 
hemisphere and the latter to the right, we simulated lesions in the right hemisphere 
by degradation of the visual attention controller (IMC) and lesions in the left 
hemisphere by degradation of the motor attention controller (IMC). We thus 
managed to obtain a reasonably good approximation of the experimentally 
observed reaction times shown in Fig. 2.5b for valid and invalid precues at different 
SOAs as well as for the different groups of subjects (right hemisphere patients/left 
hemisphere patients/controls). The simulated reaction times are shown in Fig. 2.5a. 
We can see from the reaction time results of Rushworth et al. (2001) illustrated in 
Fig. 2.5b the expected retardating effect of cue invalidity which we consistently 
reproduced across subject groups in our simulation. More importantly though, we 
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can observe an effect of lesion lateralisation on the reaction times with left 
hemisphere patients showing significantly slower responses than the right 
hemisphere patients especially for the invalid cue cases. This increased performance 
deficit demonstrated by the left hemisphere patients is to be expected given the 
crucial role of the motor attention subsystem (localised in the left hemisphere) in 
coordinating motor response by combining the visual object selected in the visual 
attention subsystem with the appropriate motor response. Moreover, according to 
our model, learning also takes place in the motor attention subsystem by means of a 
feedback of an error signal from the monitor. Thus, the detrimental effect of 
lesioning the motor attention IMC of our model in the simulated reaction times 
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Figure 2.5. Group mean reaction times in the Rushworth et al. paradigm (A: 
simulated; B: from Rushworth et al. (1997)) 
In the horizontal axis thefour cueing conditions are denoted by the compound of the SOA 
(in secs) and either V standingfor valid or INV standingfor invalid. The vertical axis 
measures reaction time (in msecs for (a) and secs for (b)). The response retardation effect of 
cue invalidity can be clearly seen in the two charts. Also notable is the increased deficit of left 
hemisphere patients across all cueing conditions. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
tsion ............................. I ......................... 
We have considered the function of attention with a focus on the underlying neural 
mechanisms that carry it out. We have particularly concentrated on recent evidence 
supporting the dissociation of the brain areas that exert attentional control from the 
brain areas under attentional control. Inspired by this view of attention as a control 
system we have turned to a theoretical framework developed specifically for the 
description and analysis of control systems, namely engineering control theory. We 
discussed the successful application of engineering control theory in human motor 
control which motivated us further to develop a control theoretic model for 
attention by analogy. After presenting the generic architecture of the control model 
of attention (CODAM) and its basic components we briefly reviewed a successful 
application of the model in the classic Posner benefit paradigm. We then reviewed 
other existing computational models of attention and noted their limitations as well 
as the advantages of CODAM. We then turned to discuss a recent series of 
experimental evidence supporting the existence of a dissociable network for motor 
attention which is found to be lateralised to the left hemisphere. We extended 
CODAM to include a motor attention system analogous to the sensory attention 
system as well as a rudimentary motor control system. We thus achieved the 
construction of a sensorimotor model which goes beyond the low-level motor 
control models in that it allows for attention to play its crucial role in modulating 
motor responses to sensory stimuli. We successfully applied our sensorimotor 
model to simulate and explain the behavioural results of two sensorimotor 
paradigms one of which would correspond to a motor variation of the Posner 
benefit paradigm. However, our sensorimotor model thus far employs only ballistic 
attention control. In future work we intend to extend the sensorimotor model to 
include CODAM-like motor attention control, i. e. to include motor sensory buffer 
(motor working memory) as well as corollary discharge and monitor components. 
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2.7 Appendix 
.................. - ....................... .I.............. ............... 
2.7.1 Computational basics of the Simulink Single Neuron 
Each module in this design consists of nodes, each of which is a leaky integrate-and- 
fire neuron modelled as a single-compartment with RC circuit characteristics. Its 
membrane potential equation is: 
dV(t) 
= -V(t) +p Input(t) dt 
where: 
Input is the current injected into the neuron by the visual stimulus (where 
applicable) and by the weighted sum of the outputs of the neurons connected to it, 
T (= RC) is the membrane relaxation time with R being the membrane resistance 
and C the membrane capacitance, and 
Q is a constant that regulates the fixed voltage to current ratio 
The continuous time dynamic equation for the neuron can be expressed in 
SIMULINK as a transfer function with the use of the Transfer Function block, which 
accepts Input(t) as input and outputs V(t). 
Substituting sV for dVIdt in the equation above (so going to Laplace transform 
space): 
,rs V(t) = -V(t) +p Input(t) and solving for V gives: 
V(t) =p Input(t)I(T s+ 1) or: 
V(t)lInput(t) = pl(T s+ 1) 
The Transfer Function block of Fig. 2.6 uses parameters to specify the 
numerator and the denominator coefficients. Here, the numerator is p and the 
denominator, r s+1. 
................... .................... . ............... ........ . ....... . 
con"p", dational modelling o"ath., tit'on a ý' 'I llcorei icat anc, , 1! .. I infl, C'MONOlls 
11i the brom, 65 
Atte. naio. n. I .................... II............ I ........................................................ ..... . ... 
rho 1, 
tau. s+l 
Step Transfer Fen Scope 
Figure 2.6. The Transfer Function block 
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We will demonstrate how this works by feeding our neuron a simple pulse of 
unit amplitude and unit duration (1s) at zero time and observe the dynamics of the 






Figure 2.7. The dynamics of the membrane potential 
However, in our simulation we consider the neurons to be decision units, thus 
their final output will be the positive part of a sigmoidal function of the membrane 





where T is the noise temperature. 
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We can easily model this using standard blocks as shown in the block diagram 
below (Fig. 2.8). 
Figure 2.8. The implementation of the sigmoidal function of the membrane potential 
Combining the Transfer Function block and the Sigmoidal subsystem, as in Fig. 2.9, 
we get the desired output from the neuron which is demonstrated again with a 
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Figure 2.10. The neuron's output when fed with a simple pulse input 
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We are now ready to put together our model neuron implemented as a 
standard input-output subsystem of the overall design and also allowing for 
inhibitory inputs as well as excitatory. Moreover, we have added a small delay that 
represents the time it takes for the input signal travelling in the dendrites to get to 
the neuron"s soma. So, the neuron subsystem block looks as in Fig. 2.11: 
> Excl 
> Inh2 Outl 
neuron 
Figure 2.11. The neuron subsystem block 




Figure 2.12. The neuron subsystem block's internal structure 
2.7.2 Deatails of the Schluter et al. simulation 
I. The model for the choice reaction time task 
The input is fed to the first processing stage, that is, visual attention, which 
comprises three modules: 
0 the Goal module which defines the task of classification of the four 
different inputs to either one of the two sets, 
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0 the Inverse Model Controller (IMC) module which controls the Object 
module via modulation of its input implementing, thus, the classification 
task, and 
0 the Object module, a plant-like module, which receives the visual input 
regulated by the IMC module and processes it feeding the output onto the 
motor attention processing stage. 
We must note that delays have been embedded in the design whenever the 
signals travel between two modules, so as to represent the time it takes for the 
electrical potentials to travel between the corresponding sites in the brain and 
activate the corresponding modules. 
The Goal module consists simply of two neurons with no interconnections and 
whose input is the sum of visual inputs 1 and 3 for the one neuron and visual inputs 
2 and 4 for the other neuron. This way it defines the classification task and drives 
the IMC module with its output. 
The IMC module also comprises two neurons but this time they are laterally 
inhibited so as to act as classifiers and regulate the visual inputs accordingly as they 
enter the Object module. 
The Object module consists of four neurons each receiving input from one of 
the visual input blocks (the pulse generators) modulated by the responsible IMC 
module neuron, i. e. visual inputs 1 and 3 are multiplied by the output of the IMC 
neuron that groups inputs 1 and 3 and visual inputs 2 and 4 are multiplied by the 
output of the IMC neuron that groups inputs 2 and 4. Moreover, there is lateral 
inhibition between the neurons in a pair-wise fashion, i. e. neurons I and 3 inhibit 
neurons 2 and 4 and vice versa in order to facilitate the classification task. 
The outputs of the Object module neurons, now, feed onto the motor attention 
processing stage, which comprises two modules: 
0 the Goal module which encapsulates the motor response rules as dictated 
by the instructions for this task, that is, respond with finger 1 to objects 1 
and 3 and with finger 2 to objects 2 and 4. However, all possible cue - 
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response combinations are included in this module, each represented by a 
singular neuron, to allow for a different set of instructions to be asserted. 
The rules coding neurons in this module are spontaneously active so as to 
provide a fixed but unsystematic bias to the corresponding neurons in the 
IMC module. 
0 the Inverse Model Controller (IMC) module which contains all object - 
response combinations both correct and erroneous ones so as to allow for 
errors to occur -as is natural to happen- and, consequently, for learning of 
the correct response to take place via adaptation of the neuronal weights in 
a process controlled by the Monitor module described below. Apart from 
this learning mechanism the neurons which represent the correct cue - 
response combinations are favourably biased by the corresponding 
neurons in the Goal module, as described above, while erroneous 
combinations are inhibited by them. The outputs of these 8 neurons (8 
object - response combinations) are linearly combined in two groups 
corresponding to fingerl -response and finger2-response and fed onto the 
two neurons of the motor control IMC module, thus, effectively entering 
the final stage of processing in the path, that is the motor control processing 
stage. 
The Goal module consists of 8 neurons representing all possible object - 
response combinations. However, only the neurons that represent correct 
combinations are allowed to fire and they do so randomly via activation by a 
random number generator. 
The IMC module consists of 8 neurons whose weights are randomly initialised 
(to allow for erroneous combinations eliciting an output as well as the correct ones) 
and updated via the dynamic equation: 
dwldt = ±(learning rate) (inpu t)(ou tpu t) 
the sign depending on whether the combination that the neuron represents is 
correct or erroneous as explained above. The learning rate is actually the response 
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error rate calculated in the Monitor module which we will describe at the end as it 
regulates the whole learning process taking various inputs from different processing 
stages. 
The motor attention IMC module neurons' outputs feed onto the motor control 
processing stage, which consists of two modules: 
the Inverse Model Controller (IMC) module which receives instruction 
from the motor attention IMC module as to which finger to respond with 
and enhances the two different finger responses separation via lateral 
inhibition of the corresponding two neurons it contains, and 
0 the Plant which is controlled by the motor control IMC and finally 
designates which finger is used to respond with via the relative magnitude 
of its two neurons outputs. 
The IMC module consists of two laterally inhibited neurons corresponding to 
the two different finger-responses. 
The Plant module comprises two unconnected neurons also corresponding to 
the two different finger-responses. 
Finally, we will describe the Monitor module which monitors the response 
output and relates it to the original input thus determining the error that is then 
used to regulate the learning process in the motor attention Goal module. It achieves 
this by taking the combined outputs of the input objects in their groups (i. e. inputs I 
and 3, inputs 2 and 4) and multiplies them with the corresponding erroneous finger 
responses as they come out of the motor control Plant (i. e. inputs 1 and 3x finger 2, 
inputs 2 and 4x finger 1). Since the inputs are all of unit amplitude this leaves the 
finger responses unaffected in magnitude. Each product is then put through a 
thresholding block that outputs unity when a certain threshold is exceeded and zero 
otherwise. We do this in order to distinguish between a "harmless" activity of the 
erroneous finger response and one that could actually be considered an error. This 
threshold is to be defined as it clearly affects the calculation of the error rate and, 
consequently, the learning process. The two thresholded products (now defining the 
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errors) are added to account for either one of the error possibilities and then passed 
through an integrator to get their cumulative sum. At the same time, an inverse of 
the running time is constructed which is then multiplied with the cumulative sum 
of the errors thus, basically, implementing the ratio of the number of errors over 
time. This is our error rate, which is then directed to the motor attention Goal 
module to act as a learning rate as described above. 
We are now ready to present the overall structure and the connectivity of the 
Schluter et al. model including the motor control processing stage along with the 
preceding motor attention processing stage and the visual attention processing stage 
in the following block diagram: 
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Figure 2.13. The overall Schluter et al. model structure with all three processing 
stages. 
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The small boxes in this diagram labelled 'in" and 'fl" & 'f2' are recorders of the 
inputs and the outputs, respectively, that save the data in the MATLAB 
environment for further off-line processing (e. g. extraction of mean reaction time). 
The error rate as recorded by the monitor module over two (2) sequence 
repetitions is shown in the following scope snapshot: 
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Figure 2.14. The Schluter et al. model's error rate over two (2) sequence repetitions. 
The monitor has detected an error on trials 1,3 and 4 of the first repetition of the 
sequence. On the second repetition, the error on the 3rd trial has been suppressed 
but the rest occur again. However, as learning proceeds less errors occur and the 
error rate decreases as shown in the following scope snapshot: 
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Figure 2.15. The Schluter et al. model's error rate over one hundred (100) sequence 
repetitions. 
Ii. The model for the simple reaction time task 
In the simple reaction time task the visual stimulus was identical to that in the 
choice reaction time task, described above. This time, however, subjects were 
instructed to respond with the same finger, say finger 1, regardless what of the 
stimulus was. Thus, the visual input can be regarded, in this case, as an on-off 
switching signal, causing a finger response without discriminating for the identity 
of the stimulus (i. e. the object identity). Therefore, we assume that the visual input 
bypasses the visual and motor attention processing stages, being driven directly into 
the motor control processing stage, and, in particular, the motor control IMC. In the 
IMC, both finger responses are represented by a node (neuron); the neuron 
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representing finger 2 response, however, is very strongly inhibited by the neuron 
representing finger 1 response, so that only finger 1 response survives the 
competition and guides the motor plant with the appropriate response. This 
operation is illustrated in the following diagram showing the architecture of the 
model for the simple reaction time task. 
TPUT 
Figure 2.16. The Schluter et al. model for the simple reaction time task. 
2.7.3 Details of the Rushworth et al. simulation 
Pulse generators were employed again to simulate these objects, one for each object, 
this time in a more elaborate configuration so as to present a good replica of the 
paradigm's visual input. In particular, random number generators were engaged to 
activate randomly the precue pulse generators (random "top" or "bottom" precues) 
which in turn enabled one of two other random number generators that randomly 
activated either the "'top" cue or the "'bottom" cue but with a strong bias to valid 
precue-cue combinations (about 80%). Moreover, another random number 
generator decided the value of the SOA (0.4 or 0.85 secs) on each trial. 
As in the previous simulation this input is advanced onto the visual attention 
processing stage, which comprises three modules: 
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0 the Goal module which encodes the visual rules of this paradigm, that is to 
correctly assess the position the cue appears aided by the precue that 
precedes it provided the later is valid. In the case of an invalid precue, 
however, the aim is to suppress the precue"s effect and enhance the cue 
related neuronal activity. 
0 the Inverse Model Controller (IMC) module which regulates the input to 
the Object module by endorsing the Goal module"s assessment and 
enforcing it upon the Object module, and 
0 the Object module, which receives only the cues as input and processes 
them supervised by the IMC module feeding the output onto the motor 
attention processing stage 
The Goal module consists of 4 neurons dedicated to each precue and each cue 
coming in from the input. The outputs of the precue neurons is passed on to the 
corresponding cue neurons, i. e. "top" precue neuron to ""top" cue neuron, "'bottom"' 
precue neuron to "bottom, "' cue neuron, so as to pre-activate them before the onset 
of the cues. In the case of a valid precue this proves beneficial in that it reduces the 
time it takes to respond to a cue. On the contrary, in the case of an invalid precue 
the preparation of the cue neuron is maleficent as it is the opposite cue neuron that 
is eventually activated and, thus, the assessment is erratic leading to response 
delays. This response time difference between the valid and the invalid case is 
known as the attention benefit as termed in the Posner paradigm. 
To counteract the activity of the invalid precue in our model we have assigned 
strong inhibition between the cue neurons and the opposite (invalid) precue 
neurons. 
The IMC module comprises two laterally inhibited neurons that amplify the 
choice in cues made by the Goal module and uses this enhanced differentiation 
between the cues to appropriately regulate the visual inputs as they enter the Object 
module. 
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The Object module consists of two neurons each dedicated to one of the two 
cues whose input to the module is modulated by the responsible IMC module 
neuron. Furthermore, the neurons are laterally inhibited in order to augment the 
disparity of the two cues propagated from the Goal module via the IMC module. 
The Object module neurons output onto the motor attention processing stage, 
which comprises two modules: 
0 the Goal module which, as before, maintains a template of the motor 
response rules, in this case being to respond with the index finger (M) to 
the "top" cue and with the middle finger (F2) to the "'bottom"' cue. Again, 
all possible cue - response arrangements are included, to allow for 
alternative task guidelines to be represented. 
0 the Inverse Model Controller (IMC) module which operates in the same 
manner as in the previous simulation, carrying out the learning of the 
correct cue - responses via a process controlled by the Monitor and biased 
by the Goal module. The difference is that it comprises only 4 neurons as 
there are only 4 cue - response combinations whose outputs are linearly 
combined in two groups corresponding to fingerl-response and finger2- 
response and fed onto the two neurons of the motor control IMC module. 
The Goal module comprises 4 neurons representing all possible cue - response 
combinations, while only the ones corresponding to correct cue - responses are 
firing (randomly). 
The IMC module also comprises 4 neurons and its function is the same as in the 
previous simulation. 
The monitor module that sends the training error signal to the motor attention 
IMC module is identical to the one used in simulating Schluter et al., as are the 
modules of the motor control processing stage, i. e. the motor control IMC and the 
motor plant. Therefore, we proceed directly to present the overall architecture for 
this simulation. 
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Figure 2.17. The Rushworth et al. model's overall architecture. 
As mentioned above, the aim for this simulation was to try to account for the 
reaction time differences amongst subjects with lesions in the left parietal cortex and 
subjects with lesions in the right parietal cortex and control subjects. 
Subjects with lesions in the left parietal cortex were simulated via degradation 
of the neurons in the motor attention IMC module, as the left parietal cortex shows 
increased association with motor attention (Rushworth et al., 1997). This was 
achieved by increasing the membrane time constant Tfrom its normal value of 20ms 
to 1s. The reason for doing so is that T, in fact, encapsulates the electrical properties 
of the neuronal membrane (capacitance C, resistance R) which we expect to be 
degraded in subjects with brain lesions, thus, presenting an overall slow-down of 
stimulus response capacity which is, in effect, what we accomplish by increasing T 
to this value. However, due to the form of the membrane potential equation we 
have used, the attack time and the decay time of the membrane potential are bound 
together by theTconstant. Thus, increasing T to a large value, as suggested, has an 
effect on the decay time, as well, giving the neuron working memory properties. 
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This is, of course, not desirable and could be avoided by using a different membrane 
equation that would dissociate the attack time and the decay time, such as: 
T= -V(t) +w (V(t) - Veq ) Input(t) 
Nevertheless, since we acquire the reaction time data by thresholding the 
neuronal activity at its rising, the results from the mean reaction time extraction 
process given below are valid and applicable. 
Subjects with lesions in the right parietal cortex were simulated via degradation 
of the neurons in the visual attention IMC module -achieved as above, as the right 
hemisphere area (in particular) of the posterior parietal cortex appears to be 
involved in covert orienting attention (Rushworth et al., 1997). 
The LH and RH subjects' choice reaction times along with those of the control 
subjects (unaltered t) are shown and discussed in the main text above. 
2.7.4 Values of constants 
Table 2.2. Values of constants for the visuomotor model. 
_Constant 
Description Value Comments 
Voltage-to-current ratio P 5 
constant. 
In the model each neuron 
Membrane relaxation represents an entire population of 
time for neurons in all 20ms neurons 
(possibly thousands). This 
T 
modules expect the goal constant likewise represents the 
modules. average membrane relaxation time 
of this population. 
The goal modules encode 
intentions. The membrane Membrane relaxation 
relaxation time is increased to give a Tg time for neurons in goal 200ms 
working memory attribute to the 
modules. neurons representing these 
intentions. 
Noise temperature of the Tampering with this constant 
T sigmoidal transfer I allows for altering the neuron"s 
function. functional capacity. 
Vthres Voltage threshold of the 0.1 
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_ Delay embedded in the 2ms Explained in main text. 
neuron. 
Delay in signal 
d. transmission between 20ms Explained in main text. 
different modules. 
Delay between the input Such a time is reported in literature di,, and the modules it looms for the processing of visual stimuli. 
connects to. 
Delay between the plant This is the time it takes for a motor in motor cortex or spinal command to reach the effector dout cord and the muscles it looms 
sends the motor 
(muscle) as measured in various 
experiments. command to. 
Inhibition strength for all Chosen as mean of average of g1mc IMC modules. 
0.4 
values; sensitivity discussed in text 
Inhibition strength for 0 2 
Chosen as mean of average of gOBJ 
object module. . values; sensitivity discussed in text 
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Chapter 3 
3 Modelling the attentional blink 
3.1 Experimental paradigm 
The operation of the human visual attention system can be explored in two main 
dimensions: spatial and temporal. The study of the spatial dimension of visual 
attention involves trying to understand how attention is engaged with one target in 
the visual scene then disengaged and re-engaged with another target and so on 
while these targets are presented simultaneously. This movement of attention can 
be made covertly or overtly depending on the visual stimuli's locations and the task 
requirements. Furthermore, the movement of attention is often hindered by the 
interference of distractors in the visual scene, which increase the attentional 
payload. Ample research has been conducted in the spatial dimension of visual 
attention usually by means of visual search paradigms. , 
The temporal dimension of visual attention refers to the allocation, de- 
allocation and reallocation of attentional resources to targets presented sequentially 
in the same spatial location. Typically the temporal dimension of attention is 
investigated through a procedure known as rapid serial visual processing (RSVP). 
The RSVP procedure involves the presentation of successive visual stimuli, one item 
every 100 ms or so, in a fixed location. One target or two targets in the stream have 
to be identified or detected, the former (one target) termed 'single-task' condition 
and the latter (two targets) 'dual-task'. D. E. Broadbent and M. H. P. Broadbent 
(Broadbent and Broadbent, 1987) used a dual-task RSVP procedure to study the 
movement of attention between a target and a probe in time and reported that 
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subjects presented a deficit in identifying the probe when the target-probe temporal 
distance was less than 400 ms. Based on these findings Raymond and colleagues 
(Raymond et al., 1992) introduced a paradigm closely modelled on the Broadbent 
and Broadbent (1987) procedure which they termed the 'attentional blink' (AB). The 
typical AB experiment involves the presentation of 16 to 24 letters at fixation at a 
rate of 11 items per second, so one item per 90 ms. During these 90 ms the letter is 
'on' (screen) for 15 ms and 'off' for 75 ms. In the dual-target condition one target 
embedded in the stream is required to be identified and then a second target is 
required to be detected by the subjects (Fig. 3.1). The first target is distinguished by 
being the only white letter in a stream of otherwise black letters and subjects are 
asked to report its identity which can be any letter of the alphabet except the letter 
X. The second target is always the letter A" and is presented only in 50% of the 
trials while subjects are asked to report its presence or absence in the stream. 
......... ... 
Figure 3.1. Visual stimuli configuration in the typical attentional blink experiment 
(from Shapiro et al., 1997). 
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The temporal distance between the two targets -the so-called stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA)- varies between 90 and 720 ms in 90 ms increments (henceforth 
refer to as 'lags). The most crucial behavioural observable of the AB paradigm is the 
percentage of correct detections of the second target (T2) given the first target's (T1) 
correct identification. This serves as an index of the efficient movement of attention 
from T1 to T2 and the successful completion of both T1 and T2s processing. From 
the early Broadbent and Broadbent (1987) results we know that when the two 
targets are temporally close a deficit occurs in the aforementioned processes. Thus 
by varying the SOA of the two targets one can quantify this dual-target deficit and 
chart attention's refractoriness. Indeed, Raymond and colleagues (Raymond et al., 
1992) reported that while in the single-target condition (T1 ignored) T2s detection 
was nearly perfect and showed no significant dependency on the targets' SOA, in 
the dual-target condition T2's detection dropped gradually from lag 1 to lag 3 and 
rose again gradually from lag 3 to lag 7 when it approached asymptotically the 
single-target levels. Thus a strong targets' SOA effect was evident giving rise to the 
now well-established U-shaped T2's detection curve (Fig. 3.2). The non- 
monotonicity of the TZ's detection line is due to an apparent sparing of T2 from the 
deficit when T2 is presented directly after T1 (lag 1 sparing) an important feature 
which will be discussed further in later sections. 
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Figure 3.2. T2's detection accuracy in the single-target condition (closed symbols) 
and in the dual-target condition conditioned on correct report of T1 (open symbols) 
(from Raymond et al., 1992). 
Since its introduction in 1992 the attentional blink has been the focus of a large 
volume of research with over 100 articles published on the AB itself up to date. The 
original findings (primarily the U-shaped T2's detection curve) have been replicated 
many times with different stimulus types (words, digits, symbols, pictures) and 
targets' spatial locations as well as by timing and procedural variations (number 
and type of inter-target and post-target items (masks), task difficulty and so on). A 
notable variation of the classic AB was conducted by Anderson and Phelps 
(Anderson and Phelps, 2001) who used words as stimuli in the RSVP and more 
importantly aversive words for T2. They used normal subjects as well as amygdala- 
damaged subjects and reported that the emotional charge inserted to T2 helped 
normal subjects escape the AB deficit but not the amygdala-damaged subjects. This 
emotional AB is discussed and modelled in the next chapter. 
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3.2 Modelling the attentional blink 
In our effort to model the attentional blink at the neural level we are guided and at 
the same time restricted by the data produced by the various attentional blink 
experiments as reported in the literature. These data represent both the behavioural 
and the brain imaging results derived from these experiments. Moreover, our model 
should conform to what is generally known in human vision and particularly visual 
attention. Thus we begin the report of our model for the attentional blink by 
reviewing the existent evidence regarding the attentional blink and then proceed to 
show how our model accounts for this evidence and is able to reproduce what is 
recorded experimentally during a typical attentional blink experiment. 
3.2.1 Examining the behavioural evidence 
The main and consistent behavioural finding in any attentional blink experiment is 
the U-shaped curve of the second target's detection accuracy across different lags as 
described in the previous section. We have taken the subjects" ability to detect T2 to 
mean that T2 has broken into awareness. This is in fact the interpretation that most 
psychologists give to the reportability of T2. However the meaning of 'breaking 
into awareness' is somewhat ambiguous so we further take this to mean -this time 
at a neural level- that T2 has built up sufficient activation in its working memory 
site. Sufficient working memory activation allows for the target to be verbally 
reported or a motor response to be guided by it. This is again in accord with the 
subjects' awareness of T2 to TZ's entry in to working memory association suggested 
by the two main neuro-psychological models of the attentional blink that will be 
discussed later in this chapter. So the main thrust of our model is to explore the 
underlying mechanism (or mechanisms) that lead to this differential activation of 
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T2's working memory node with respect to the lag between T2 and T1 with a 
minimum of activation of T2 at lag 3. 
An important feature of T2's detection accuracy curve is -as mentioned earlier- 
the non-monotonicity of it. One would intuitively expect that when T2 is presented 
right after T1 (i. e. at lag 1) the AB deficit would be maximal thus yielding a 
monotonic TZ's detection accuracy curve that would start very low and gradually 
increase with lag increase until T2 is released from the influence of T1. Quite to the 
contrary, AB literature again consistently reports a very small drop of T2's 
reportability at lag 1 which breaks up TZ's detection accuracy curve into a declining 
part (up to lag 3) and rising part after lag 3 until maximal (equivalent to the single- 
target condition) T2's detection accuracy is asymptotically reached (see Fig. 3.2). 
This counterintuitive feature of the attentional blink has been termed "lag 1 sparing'. 
In the psychological dialect lag 1 sparing has been attributed to the existence of an 
'attentional window' defined as the time between the opening and the closing of an 
/attentional gate' that controls objects' flow into further stages of processing. 
According to this concept, when T1 and T2 are very close together (as when they are 
one lag apart) they can both get in through the attentional gate and thereby be 
successfully processed together. While such a justification of 'lag I sparing' is 
theoretically attractive it is not entirely clear how it can be implemented neurally. 
Nevertheless our model addresses 'lag 1 sparing' at the neural level and as will be 
shown later it turns out to be an intrinsic property of the main mechanism we 
suggest the attentional blink effect is based on. 
Another crucial feature of the attentional blink is the reduction or elimination of 
T2's reportability deficit when the item immediately following T1 (henceforth 
referred to as the mask of T1) is replaced by a blank (Fig. 3.3). This was reported in 
the original AB paper by Raymond and colleagues (Raymond et al, 1992: 
Experiments 3 and 4) and confirmed by Chun and Potter (Chun and Potter, 1995: 
Experiment 3). The effect of T1"s mask has been explicitly investigated in several 
other papers (e. g. Seiffert and Di Lollo, 1997) showing that it is a robust feature of 
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the attentional blink as well as being independent of the type of masking used. In 
our model we tackle the effect of masking T1 in the AB by means of a unique 
mechanism that allows us to reproduce reasonably well the alleviating effect of 
removing TI's mask. Furthermore this mechanism provides a plausible neural 
interpretation of what in the psychological dialect is meant by excessive 
consumption of 'attentional resource' by TI due to the difficulty to recognise it 
caused by its mask. In other words, we can demonstrate at a neural level how TI 
can drain the system's 'attentional recourse' leaving little for processing the second 
target thereby laying bare the 'scarceness' of attention. We will explore this 
mechanism in a later section. 











200 400 600 
TI- T2 SOA (ms) 
Figure 3.3. The effect of removing TIs mask is illustrated by the blank symbols 
whereas the filled symbols show the typical (T1 masked) AB in [A] the dual-target 
condition and [B] the single-target condition (from Seiffert and Di Lollo, 1997). 
Apart from the basic features discussed so far, the attentional blink literature 
contains numerous variations of the classic paradigm, as mentioned earlier, using 
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different types and locations of stimuli as well as modified timing and task settings 
with a wealth of accompanying behavioural results from these variations. 
Moreover, a series of cross-modal studies of the attentional blink have been 
conducted using combinations of visual, auditory and tactile stimuli with intriguing 
results as to which of these combinations yield an attentional blink effect. Finally, 
there are studies of attentional blink experiments performed on subjects with 
various brain deficits that only but add to the wealth of variant behavioural AB data 
and can provide significant insight into the neural mechanisms that underlie the 
attentional system under deficient or normal performance of the AB. Such wealth of 
experimental data poses a considerable challenge to our model in terms of testing 
the model's ability to generalise from the basic AB and also it's ability to make 
useful and plausible predictions of AB conditions yet uninvestigated. However such 
explorations through our model are part of work in progress as well as future work 
and will only be reviewed briefly in the relevant section. 
3.2.2 Examining the brain imaging evidence 
Due to the high stimulus frequency in the attentional blink paradigm a demand for 
high temporal resolution is posed on brain imaging in order to disentangle the 
individual brain signatures of the different stimuli. Such high temporal resolution 
can be obtained from EEG and the associated electrical brain signals. These brain 
signals are observed to occur at successively later times after stimulus onset (across 
a range of paradigms). In vision, there is the P1/NI at about 100-200 msecs, the 
P2/N2 at about 180-250 msecs, the P3 at about 350-500 msecs, and the N4 at about 
300-400 msecs (Vogel et al., 1998). The amplitude of each of these signals can be 
manipulated by attention to the source of the input. There are two particular signals, 
the N2/P2 and the P3, which are lost in the blink, although there is still semantic 
level processing, as shown by preservation of the P1/N1 and the N400 signals (Vogel 
et al., 1998). The P3 itself has been suggested to arise from access to working 
.......... ... ....... .... .......... ........... -........ ............ .... . .............. 
mal modcllilný, ofatrcwti I f'mi 'u, the In 1 ant c 'Pullatio on and, onotio I "a I1 89 
41iw, ý the affentionafbhnk Ogg the a0-teritional. blink Nio, .......................................................... .......... ..................................... ................... .......................... ....................... ! ......................... I. .... .... ....... : ........... 
memory by the input signal; such activity thereby being available for report (Vogel 
et al., 1998). The signal of the availability for report of the attention-amplified input 
arriving from earlier sensory cortices to the associated working memory sensory 
buffer site is therefore taken to be the P3 signal at about 350-500 ms post-stimulus. 
Such a time delay is expected to elapse before any attention-amplified signal from 
sensory cortices becomes available to access the working memory sites, and is 
consistent with observed feedback from higher sites of an attention control signal 
successively to V4, V2 and V1 (Mehta et al., 2000a, 2000b). It is also consistent with 
the 300-500ms observed time of the onset of awareness by direct activation of 
somato-sensory cortex in patients with motor defects (Libet, 1964). 
The N2/P2 signal at about 200 ms was proposed (Taylor 2000; 2003) as an 
indication of the corollary discharge of attention movement, this signal being crucial 
for the related input stimulus activity to access its sensory buffer. The N2/P2 signal 
will be shown below to be important in the CODAM model by simulation of the 
temporal flow of activity after presentation of the two targets and the distractors in 
the AB situation. 
3.2.3 CODAM in the attentional blink 
While the general architecture of the CODAM model is portrayed in detail in 
Chapter 2 we here begin the description of the simulations of the attentional blink 
by briefly reviewing the components of the CODAM model as applied to visual 
object detection and recognition. To this end only modules that pertain to visual 
objects (and their corresponding maps) are included while modules related to motor 
commands (or their maps) are left out. Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, only 
high-level visual object maps (such as letter, word or face maps in temporal cortex) 
are employed by the model thereby avoiding entanglement of the simulations in the 
detailed properties of low-level maps such as spatial or feature maps (in early visual 
cortex). We justify the exclusion of low-level visual maps and related processing 
by 
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there being strong evidence supporting the view of the attentional blink as a post- 
perceptual phenomenon thereby suggesting that the low-level mechanisms that lead 
to perception operate unimpeded (Vogel et al., 1998). To further simplify the 
simulations, the visual objects are represented in the various modules by means of 
dedicated nodes that ultimately themselves represent localised ensembles of 
neurons. 
The basic architecture of the resulting simplified version of CODAM is shown 
in Fig. 3.4. 











Figure 3.4. The CODAM model architecture used for modelling the attentional 
blink. 
All visual stimuli are represented in the INPUT module as distinct visual objects following 
all processing that occurs in early visual cortex (not included in the model). Each stimulus 
leaving the INPUT module is sent directly to the OBJECT MAP (early activation) and also 
activates the corresponding node in the EXOGENOUS GOALS module which, in turn, 
biases the controller of attention (IMC). The IMC then operates in a modulatory way (by 
means of multiplication) on the signal comingfrom the INPUT to the OBJECT MAP thus 
giving rise to a later, appropriately amplified, OBJECT MAP activation. The IMC also 
activates the corresponding node of the COROLLARY DISCHARGE module which acts as 
a predictor of the attentional movement about to ensue. This COROLLARY DISCHARGE 
signal is then used to preactivate the WORKING MEMORY buffer in assistance of the 
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signal comingfrom the OBJECT MAP slightly later. While sufficient activation of the 
WORKING MEMORY buffer is being developed (leading to awareness), all irrelevant 
activity in the COROLLARY DISCHARGE is being suppressed to ensure there will be no 
interference with this process. (The different colours of the connections correspond to the 
different processes in the overallflow of activity during the attentional blink -discussed 
below). 
It consists of the following modules: 
1. The primary and associative cortices in a given modality, acting as the 
'plant" in an engineering control approach, modulated by the attention 
control signal. This region is denoted as the object map in Fig. 3.4; 
2. The attention control signal generator, as a separate site compared to the 
modulated region, and sited in parietal cortex (Corbetta and Shulman, 
2002). This is denoted as IMC in Fig. 3.4, where IMC stands for 'inverse 
model controller' in the engineering control approach; 
3. The goals module in Fig. 3.4, sited in prefrontal cortex, and used to bias the 
attention movement control signal generated by the IMC; 
4. The sensory working memory module in Fig. 3.4, sited in parietal cortex, 
and functioning as an estimator of the attended stimulus, or of the 
'attention state" in engineering control terms. Items arriving here are 
available for report by the subject (Baddeley, 1986; Halgren et al., 2002); 
5. The corollary discharge of the attention control signal in Fig. 3.4, is derived 
from a copy of the attention movement control signal, and performs two 
distinct functions. One is to serve as a reference signal of the attention 
movement in progress, available for comparison in the monitor to the 
desired attention movement (coded in the goals) so that fast error 
correction can be performed when discrepancies are detected. The other 
function of the corollary discharge is to give an early 'wake-up call' to the 
working memory site to help speed up its processing of the incoming 
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attended stimulus. The corollary discharge does not know about lower 
feature activations of the object representations, so pre-activation of 
working memory by the corollary discharge signal will not cause object 
report. The corollary discharge signal functions as a predictor of the 
attended stimulus, or in engineering control terms as a predictor of the 
'attended state' just mentioned in (4)). This corollary discharge signal in the 
CODAM model is assumed to be held on another working memory buffer 
site, separate from that for the attended sensory input, so as to be available 
for rapid error correction before being replaced by the more correct 
working memory signal of the attended object (the latter process not used 
in our simulation of the CODAM model). 
6. The monitor site in Fig. 3.4, sited in cingulated cortex, and used to generate 
an error signal computed by subtracting from the goal signal the value of 
the predicted attended object signal arriving from the corollary discharge 
buffer. We could also use the later attended state estimate from the 
working memory buffer, when that has been amplified by the attention 
feedback signal, as noted above. We expect the later signal to be used in 
learning corrections to the attention control system, but we did not use it 
for speed-up of access to the working memory buffer or for boosting the 
attention movement generator signal since we felt the signal to be too late 
to be effective. 
The IMC of Fig. 3.4 is the site in the CODAM model where visual objects 
compete for attention according to the behavioural requirements coded in the 
prefrontal goals; the resolution of this competition consequently gives rise to the 
appropriate attention movement signal most crucial for the achievement of attention 
feedback control over the sensory information coding sites. The nature of this 
attention feedback control is discussed next. 
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3.2.4 The nature of attention feedback control 
Attention feedback control in the CODAM model is applied by means of contrast 
gain modulation of the sensory sites. The contrast gain effect of attention is reported 
in numerous experiments (Reynolds et al., 1999; Di Russo et al., 2001; Carrasco et al., 
2004) and is implemented in our model by means of explicitly amplifying (by 
multiplication) the relevant attended inputs to a given neuron while leaving the 
other inputs unchanged. Other models of attention (e. g. Deco and Rolls, 2004) use 
additive feedback bias to apply attention feedback control. According to this 
method a bias term (of prefrontal origin) is added to the neurons that code for the 
particular attended stimulus in the object map. Such neurons could presumably be 
coding for many other unattended or competing stimuli that would also partly 
benefit from the additive bias. In other words, while contrast gain feedback 
modulates the connection between the attended inputs and their corresponding 
object map nodes and that alone additive feedback bias modulates the 
responsiveness of the actual neurons in the object maps which receive input from 
attended and possibly unattended or competing stimuli. Therefore the latter method 
results in lower input specificity than the former. The exact formula of the contrast 
gain feedback can be found in the Appendix. 
3.2.5 The Single neuron and Its Coding 
The simplest possible neural network model of the movement of attention, 
consistent both with the CODAM model and the attentional blink paradigm, was 
constructed using a set of dedicated neurons in each module to represent the stimuli 
in the attentional blink paradigm, as mentioned above. The neurons are graded 
neurons with a sigmoid response function and no internal structure, their equations 
being described in the Appendix. These single neurons are used to approximate 
responses of subsets of cortical neurons locally coded to represent separate object 
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stimuli. We do not use spiking neurons since mean spiking rates may be enough to 
capture the main responses of the appropriate cortical neuron subsets represented 
by the dedicated nodes. Nor do we use ensemble coding for the objects, since we 
suspect that a self-organising map-based learning approach will lead to roughly 
similar results as we obtain by use of dedicated nodes. However that has to be 
tested by further simulation in which the objects are themselves learnt. Such further 
testing requires learning prefrontal goal representations and the associated requisite 
attention feedback to the object nodes associated to the goal representations. 
Presently no-one has achieved this. 
3.2.6 Activity flow in CODAM during the attentional blink 
Before proceeding to explain the flow of neural activity via the feed-forward and 
feedback connections in the architecture of Fig. 3.4 during the attentional blink we 
must note that we have made a crucial division of the goal module in Fig. 3.4 into 
two distinct sections, an endogenous one and an exogenous one (Corbetta and 
Shulman, 2002). The endogenous section of the goals module is coding for the task 
rules which in the dual-target condition would be to identify the first target and 
then detect the second one while ignoring any distractors. The exogenous section of 
the goals module promptly signals the arrival of any new stimulus, including the 
distractors, from the posterior visual cortex (as shown recently by Foxe et al., (2003)). 
The latter is used for the guidance of attention by means of biasing (favourably for 
the targets that match the endogenous goals) the competition in the IMC thereby 
appropriately directing the attention movement signal. 
With this division of the goal module in Fig. 3.4, we can break down the overall 
flow of activity in the CODAM architecture of Fig. 3.4 into the following processes 
as indicated by the colours of the connections in Fig. 3.4: 
1. Input stimulus is mapped to object map - Green Route (feed-forward): 
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Input-to-object map - Upon presentation of the input stimulus from the RSVP 
activity flows through visual cortices (not included in the model -see 
above) ending up in the dedicated node in the object map. Time delays are 
used to emulate processing time as specified in the Appendix. 
2. Attention is directed to input stimulus - Red Route (feedback): 
Input-to-exogenous goals module-to-attention control signal genera tor- to-con tras t 
gain modulation of input to object map connection - The input stimulus 
activates its corresponding node in the exogenous goals module which then 
additively biases the attention control signal generator. The attention 
control signal generator in turn acts by multiplication on the input arriving 
at the dedicated object map node. 
3. Monitor detects error and corrects (targets only) - Blue Route: 
Attention control signal genera tor- to-corollary discharge buffer- to-monitor- to- 
attention control signal generator - The corollary discharge buffer carries a 
copy of the attention control signal and can thus reflect the deteriorating 
effect of stimuli competition on the targets in the attention control signal 
generator. The difference between the desired attentional level (coded in 
the endogenously-held goal) and the early estimate of what is actually 
being achieved (stored on the corollary discharge buffer) defines the error 
which triggers the monitor to compensate for it. The monitor compensates 
by adding extra excitation on the impaired attention control signal 
generator target node while inhibiting further all other competing nodes. 
4. Working memory preactivation by the corollary discharge buffer - Brown 
Route: 
Corollary discharge buffer-to-working memory - The corollary discharge sends 
a 'wake-up' call to the relevant node in the sensory working memory, 
preparing it for the content due to arrive from the object map. 
5. Working memory activation by the object map - Yellow Route: 
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Object map-to-working memory - Activation on the working memory is 
thereby achieved, with no output report is available until a suitable 
threshold is reached for the activation, as specified in the appendix. 
6. Working memory protection from conflicting objects entry - Purple Route: 
Working memory- to-corollary discharge buffer - Once an object enters the 
working memory to gain awareness it automatically turns off (by means of 
inhibition) all the other nodes in the corollary discharge buffer that code for 
other objects also trying to breakthrough to awareness. This mechanism is 
important especially for the protection of the targets from the distractors. 
7. Endogenous goal achieved and turned off - Route: 
Working memory-to-endogenous goal - Once a target has built sufficient 
activation in the working memory it sends a signal back to its endogenous 
goal to turn it off signifying the goal's successful attainment. If the target is 
the first one then this allows for the second target's endogenous goal to be 
uploaded and executed. 
The mathematical formulation of the above processes is contained in the 
dynamic equations in the Appendix. For the attentional blink paradigm, each of the 
modules: object map, attention control signal generator, corollary discharge buffer, 
working memory and exogenous goal modules have the same dedicated coding for 
the set of input stimuli (one node per stimulus), while the endogenous goal module 
and the monitor has only dedicated nodes for the first and second target stimuli 
(those being the only ones for which endogenous goals were set up by the 
experimental paradigm). Fig. 3.5 is similar to Fig. 3.4 with the additional feature of 
the constituent nodes of each module being shown as well as individual node 
connections having been drawn for a representative node (for visual clarity). 
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Figure 3.5. The CODAM model architecture used for modelling the attentional 
blink. 
Open circles denote targets and closed circles denote distractors1masks. Also black lines 
denote excitatory connections while grey lines denote inhibitory connections. Connections 
are shown for one node only across all the modules for visual clarity. All other nodes follow 
the same connectivity patterns. 
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3.2.7 Mechanisms for the creation of the attentional blink 
We propose that there are two main mechanisms for the creation of the AB in 
CODAM: 
1. By means of inhibition of all activity on the corollary discharge buffer sites 
(including that of the first and the second targets) from the sensory 
working memory activity of the first target. This inhibition is used in order 
to allow the corollary discharge to be available as soon as possible, after 
working memory access has been attained by a particular stimulus, for 
support to be given to any further stimulus deemed to be salient due to 
various factors (intensity, relation to ongoing goals, emotional valence, to 
name but a few) and now needing to be speeded in its access to report. 
Such a mechanism has no direct physiological support, but enables rapid 
and efficient response to be made to a rapid sequence of inputs, as occurs in 
the attentional blink. 
2. By the monitor signal sending excitation to the relevant attention control 
signal generator module node representing the most active (so current) 
endogenous goal, with inhibition to all other nodes on the attention signal 
generator. This mechanism helps ensure achievement of endogenous goals. 
Chronometric analysis of the ERPs occurring during the attentional blink 
especially supports the former of these mechanisms. In order for the now classic U- 
shaped second target identification curve to have a minimum at around 300ms 
presentation after the first target, as is reported in many attentional blink 
experiments, it is required that an early attention processing component of the 
second target be inhibited by a late component of the first target, namely the P3 of 
the first target (Fell et al., 2002). We show in Fig. 3.6 the structure of the time course 
of the N1/P1, N2/P2, N400 and P3 components of the first target, and also those of 
second target when the latter is presented at the different lags 1,2,3,4. 
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Figure 3.6. Chronometrical analysis of the ERPs occurring during the AB. 
The top graph indicates the times that the ERPs of T1 occur and the rest of the graphs show 
the samefor T2 for thefirst 4 lags. The arrows represent inhibition brought about by the 
working memory activity (P3) of T1. It can be clearly seen that the peak of the P3 of TI (and 
hence the maximum of the inhibition it produces) coincides with the time that the N21P2 
ERPs of T2 occurfor lag 3. According to the CODAM model the N21P2 ERPs partly reflect 
the corollary discharge signal. Some inhibition can affect the N21P2 of T2 for lag 2 and 4 but 
notfor lag 1 (lag 1 sparing). This differential amount of inhibition on the corollary discharge 
signal across the lags we claim gives rise to the U-shaped AB curve. 
Assuming that the P3 of the first target indicates the processing of the first 
target has occurred to the level of report, following the results of (Vogel et al., 1998), 
what are the sites that could thereby be inhibited to prevent detection of the second 
target? Of the candidate early components for the second target, we have eliminated 
the goals and the site of attention control signal generation, since these modules, on 
being inhibited by the P3 of the first target, would result in reduced object map 
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activation for the second target, which is not seen to any large degree in the 
experiments (Vogel et al., 1998). 
We therefore propose that it is the corollary discharge of the second target, as 
exemplified by its N2/P2 activations, which is damaged by the successful entry of 
the first target into its working memory buffer (i. e. to enable report). This will have 
a protective prevention of any other stimulus getting through onto the sensory 
buffer after a sufficient level of activity for the first target report has been reached. 
However such an inhibitory mechanism is not sufficient to explain the effect on 
the attentional blink of the presence or absence of the first mask. It is well 
established that masking of the first target is necessary to bring about the attentional 
blink. With no mask immediately after the first target, the attentional blink reduces 
or disappears (Brehaut et al., 1999). 
The two main mechanisms we are considering for the attentional blink 
mentioned above - of inhibition from the first target on its buffer, and amplification 
of the signal to attend by error in achieving the endogenous goal - each play 
somewhat complimentary roles. The first of these gives the overall U-shaped curve 
of second target detection accuracy against second target lag time, as noted above. 
The second mechanism, of feedback error boosting of the processing of the first 
target to threshold for report, helps to sculpt more precisely this curve by deepening 
or raising its lowest point, as well as providing a mechanism for supporting the 
processing of the first target in the presence of distractors. We will explain the 
relevance of these two inhibitory mechanisms more fully by means of simulations in 
the Results section. 
The second mask (the distractor immediately following the second target) plays 
an independent role as compared to the first mask, as noted in (Brehaut et al., 1999: 
p. 1444). The second mask makes the recognition of the second target more difficult, 
as suggested by (Brehaut et al., 1999), substituting the mask stimulus for the second 
target itself (in the case of interruption masking). We do not address the nature of 
the effect of the second mask here. 
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Inhibitory connections strengths and neuron time constants (see the table of 
parameters in the Appendix) were set at values of order one; with the inhibitions 
able to support the processes (1) and (2) noted above as the basis of our simulation 
of the attentional blink. The time delays in the CODAM model were then chosen to 
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Figure 3.7. Single stimulus response for the first stimulus in the RSVP sequence. 
We note that the activations shown in thisfigure peak at around the time of the 
corresponding ERPs although the activations are simplified compared to the real brain. Part 
of the timing in thefigure is determined by the time delays inserted in the architecture offig. 
2, as well as by the intrinsic growth effectfrom the neurons themselves. Also note the highly 
suppressive effect of thefollowing RSVP stimuli due to lateral inhibition in the IMC and a 
similar but lesser effect in the OBJECT MAP. Finally note that as WM activation peaks its 
Corollary Discharge is turned off. 
102 
fle aftk-mtional blirik 'he affentio-na 'W ýqk .................. ................................................................. I .................................... I .......... ............................. -Modell 
'i 
..................................... .......... ....................................... I .................... 
We plot in Fig. 3.7 the value of the membrane potential of the relevant neuron 
in CODAM against the time after a single stimulus (in this case the first target) was 
presented to the CODAM model. We related the peak neuron activity values in the 
various modules of Fig. 3.4 to the related ERPS as follows: Goal site activity to 
N1/P1; attention control signal generator (IMC) activity to N2/P2; object map 
activity to N400; sensory working memory activity to P3; corollary discharge buffer 
activity to N2/P2. Such relations are more justified in those modules for which there 
is only a dedicated node active (such as the object, attention control signal 
generator, and goal modules), but are also roughly justified for modules (such as the 
sensory working memory buffer) for which a subtraction to form the P3 is taken 
over events with novel object versus activity arising from more common ones (so 
expected to leave only activity from the dominant node). The modules displayed in 
Fig. 3.7 are specifically: the exogenous goal map (related to the N1/P1 results of 
(Vogel et al., 1998)), the attention control signal generator (related to the similar 
N2/P2 results), the corollary discharge buffer (for N2/P2), the sensory working 
memory buffer (for P3), and the object map (for N400). With the time delays chosen 
as in the table in the appendix, the relevant peak neural activities in Fig. 3.7 appear 
at the times roughly observed in the ERPs in (Vogel et al., 1998). We do not attempt 
to include the differences of polarity (P versus N) that arises from different 
orientations of cortical sites in the skull, or for other reasons. However there is 
expected to be some relation between the simulated "local field potentials", which 
we show in Fig 3.7, and the ERPs (and as well the fMRI BOLD signals observed in 
the AB, after suitable temporal convolution) that would arise if our CODAM model 
were simulated as part of a real brain environment (including intracranial fluid, etc) 
(Logothetis et al., 2001). The similarity of the results of Fig. 3.7 and those of (Vogel et 
al., 1998) supports our time delay parameter choices. 
Finally we perform the simulations in Simulink. 
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3.3 Results from the simulations 
3.3.1 Basic results 
Stimuli were presented sequentially to each of the appropriate neurons in the object 
and exogenous goal modules of the CODAM model of Fig. 3.4, according to the 
attentional blink paradigm, in other words as a rapid stream of activations, with 90 
msecs between each stimulus onset, the stimuli only being on for 30 msecs each (for 
details see appendix). The first and second targets were chosen as any two of the 
stimulus stream, as represented by the dedicated nodes in the object map of Fig. 3.4. 
After presentation of the second target, the inhibition from activity generated 
by the first target, on its sensory working memory site, to the activation of the 
attention movement control signal generator node for the second target, causes 
reduced activities related to the second target-there, and thence reduced activities 
for the second target on the corollary discharge buffer and on the sensory working 
memory buffer. Thus there is no, or a very reduced, corresponding P2 or P3 
activation for the second target. This reduction can be observed by comparing the 
P2 and P3 activations elicited by T2 at lag 3 (inside the blink) and lag 7 (outside the 
blink), illustrated in Fig. 3.13a and Fig. 3.13b respectively. This reduction is also 
brought about to a smaller extent by lateral inhibition on the object map and on the 
attention movement control signal generator (IMC) in the CODAM model 
architecture of Fig. 3.4. These inhibitions are given more explicitly in the equations 
for the modules in the appendix, and in the description of CODAM model applied 
to the attentional blink in the methods section earlier. 
The main result of the paper, arising from this joint inhibitory effect, is the level 
and timing of the activations of the sensory buffer for each of the two target nodes, 
as they begin to reach their output threshold, for report, in the simulation. These 
levels and timings are determined by the sensory buffer activations over time, and 
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are shown in Fig. 3.8. So Fig. 3.8 shows the sensory buffer activations for T1 (dashed 
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Figure 3.8. The membrane potentials of the working memory buffers for TI and T2 
in the dual-target condition when TI is masked (dotted line for TI & solid line for 
T2). 
Note the considerable decrease of the T2 activity, causing the attentional blink. This is 
especially clear at lag 3, whereas the effect disappears by lag 7-8. Also note that the results 
are sensitive to parameter choices in the model asfound by simulations with different values 
of the connection strengths. 
As seen in Fig. 3.8, when the first target is followed by the second target at 
various lags (the solid curves), the membrane potential for the second target on the 
sensory working memory buffer begins to drop off as the delay in the presentation 
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of the second target increases. This reduction of the second target's working 
memory activation reaches a maximum at lag 3, so about 270 ms. The second 
target's activity on the working memory buffer then begins to increase gradually 
with further increase of the lag of the second target after the first. 
The resulting accuracy of detection of the second target can be estimated from 
Fig. 3.8 by assuming that the accuracy level is a sigmoid function of the sensory 
working memory buffer potential (depending on the noise parameter in the sigmoid 
function), resulting in a lag versus accuracy curve very similar to the experimental 
value (Vogel et al., 1998). 
Another effect that can be extracted from Fig. 3.8 is the reduction of Tl's 
sensory buffer activation when T2 is presented in lags I and 2. This is consistent 
with findings in Chun and Potter (1995). 
3.3.2 Effect of Masking and Error Boosting of Attention 
An important feature of the attentional blink, mentioned in the introduction, and 
used in the methods to help specify the inhibitory character of connections from the 
monitor in the CODAM model, is the effect of masking. In our model this effect is 
accounted for by the compensatory function of the monitor to ensure successful 
processing of any target held in the endogenous goal at any given moment. 
To explore this in more detail, the model assumes that during the performance 
of the attentional blink there are two types of goals activated in prefrontal cortical 
sites (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). One type is an endogenous goal that represents 
the task rules imposed from a high-level area, and held as working memory activity 
on the endogenous goals module, as described in the methods section. The other 
type of goal is an exogenous goal that represents attention-grabbing effects of the 
incoming stream of stimuli. An exogenous goal is activated by the input stimulus 
going straight onto the relevant exogenous goal module node, with a time delay 
specified in the table of parameters in the appendix. The relevant attention 
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movement generator node is thereby activated, sending its signal to the appropriate 
object map node so as to produce a maximum attention gain modulation during the 
time when the object activation arises directly from the input. 
All targets and masks have associated dedicated exogenous goal nodes in the 
goals module. Each such goal node is used to bias the attentional movement 
generator accordingly. However, only the first and second targets have associated 
endogenous goals. The activations of these endogenous goal nodes are not directly 
used in the movement of attention (they would produce a roughly constant bias if 
they were so used); but instead are employed to determine if the task they each 
represent has been achieved. This checking is done by comparison between the 
desired state of the system (given by the endogenous goal node activity) and the 
predicted state of the system (arising from the forward model given by the corollary 
discharge working memory). In case of discrepancies being detected, corrections are 
made through the error signal produced by the monitor module, by a further 
additive bias sent to the attention movement control signal generator (the IMC of 
Fig. 3.4), plus inhibition to all other nodes there. 
The endogenous goals for the first and second targets are such that only one of 
them can be active at any one time until that particular goal has been achieved. 
Thereby the next goal node then turns on. This is achieved by the endogenous goal 
for the first target inhibiting the endogenous goal for the second target until the 
endogenous first goal is turned off by a signal that arises from the sensory buffer 
activation, representing the first goal crossing a threshold near its P3 peak. This 
occurs at about 500 msecs from the onset of the first target stimulus. 
The endogenous goals are used in this way to detect the error of the movement 
of attention through the use of the monitor, which compares the endogenous goal 
activations for the two targets with their corresponding corollary discharge. The 
difference of these two signals is put through a decaying neuron (with time constant 
of 20 msecs) and the output of this neuron is used as the error signal. 
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The mechanism we have introduced for this is as follows (and described 
mathematically in the appendix). The error signal is used to protect the two targets 
from further damage, caused by the following incoming stimuli, by being fed into a 
self-recurrent neuron which, in turn, spreads inhibition onto all the nodes in the 
attention control signal generator apart from the target node under protection. In 
the case of activation of the error signal by the first target, the nodes of the attention 
control generator which will be inhibited by this protector neuron, include those of 
the second target. This second target poses at that time a potential threat to the first 
target's further processing, as well as does any mask following the first target. The 
error-based inhibition used here lasts until confirmation arrives from the sensory 
working memory buffer that the target has reached a suitably significant level of 
activation for report. This report signal is the same confirmation signal that is used 
to switch between the two targets, as explained above. 
The discrepancy, produced by the monitor node for the presence of the first 
target, is roughly constant for different lags for the second target, because the error 
arises from the first target in the input stream. Also note that the (endogenous) goal 
activation for the first target is always at its maximum during the time that it is used 
for reference in the monitor. On the other hand, the discrepancy from the monitor 
node for the second target varies across the lags and depends on the level of 
endogenous goal activation that the second target has been allowed to have (by the 
feedback inhibitory mechanism described above). This second target discrepancy 
also depends on the level of corollary discharge activation that survives the 
inhibition caused by the sensory working memory activation of the node for the first 
target. For the parameters chosen for the simulation, the goal activation for the 
second target is zero across the first 2 lags (being inhibited by the goal for the first 
target) and rises slowly as soon as the inhibition from the goal for the first target is 
released (from lag 3 and on). The corollary discharge activation for the second 
target, for lags for which there is also non-zero goal activation -i. e. for lag 3 and 
later - also follows the same slow rising pattern as it 
is gradually released from the 
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inhibition caused by the sensory buffer activation of the first target. The difference 
between the two signals is therefore almost zero for those lags and does not elicit an 
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Figure 3.9. The Monitor for T2: The endogenous goal for T2 (solid) and corollary 
discharge for T2 (dotted) superimposed across the lags. 
Noticefor lagI and lag2 there is no endogenous goal activationfor T2 as it is inhibited by the 
endogenous goal for T1. From lag3 and onwards, the endogenous goal activation for T2 is 
starting to rise, having been releasedfrom inhibition, but so does the corollary discharge 
activation for T2 starting itself to escape inhibition from the Sensory working memory buffer 
activation of TI. This parallel rise of the two signals yields a minimal difference which is 
never positive (T2 corollary discharge > T2 endogenous goal), and, therefore, no error signal 
is generatedfor T2 from the monitor. 
We also ran the simulation when there was no mask for the first target, as arises 
when the distractor following the first target is replaced by no stimulus. Under the 
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assumptions that the attention control components reside in the parietal and frontal 
cortices and that the response accuracy level is proportional to the sensory buffer 
activation, there is good qualitative agreement between the results of Fig. 3.10 
(when there is only a blank following the first target) and the attentional blink data, 
including ERP values, of Vogel et al. (1998). From the explanation above, the no- 
mask case corresponds to no further error being needed to be created by the 
monitor to help support the attainment of the goal of detecting the first target. The 
attention task is relatively easy to attain in this unmasked case, so does not use up 
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Figure 3.10. The membrane potentials of the working memory buffers for T1 and T2 
when T1 is unmasked. (dotted line for T1 & solid line for T2). 
Note theflatness of the activityfor T2 across lags. 
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It is possible to obtain an attentional blink effect without this second inhibitory 
protective system of monitor feedback to the IMC, in the presence of the first mask. 
Such an attentional blink effect arises solely from the inhibition from the P3 of the 
first target on its sensory buffer to the corollary discharge module. Such feedback 
can be made as strong as one likes by suitable choice of the inhibitory connection 
strengths. However, after considerable experimentation, we could not find suitable 
settings for the inhibitory parameters which led to the loss of the attentional blink 
when the first mask was absent. This is due to all of the attentional blink effect being 
achieved solely by the inhibitory effects arising from the P3 of the first target. 
However such inhibition is not strongly affected by the presence or absence of the 
first mask. Only if the attentional blink is suitably shared between the two 
inhibitory processes of P3 feedback inhibition and monitor saving/inhibition will the 
presence of the first mask make an effect, as agrees with the experimental results 
(Brehaut et al., 1999). 
3.3.3 Relevance of the Corollary Discharge 
The importance of the corollary discharge buffer is shown by running the 
simulation without its presence. The results, shown in Fig. 3.11, indicate complete 
loss of any attentional blink altogether. This justifies the use of the corollary 
discharge, buffered in the manner of the CODAM model, to achieve speed-up of 
attainment of the sensory buffer. It is this speed-up that has been proven to occur in 
motor control in the brain. We claim that our CODAM model results 
for the 
attentional blink give initial support for the use of this speed-up more generally 
in 
attention. At the same time, the CODAM model gives thereby a very specific 
mechanism for attention to be a scarce resource: by a target having its entry to the 
sensory buffer being shielded by its buffered corollary discharge 
from dangerous 
distractors. It achieves this in terms of the amount the corollary discharge signal 
differs from the endogenous goal. 
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Figure 3.11. The membrane potentials of the working memory buffers for T1 and T2 
when the Corollary Discharge module is removed (dotted line for T1 & solid line for 
T2). 
The monitor can still function without any corollary discharge signal by using 
the working memory activation from the first target to help boost its activation by 
amplifying the attention movement control generator for increasing the level of 
attention to the first target. The result of such a modified simulation is in Fig. 3.12. 
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Figure 3.12. The working memory activations for the first target (dotted line) and for 
the second (solid line). 
Using the values of this signalfor thefirst target asfeedback to the monitorfor comparison 
with the buffered goal signals doesn't work because the error signal that is elicited (for the 
first target) is so late that its boos tinglinhibiting on the attention movement control 
generator would require a further corollary discharge signal (which has been removed) to 
have any effect on the working memory activation for the second target. 
We show in Fig. 3.12 the temporal curves of the working memory activities for 
the first and second targets for different lags of the second target. As is clear, there is 
no effect of the monitor signal on the second target, due to the error signal caused 
by using the working memory activity of the first target being too late to be able to 
boost the activity from the first target to achieve sufficient inhibition to the second 
target. Thus from Fig. 3.12 there is no attentional blink in this case, so further 
supporting the need for the corollary discharge of the attention movement control 
signal. 
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Finally we present the ERPs for the second target, when presented at lag 3 after 
the first target in the attentional blink simulation of the CODAM model in Fig. 3.13a. 
We also present in Fig. 3.13b the ERPs for the second target, when presented at lag 7 
after the first target to demonstrate how the P2 and P3 ERP components recover to 
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Figure 3.13a. The ERPs related to the second target when it was presented at lag 3 in 
the CODAM simulation. 
Note the reduction of the working memory activation as compared to thatfor thefirst target 
shown in Fig. 3.7. There is also reduction of activity in the attention movement control 
generator due to inhibition, compared to thatfor thefirst target, as in Fig. 3.7. 
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Figure 3.13b. The ERPs related to the second target when it was presented at lag 7 in 
the CODAM simulation. 
We note the considerable reduction of the N2/P2 (both as attention movement 
control signal and corollary discharge signal) and the P3 values for the second target 
in Fig. 3.13a compared to that for the first target in Fig. 3.7. We also note the 
recovery of the corollary discharge (P2) and the working memory (M) activation in 
Fig. 3.13b to values similar to that for the first target shown in Fig. 3.7. 
In summary, we have shown that the essential mechanisms for the attentional 
blink are a suitable mix of two effects: 1) the P3 inhibition from T1 activity on its 
sensory working memory site back to all activity on the corollary discharge working 
memory; 2) the error signal for T1 attainment, on the sensory working memory 
buffer, sent as excitatory to boost the T1 signal on IMC and inhibit the T2 signal 
there. With this mix (set by the parameters for inhibition and excitation so chosen) 
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loss of the corollary discharge buffer was shown to lead to complete loss of the 
attentional blink, with concomitant encoding of TI and T2. Modification of the 
parameters of the architecture, devoid of the corollary discharge and monitor 
modules, can be made to bring back the blink by strong enough inhibition of the T2 
activation on the IMC. However that does not lead to loss of the blink if the stimulus 
at lag 1 is removed, since presence or absence of this stimulus has little effect on the 
inhibitory mechanism from the P3 of T1. 
3.4 Discussion of the results 
Much is understood about the spatial spread of attention in the relevant network of 
brain modules (Kastner and Ungerleider, 2000; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). There 
is lack of similar clarity about the detailed functionality and the temporal flow of 
information in the modules observed performing attention control. The attentional 
blink is an important phenomenon for probing such temporal character. We have 
tried to help tease apart some of the inherent complexity in attention processing in 
the attentional blink by developing a simulation using the CODAM model. We have 
been successful, but we must consider what exactly has been achieved. 
3.4.1 Attentional Blink-Specific Results 
The results we have presented in the paper show that the data on the loss of the P2 
and P3 responses to the second of the attended targets (Vogel et al., 1998), under the 
attention blink condition, can be understood in terms of the CODAM model. This is 
achieved by our two mechanisms proposed in setting up the CODAM model and 
mentioned under the Methods section: 
1. Buffering on the sensory working memory of the current input thereby 
inhibiting the corollary discharge signal for the second target. The stimulus 
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input of the first target leads to strong activity in the sensory buffer, 
thereby preventing activity from the corollary discharge of the attention 
movement control signal, in response to the second target, from entering its 
buffer. In particular the N2/P2 complex is now partly interpreted as a signal 
of the presence of the efferent copy of the attention movement signal to any 
new target, it being lost to the second target during the blink. 
Further support for the first target gaining its working memory buffer 
occurs by inhibition from the associated error in the monitor for the first 
target preventing any other targets or distractors achieving their working 
memory nodes by attention amplification. The relevant inhibition from the 
monitor is sent to incorrect nodes (those of the second target or distractors) 
in the attention movement control signal generator, and thence to the 
corollary discharge buffer site, thereby reducing support for the second 
target from being available for its processing. 
Due to the relative slowness of the develoPment of inhibition from the first 
target, the second target is spared if it appears at lag 1. This is clear from the results 
of the simulation shown in Fig. 3.8. We have thus given a plausible explanation of 
lag 1 sparing in the attentional blink. 
The comparison of the attentional blink in the presence of the first mask, and in 
the absence of that mask, support both the assumed use of the corollary discharge 
signal as well as its further use by the creation of an error signal from the monitor, 
guided by the endogenous goal activations. The resulting boost to the attention 
control signal generator module for attention to the first target causes further 
inhibition of the second target, especially in the presence of the first mask. This 
effect explains why the presence of the first mask is necessary to create a strong 
attentional blink. The boosting mechanism, by means of the error signal caused by a 
mask preventing target achievement, allows attention to be seen as a scarce 
resource: A given target, being processed in the focus of attention, is enabled to 
achieve its processing goal by monitor enhancement. This uses early activity from 
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the corollary discharge buffer so that as little delay as possible can be achieved in 
goal achievement. A similar argument has been used for the presence of the 
corollary discharge in motor control (Desmurget and Grafton, 2000). 
Finally we add that the timings we have chosen allow us to relate the ERPs 
observed in the attentional blink (Vogel et al., 1998) to the local field potentials 
created in the CODAM model simulations. The resulting loss of ERPs for the second 
target is similar between our simulation by CODAM and the results reported by 
(Vogel et al., 1998). 
3.4.2 Comparison with other models of attention for the AB 
3.4.2.1 Relation of CODAM to Other General Models of Attention 
We will start by considering models of information flow based on psychological and 
neuro-scientific experimental results. The most influential psychological models of 
attention are those of Posner (Posner et al., 1987), LaBerge and Brown (1989), and 
Desimone and Duncan (1995). None of these models provide any detailed neural 
architecture or simulation, so we can only consider their overall flow of information 
in relation to our control approach. 
The Posner model assumes 3 stages of processing during the movement of 
attention: 
1. Disengage (from previously attended focus); 
2. Move (to the new focus of attention) 
3. Re-engage (to new focus). 
The claim that this 3-stage control process is a correct splitting of attention 
movement is based on deficit studies in parietal patients. In particular the disengage 
process is claimed to be under the control of the parietal lobe, from evidence of an 
increased value of the so-called 'disengage deficit' = (RT invalid - RT valid), for the 
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difference of reaction times between invalidly and validly cued targets (the Posner 
paradigm), especially for the cue in the contra-lesional hemisphere. 
How does CODAM relate to the Posner model? CODAM has no clear 
'disengage' process, nor does this occur on any specific site. However we can 
suggest that some sites will be more important than others in achieving any similar 
process. 
To analyse CODAM along the Posner lines, consider the movement of the focus 
of attention (in space) from one place (A) to another (B); assume this is in an RSVP 
situation. The correspondence of the CODAM model to Posner"s 3-stage attention 
model in the RSVP paradigm is shown in the following figure. As can be seen, there 
is considerable overlap between the 3 supposedly separate disengage-move-re- 
engage Posner processes and the 5 CODAM processes. However there is no 1: 1 
relation between the two approaches. 
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CODAM 
The representation of A on the IMC is being 
annihilated by that of B. 
4 
The goal representation of A is being annihilated 
by the achievement of its goal, through activation 
of A on WM Sensory. The goal representation of 
B can now be activated. 
4 
This helps the IMC representation of B to 
destroy that of A, and to amplify its OBJ 
representation. 
a 
The WM Sensory representation of A now dies 
down, and the inhib iti on fro mAo nto WMc d 
reduces, so that the representations of B on this 
module can now become effective in developing 
th e 'VTM Se ns ory repre se ntatio nofB. 
m 
When that has occurred then the representation 
of B on WIA Sensory can develop fully. 
G 
E 
Figure 3.14. CorresPondence of CODAM model to Posner 3-stage attention model in 
the RSVP paradigm. 
There is no one-to-one relationship; rather several stages of CODAM overlap with the 
Posner stages to a degree indicated by the shade of grey. 
One question would be: how could the Posner model be implemented in neural 
network terms? We suspect that it would need to be in some CODAM form, without 
any clean implementation of each Posner stage by a corresponding unique neural 
stage. 
An alternate way of looking at this overall in CODAM is to consider how the 
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(2002), but only by using a very reduced version of CODAM, with no Corollary 
discharge or Sensory working memory): 
a. Attention is drawn to the cue, so leading to inhibition of surrounding sites 
(also in opposite hemisphere) on the IMC and Corollary discharge; 
b. Having settled into that focus, the target then appears, so biasing the goal 
map to modify the focus of attention in the invalid case; 
c. This brings activation onto the IMC & Corollary discharge, and thence 
amplification of the place for the target; 
d. The resulting battle is between the cue representation on the Sensory 
working memory, and the resulting inhibition of other sites on IMC and 
Corollary discharge, and the new target position on the goal map and its 
input to the IMC and Corollary discharge. 
It would appear that the disengage process occurs under (d) above, although 
competition in (c) is also involved. But again there is overlap between the processes 
(a) - (d) above and the 3 Posner processes. 
The model of LaBerge and Brown (1989) is based on the selection of an area in 
visual space, using both excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms in a filter module to 
enable object identification, and how subsequent movement of attention can be 
handled by the presence of a processing gradient. The location filter is guided in its 
selection by a higher order goal system, and thereby biases feature flow to an object 
module. This is can be related to the control model of Fig. 1, with the identifications: 
0 IMC = filter 
0 Goals = higher-order process 
0 Object module = feature register 
Finally the influential model of Desimone and Duncan (1995) appears on the 
surface not to involve any control structures. As they say (p. 194) "Instead the model 
we develop is that attention is an emergent property of many neural mechanisms 
working together to resolve competition for visual processing and control of 
behavior". The model uses biased competition between various object 
... .......... ... ...... . ... ........... --- ......... .......... . ... ............. 
Ik U( II li) 1 121 on and ctnot' )ns 'n. the bra I teoretic(Il ýqn, c(, a /it' 
'llill cr th ea of 
'U, r, df tteritional. b1ii. Di.. c-us iou N -51, -s -. -i k ........................................................ ................. . ........................ ................. - ............................ I ................................... I ........................................................... 
representations, as based on related single cell observations in anterior temporal 
cortex in monkeys performing saccades to object shapes matching previously 
presented ones among a set of distractors. The bias may be bottom-up, such as 
brought about in exogenous attention control by sudden onset, or can arise from a 
top-down goal to observe some target feature such as a specific colour or to observe 
a particular object such as a letter X, or from a spatial location bias. This approach is 
yet again an example of a control system, contrary to what would appear from the 
quotation, with attention control signals either being bottom-up or top-down. Hence 
the biased competition model of Desimone and Duncan (1995) can be identified 
with components of the control modules in Fig. 3.4 as 
" Goals = top-down bias information 
" IMC = site of competition 
" Object module = unimodal cortices as feature modules 
3.4.2.2 Experimental Support for CODAM as Compared to Other Models 
We note that there is good experimental support for the further modules of 
CODAM that extend it beyond biased competition and the 3-stage model. In motor 
control, all of the modules in a similar engineering control model to CODAM 
(Desmurget and Grafton, 2000) have been detected in the brain, either directly or 
indirectly. In attention control, the attention control signal generators, error 
monitors and goal systems have similarly all been observed. 
Sites for the generation of the attention control signal in vision were observed in 
superior parietal regions (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Yantis et al., 2002; Tootell 
and Hadjikhani, 2000), goal holding was well established in prefrontal sites 
(Scalaidhe et al., 1999; Miller and Cohen, 2001), and error monitoring was well 
established in cingulate regions (Pailing et al., 2002; Luks et al., 2002). 
The existence 
of working memory buffer sites, as holding state estimates over 1-2 seconds, was 
also well established by Baddeley's working memory model (Baddeley, 
1986) and 
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its experimental justification. The presence of a buffer to hold the corollary 
discharge of the attention movement control signal (acting as an attention state 
predictor) is still uncertain, although it has been suggested (Taylor, 2000,2003) to be 
related to the presence of the N2 ERP signal at about 200 msecs post-stimulus (Hopf 
et al., 2000; Ioannides and Taylor, 2003). 
We have also used in CODAM the contrast gain amplification model of 
attention, rather than additive feedback. Additive feedback biasing has been used in 
a number of simulations of attention feedback (Deco and Rolls, 2002; Deco and 
Rolls, 2004). However attention data are only consistent with contrast gain 
(Reynolds et al., 1999; Reynolds and Desimone, 2003). Various simulations carried 
out using contrast gain (Taylor and Rogers, 2002; Taylor and Fragopanagos, 2003; 
Taylor, 2003; Reynolds et al., 1999) have given good fits to Posner/V4 
competition/Sensory-motor attention paradigms. This would not have been possible 
by purely additive feedback, especially for the data of (Reynolds et al., 1999). The 
model of (Mozer and Sitton, 1998) used attention control by contrast gain, and also 
gave a good fit to data from various conjunction search paradigms. 
Evidence exists that an additional mechanism of attention control may be by 
means of phase synchronisation (Gross et al., 2004). Recent results indicate that such 
synchronisation is just observable in the attentional blink (Gross et al., 2004). None 
of the models of attention considered so far, nor those considered below for the 
attentional blink, have explicitly depended on the specific mechanism of phase 
synchronisation. The results of (Gross et al., 2004) may be important for a more 
detailed understanding of the phenomenon of attention. However the results in 
(Gross et al., 2004) indicate that periods of synchronisation and de-synchronisation 
occur across the parieto-frontal network involved in the attentional blink about 260 
msecs after each stimulus onset, and for a limited period of some 50-100 ms in total 
around that time. Such synchronisation could be approximated by the periods of 
amplitude coupling in our CODAM model, during creation of the N2/P2 complex in 
the IMC/Corollary Discharge buffer/Goal sites/Monitor (and agreeing with the 
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siting of such interacting sites observed in (Gross et al., 2004)). We suggest our 
CODAM model as a functional approximation to a more complete spiking-based 
amplitude and synchronisation-coupled model; that is presently being developed. 
3.4.2.3 Relation to the Two Stage and Interference Models for the AB 
Two important models have been proposed to explain the attentional blink: the 2- 
stage model (Chun and Potter, 1995) and the interference model (Shapiro et al., 
1994). The 2-stage model (Chun and Potter, 1995) argues that the blink arises at a 
second stage, after initial semantic level processing has been achieved at a lower 
stage. While the first target is being processed at the second stage for report (so as to 
be able to control behaviour), the second target is unable to gain access to second 
stage processing. Thus the system does not reject the processing of the second 
target, allowing it up to the first stage, so as to contain information about the colour 
and other physical characteristics of the second target as well as associative 
information from long-term memory. This total information is held in a conceptual 
short-term memory (CSTM). However the CSTM is short lived, and does not 
automatically attain the more durable representation at the second stage, especially 
in the presence of distractors as in the attentional blink phenomenon. 
The interference model (Shapiro et al., 1994), based on the earlier similarity 
theory of visual search (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989) has the first target interfere 
with second during its processing. In the similarity theory, highly processed 
representations of stimuli are created, and matched to templates for the first and 
second targets and nearby masks. For a time period of less than 500 mecs between 
the first and second, targets, the representations for the first target dominate any 
competition for response, interfering with any representations for the second target. 
Beyond that time difference, the processing of the first target up to the level of 
report has succeeded, and now the second target is no longer interfered with. The 
difference between the 2-stage and interference models are that, in the former the 
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second target fails completely to enter the sensory buffer, while in the latter the 
interference between the two targets is supposed to occur on the sensory buffer. 
CODAM is more general than these two models, being able to apply to all 
attention phenomena in principle. To be more specific there are in the CODAM 
model several modules identical to those of the above two specific attentional blink 
models, together with several modules not considered as part of either of them. 
Specifically the object module and the sensory buffer in CODAM are to be identified 
with the first and second stages respectively of the two-stage model (Chun and 
Potter, 1995). The endogenous goal module in CODAM holds the templates in the 
interference model (Shapiro et al., 1994). However there are two separate goal 
modules in CODAM: one for exogenous and one for endogenous goals, that do not 
seem to be differentiated in the interference model. CODAM requires such 
differentiation so as to properly represent the information in the subject, as well as 
take account of exogenous biasing by each of the stimuli of the input stream. Such 
separation is supported by the dorsal/ventral separation of endogenous and 
exogenous cortical attention circuits in (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). 
The need for some mechanism to protect attention against further distractors 
was hinted at in the interference model, but not specified in terms of our mechanism 
using the monitor and corollary discharge buffer. As seen from Fig 3.7, the sensory 
buffer signal for the second target in the simulation is reduced during the blink 
period, in agreement with the data of (Vogel et al., 1998), due mainly to interference 
from the sensory buffer activation of the first target inhibiting the corollary 
discharge activation of the second (which would otherwise give support to the 
growth of the sensory buffer activation of the second target). Thus the model 
simulation supports the two-stage model, rather than the interference model in this 
aspect: competition in the model does not occur directly between the 
representations for the first and second targets on the sensory buffer. Even more, the 
boosting by the monitor of the attention control signal, and thence its corollary 
discharge, is a crucial component of the simulation mechanism in CODAM to 
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handle interference in complex domains; this aspect also supports the interference 
model. The case for interference on the sensory buffer alone (in the two-stage 
model) is not needed in CODAM, although it could be added if further data were 
forthcoming in its support (agreeing with comments in Kranczioch et al. (2003)). 
3.4.2.4 Relation to the Competitive Model (Dehaene et al., 2003) 
This model was based on a competitive mechanism between representations of the 
two target stimuli in higher order cortex. The resulting simulation achieved good 
agreement with the attentional blink data. However there are a number of 
difficulties with such an approach, in contradiction to experimental data: 
1. There is crucial dependence on the presence or absence of a mask 
immediately succeeding the first target, which ensures that the difficulty of 
the task of detecting the first target is not easy. We already indicated that 
our compensatory mechanism of using the corollary discharge buffer was 
able to provide a suitable way of obtaining such compensation. This is 
completely absent from the simulation of (Dehaene et al., 2003); 
2. In the simulation of (Dehaene et al., 2003) the semantic level is in 'higher 
cortex", this term denotes temporal, parietal and prefrontal cortices. 
(Dehaene et al., 2003) claimed that the N400 arises at perceptual level (in 
their simulation, in the perceptual modules assumed to be V1 - V4), which 
is thereby not suppressed in the attentional blink. However object level 
representations activated in the attentional blink would be expected to be 
in temporal lobe (so in higher-level cortex) in the simulation of (Dehaene et 
al., 2003)), so will be suppressed during the blink in their simulation. The 
reason we avoided this route, and instead used the P3 of the first target to 
achieve an important component of the inhibitory feedback onto the 
attention control signal generator but not onto the object map, was to allow 
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no suppression of activity in the object map for the second target during 
the attentional blink. 
3. The simulation of (Dehaene et al., 2003) used an additive feedback attention 
signal, which we noted earlier, was in disagreement with experimental 
data. 
3.4.2.5 Relation to the AB Model by Bowman, Wyble and Barnard (2004) 
The Bowman et al. (2004) model for the attentional blink is able to effectively 
reproduce the basic blink effect as well as lag 1 sparing and blink attenuation by 
T1/T2 unmasking. Moreover, the model is able to model an impairment in T1 
performance at lag 1 as well as an increase in temporal order confusion at lag 1, and 
to a lesser extend at lag 2. The authors of the model propose that there are two 
mechanisms for the creation of the attentional blink. One is strong competition 
between the RSVP items at the level of visual features. This mechanism can account 
for the effect that masks have on the targets and can also reproduce the attenuating 
effect of T1/T2 mask removal. The other mechanism for the creation of the 
attentional blink is based on the concept of types and tokens. In particular while 
types are able to describe an item at a semantic and perceptual level they lack the 
information of how and when an item occurred. The latter is provided by the token. 
In the Bowman et al. (2004) model the drop of TZ's reportability is linked to the 
reduction of T2s tokenization capability. 
We take the Bowman et al. (2004) model to have a number of resonances with 
our CODAM/AB model as well as some dissonances. The resonances are: 
The sensory working memory in CODAM can be related to the Bowman et 
al. (2004) token traces layer, 
The Object map (with its lateral inhibition) in CODAM can be associated 
with the Bowman et al. (2004) semantic and masking layers, 
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0 The Goals modules in CODAM can be linked to the Bowman et al. (2004) 
task demand signal input, 
0 The corollary discharge in CODAM resembles the Bowman et al. (2004) 
recurrent excitation signal layer. 
The dissonances are: 
0 CODAM uses attention feedback contrast sensitivity amplification (based 
on a vast wealth of brain imaging and single cell data (Reynolds et al., 1999; 
Di Russo et al., 2001; Carrasco et al., 2004)) as a crucial processing 
component (where the Bowman et al. (2004) model has no such attention 
amplification). It is possible that some attentional amplification arises from 
the recurrent feedback excitation in the Bowman et al. (2004) model, but 
that is only for 50msecs and to all neurons in the TSL and semantic layers, 
far too general for attention feedback signalling (which amplifies only task- 
relevant lower level input activities). 
0 CODAM has no short-term (over several hundred msecs) learning, but all 
connection weights are fixed in a given simulation, whereas the Bowman et 
al. (2004) model uses a crucial dynamic modification of the binding links 
over such a short period. We find no evidence for such short-term 
modification in neurophysiological data, especially in a special area, as 
compared to other areas. 
0 We try to give specific places in the brain in which the CODAM modules 
are expected to be sited, and for which there is good experimental support 
from the many brain imaging and single cell results on attention and even 
on the AB phenomenon itself. We do not have a similar 'ground truth' in 
the Bowman et al. (2004) model, although it could possibly be given (say by 
our identification between sites in the two models, as given under the 
resonances above). 
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3.4.2.6 Summary of Relations to Other Models 
The CODAM model can thus be seen to contain several of the mechanisms and 
modules of the two-stage and interference models, but allows their fusion and 
extension by further modules needed to allow attention to function fast and also to 
function as a scarce resource. It also tends to implement the interference model, 
although it uses the sensory working memory buffer for report after lower level 
processing, as in the two-stage model. It also avoids the difficulties of the model of 
(Dehaene et al., 2003) by giving more detailed functionality (following CODAM) to 
the various modules involved in attention. 
In all, the CODAM approach provides not only a computational model of the 
attentional blink but also of a number of other paradigms (Taylor and Rogers, 2002; 
Taylor and Fragopanagos, 2003). However the only paradigm that specifically needs 
the corollary discharge signal so far is the attentional blink. The corollary discharge 
signal is used to give the wake-up call to the sensory working memory and to 
contribute to the error monitor, both processes contributing to resolving the 
complexity of the phenomenon itself. Both of these features are crucial in our 
simulation, as shown by the results of Fig. 3.11. But how strong is our claim that the 
corollary discharge of the attention movement signal is made available in this 
manner? 
The corollary discharge signal is not present in any other model of attention, 
computational or otherwise, nor is there any other computational evidence for its 
existence. However there is evidence for the existence of such a corollary discharge 
in motor control (Desmurget and Grafton, 2000). It would be strange if nature used 
such an efficient control mechanism for motor control but not for the equally 
important one of attention. We note also that we have proposed a mechanism for 
the scarce resource character of attention by means of an 'attention-boosting' signal, 
based on the corollary discharge signal. This is the only detailed computational 
mechanism we know that achieves such an important character of attention - that of 
a scarce resource. 
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There is experimental MEG evidence for a number of early signals, at around 
200 msecs after stimulus onset, which can be interpreted in terms of the attention 
control signal and its corollary discharge (Hopf et al., 2000; loannides and Taylor, 
2003). These results need to be followed up, especially in other attention paradigms. 
At the same time, speeded attention paradigms need to be modelled using CODAM 
and compared to results with no such corollary discharge signal. We hope to turn to 
this elsewhere. 
3.4.3 Predictions 
We close this section with predictions that arise from CODAM beyond our 
discussion so far. Both are associated with the corollary discharge signal. 
The first prediction is that there will be an important component of the 
attention movement control signal, a little delayed due to conduction time, on some 
suitable buffer site or sites, for its use in the monitor and its implementation as a 
wake-up call for access to the working memory site by the attended stimulus from 
the object map. Such a signal should be able to be seen by use of MEG, although 
care would have to be taken to disentangle the various MEG signals arising from 
each of the distractors and the two targets. An alternate way would by to use a TMS 
search paradigm to localise a site functioning in the correct manner, whose loss 
would lead to no attentional blink and no P2 or P3. 
The second prediction arises from the shoulder in the activity of the object map 
ERP in Fig. 3.7, due to the boost to the direct input by amplification from the 
attention movement control signal generator. Such a double structure would be a 
clear signal of the presence of the attention movement control signal generator as a 
separate component of the system (although this has already got support from 
much brain imaging data, such as reported in (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002)). 
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3.5 Conclusions 
We have presented a simulation of the attentional blink phenomenon by means of 
CODAM. The simulations are able to fit the overall temporal flow of activity in the 
brain as observed by ERP results (Vogel et al., 1998), as well as giving an explanation 
of the attentional blink effect compatible with the general features of the 
interference and the two-stage models. The main components being used in our 
model to attain the temporal dip at the maximum loss of awareness of the second 
target are (1) feedback from the first target activity on its sensory buffer, which 
destroys (by inhibition) the attention movement control signal and its resultant 
corollary discharge signal associated with the second target, (2) the boosting (and 
related inhibition to other sites), especially in the presence of a mask for the first 
target, of the attention control signal to the first target, and by means of a goal error 
signal, to better help attain the relevant goal. This is more closely an implementation 
of the interference model (Shapiro et al., 1994) than the two-stage model (Chun and 
Potter, 1995), since the interference between the first and second targets in CODAM 
strictly does not take place on the sensory buffers. However CODAM is built with 
important features of each of those models. 
The scarce nature of attention as a resource is implemented in CODAM by 
supporting the goal of report of the first target, in the presence of a succeeding 
mask, by boosting the corollary discharge for that target arising from the monitor. 
Such boosting indicates that the first target processing has not yet reached the 
expected goal level. It is such a boosting mechanism which creates, in the CODAM 
model, the difference in the attentional blink between the processing in the presence 
of a mask for the first target as compared to its absence. 
Further work to be done on the attentional blink using CODAM is to extend the 
simulation to include the effects of second masking on the attentional blink 
simulation (Kranczioch et al., 2003), as well as to consider various types of stimuli 
and their relative interconnectivity (Maki et al., 2003). 
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A main prediction was made about the presence of the corollary discharge 
signal. This needs to be determined by further experimental work on the attentional 
blink, using either MEG or TMS. 
3.6 Appendix 
3.6.1 The neuron equations 
Each neuron in our simulation is a simple graded-response neuron with a 
membrane equation: 
dV 
,r-= _V + PI dt 
where V is the neuron membrane potential, T is the neuron time constant, I is 
the injected current from the neuron's various connections and p is a constant that 
regulates the voltage to current ratio. 
The output of each neuron is the positive part of a saturating sigmoidal non- 
linearity: 
"-g output =f (V(t)), fW - J9 
-I+e 
T 
where 0 is the threshold and T is the noise temperature. 
3.6.2 The modules' equations 
3.6.2.1 Input 
Each of the stimuli in the RSVP stream is represented in the Input module by a unit 
amplitude pulse of duration t, = 30ms with an onset time ti. In our simulation TI is 
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always the first stimulus and, say, its onset time is h=0. The stimuli in the RSVP 
stream are presented every 90 ms so the second stimulus has an onset time t2 -` 90 
ms, the third t3= 180 ms and so on. 
0 for 0<t< ti 
IiIN I for t, <t <t, +t, 
0 for t> ti + t, 
3.6.2.2 Goals (Exogenous) 
Each neuron in the Exogenous Goals module is activated by the corresponding 









3.6.2.3 Goals (Endogenous) 
Only two neurons comprise the Endogenous Goals module representing the goals 
of the task, i. e. detecting/identifying the two targets T1 and T2. These goal neurons 
are turned on from the beginning of each trial (ION) but the neuron that represents 
the goal of T1 inhibits the neuron that represents the goal of T2 
( GOAL ý-12-Tl ) thus 
keeping it from being active. It does so until such time that the working memory 
membrane potential of T1 has reached a certain threshold (indicating 
awareness has been reached for T1) and T1 is turned off (IOFF) and the T2 goal 
neuron is allowed to develop its activity. 
d VGOALFVD (t) TI 
_VGOALEVD 
(t ION (t) 
_ 









ION =I for 
0<t< tEND 
, OFF = 
WM-GOALEND H (V wm 9v,, v WTI TI where H(x) =x for x ýt 0, and H(x) =0 for x<0. 
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3.6.2.4 IMC (Attention Control Signal Generator) 
Each neuron in the IMC module is biased by the corresponding neuron in the Goals 
module (JIMC-GOAL)with a delay0f tIMC-GOAL and also receives lateral inhibition from 
the other neurons in the IMC module (I'MCLAT). When one of the two targets causes 
the monitor to generate an error signal then an inhibitory signal (Fmc-mONiNH) is 
generated by a monitor-triggered recurrent pair of neurons. This signal is used to 
inhibit the rest of the neurons in the IMC module to protect the target against 
competing distractors/masks. Moreover, the target(s) that have caused the error 
signal in the monitor receive a boosting signal to compensate for the low corollary 
discharge activation that has been detected by the monitor 
(FMC-MONEXC). 
dV, 'mc (t) 
_ _Vmc (t) +P 
tjiIMC-GOALFx 
- 
tIMC )- JIMCLAT (t) _ I; 






I IMC-GOALEX = 
IMC-GOALEx f(VGOALEr (t)) Wi i 





H Wi IIIMC_ 
Im- f(VmONN, (t)), where j runs over the indices that 
j#i 
correspond to T1 and T2. 
I, "'u, (t) = 
ým`ON-c f (V, ' (t)), where i corresponds to T1 or T2: this term is Wi 
only applicable for the target IMC neurons. 


















MONINHREC MONINH _MON"RECf(V MON 'NHREC (t)) W= Wi 
IýONIA, H -MON (t) = WýONINH -MON 
f(V MON (t)) 
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3.6-2.5 Object Map 
Each neuron in the Object module is directly activated by the corresponding 
incoming stimulus from the Input module with a delay0f tOBI-IN. It also receives a 
later signal (IOBJ-IMClNwith a delay0f tOBJ-IMCIN) from the same input neuron only 
suitably amplified by the IMC (by means of contrast gain multiplication). Finally it 




OBJ (t) +P 
tjiIN (t _ t()BJ_JN) + IiOBJ-IMC, 




Ji0BJ - IMC, IN (t) W1 
OBJ - IMC, IN Ii IN f (Tý. IMC (t)) 
JOBJLAT (t) 
WOBJLAT f(VOBJ (t)) 
IJ J 
j#i 
3.6.2.6 Corollary Discharge 
Each neuron in the Corollary Discharge module is turned on by the corresponding 
IMC neuron with a delay0f tCORDIS-IMC 
(ICORDIS-IMC). It is turned off with a delay of 
tCORDIS-wm by the corresponding Working Memory neuron or any other Working 








CORDIS (t) + 
'0 
11 CORDIS-IMC (t) II CORDIS-WM (t - tCORDIS-WM 
ORDIS-IMC(t) 
= WjCORDIS-IMCf(VIMC(t)) IiC i 
j 
ICORDIS-WM (t) WjJCORDIS-WMf(VWM (t)) 
3.6.2.7 Working Memory (Sensory Buffer) 
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Each Working Memory neuron is recurrently connected to an auxiliary neuron 
(IWMREC) 
so as to simulate the build-up of activity that occurs in the Sensory Buffer 
neuronal populations. Otherwise it receives input from the corresponding neuron in 
the Object module with a delay of tWM-OBI (Iwm-OBJ) and an earlier boosting signal 
(with a delay Of tWM-CORDIS) from the corresponding neuron in the Corollary 
Discharge module(IWM-CORDIS). 
Twm 
d Vi wm (t) 
- 
-ý-Wm +p -OBJ (t _t wm _ OBJ 
+ IýM -CORDIS (t _t wm_coj. + 
It WMREC 
dt 
JýM -OBJ (t) ltýM-OBJ f(VOBJ (t)) 
i 
JýM -CORDIS WýM - 
CORDIS f (Jý. CORDIS 
Td 
WMREC 
'R- (t) + pWWMR--'f(V' WMREC 
dt i 
(t)) 




The Monitor module consists of two neurons, one for T1 and one for T2. Each 
neuron is responsible for calculating the difference between the endogenous goal 
activation and the corollary discharge activation for each of the two targets. Each 
neuron therefore receives excitatory input from the corresponding endogenous goal 
neuron (only at the time when the exogenous goal neuron is active) and inhibitory 
input from the corollary discharge neuron. 
dVi"ON (t) 
_ _VMON 





I ON-GOALEND(t)= ýON-GOALEVDf(VGOALEVD VGOALEX (t))) 
I Wi (t))hff (i where h(x) =1 for x ý! 0, and 
H(x) 0 for x<0; (Note that the exogenous goal neuron activation acts as a gate to 
prevent the monitor becoming active before the target is presented to the system). 
I ON-CORDIS(t)=WýON-CORDISf(VCORDIS(t)) 
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3.6.3 Table of parameters 
A ove I "dix ........................ ........................................ I ........................ .... fI....................... - 




T 20 ms 
Timc 70 ms 
TOW 140 ms 
200 ms 
T wm Ir 
WMREC Z*MONINH Ir MONIMHREC 
100 ms 
tGOALEX 





GOAL EN"T2-7'1 1 
tIMC-GOALEX 25 ms 
IMC-GOALEX 
Wi 1.3 for Tl, 1.5 for T2 &I for the rest 
'MCLAT 
W 0.8 ii 
































tWM-OBJ 10 ms 











tMON-GOALFND 150 ms 
Wi 
)N-GOALEVD 5 
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Chapter 4 
The interaction of attention and 
emotion 
4.1 Introduction 
People's commonplace view of emotions is that they provide the 'colouring" or 
'flavouring' of everyday life activity. Life without emotions is thus perceived to be 
deprived of meaning, purpose and the pleasure that is derived from any rewarding 
experience. Emotionless actions are often related to machines executing a sequence 
of pre-programmed commands. While this commonplace perception of the role 
emotions play in everyday life is pertinent it is somewhat limited in scope. So in fact 
emotions not only 'colour' human behaviour but to a large extend guide it as well. 
We have so far discussed how attention is used to effectively reduce the 
information flow into the sensory system of the brain by enhancing the relevant or 
important components of the input stream while eliminating the distracting ones. 
This operation we have noted is guided by the goals, in prefrontal cortex, that 
maintain the template for these relevant or important components. However we 
haven't yet discussed what determines the relevance or importance of incoming 
stimuli according to which attention is applied and actions in response to the 
attended stimuli are generated. 
The emotional content of stimuli presented to the sensory system is the 
principal indicator of the importance of these stimuli. Thus emotional content can 
modify and update the goals and consequently alter the direction of attention to the 
presented stimuli. Emotions and goals are strongly intertwined in the sense that the 
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immediate relevance of any stimulus to a goal defines the emotionality of the 
stimulus. The relationship between emotions and the personal goals and concerns of 
individuals is often suggested to be the basis for emotion elicitation and 
differentiation by appraisal theorists (see Scherer, 1999 for a review). For instance 
the emotional tag of fear can be attached to a threatening stimulus in so far as the 
latter can potentially impede the goal of survival. Another example is the emotional 
tag of happiness that can be assigned to any stimulus that advances the goal of well- 
being. In a similar fashion numerous emotional tags can be given to stimuli that 
promote or hinder the attainment of goals ranging from basic individual survival 
goals to more complex social interaction goals. This vast range of emotions and 
related goals is not likely to have been formed concurrently. Rather, emotions 
evolved from very simple mechanisms that ensured harm avoidance and attainment 
of vital physical resources to more complex ones that guide complex social 
behaviour. This evolution of emotions may in fact be reflected in the brain systems 
that generate them with emotions linked to survival arising from evolutionarily old 
brain systems while emotions linked to complex social behaviour developing in 
phylogenetically more recent brain areas (Esslen et al., 2004). 
So far we have avoided a formal definition of emotions and restricted ourselves 
to illustrating only some basic features of emotions. However, a distinction should 
be made between emotions as labels attached to stimuli presented to the sensory 
system and the experience of emotions or the so-called 'feelings' (LeDoux, 2000). 
Feelings can be regarded as states of emotional consciousness bearing all the 
relevant characteristics of conscious states. Thus feelings echo the phenomenal 
experience of emotions or the "what it"s like" as in "what it's like to be sad". The 
neural basis of the conscious experience of emotions has been regarded by some 
scientists as unimportant compared to the much more tractable neural signatures of 
emotions themselves (LeDoux, 2000), but others consider emotional experience a 
crucial issue in understanding the role emotions Play in human behaviour (Lambie 
and Marcel, 2002). However, such a pursuit lies outside the scope of this thesis 
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insofar as we here investigate the manner in which emotions may (or may not) 
attract attention to sensory stimuli thus selectively enhancing their perception. 
Given that such emotion-laden stimuli are attended and fully processed, more 
complex processes relating these stimuli with long-term emotional memories can 
then lead to emotional experience but we won't deal with these processes here. 
In what follows in this chapter we will first discuss the nature of emotions and, 
particularly the concept of their automatic processing, and then look at how 
emotions may interact with the attentional selection mechanisms based on the 
experimental evidence. We will then proceed to present a neural model of the 
interface of emotions and attention and apply this model to explain qualitatively 
and quantitatively a series of experimental paradigms. 
4.2 The automatic view of emotions 
Before attempting to put together any model of attention/emotion interaction we 
must address an important question about the nature of emotions, that is whether or 
not emotions are encoded 'automatically" and what this "automatic' encoding could 
mean. Indeed the concept of 'automaticity' when applied to brain processing is not 
as straightforward as when applied for instance to engineering where it is most 
often encountered anyway. In engineering, 'automatic' implies an operation that is 
based on a self-regulating mechanism and is carried out without voluntary control. 
However in psychology, 'automatic' is more ambiguous and can be taken to be 
linked to a host of features. 
One of the features of automatic brain processes is argued to be their 
independence from attentional resources insofar as automatic processes can be 
carried out concurrently to other distracting or conflicting processes without 
interference from the latter hindering the execution of the former. Of course the 
concept of 'attentional resources' is itself somewhat problematic as it does not 
directly address the underlying neural mechanisms that generate, maintain and 
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distribute these resources but we have already presented in previous chapters a 
model that addresses such neural mechanisms and shows how they manifest in 
various attentional paradigms. 
Another characteristic of automatic brain processing is suggested to be the lack 
or reduced level of conscious awareness involved in it. So in terms of automatic 
emotional encoding this could mean that the emotional stimuli themselves have not 
been consciously registered (thus they're not reportable) but somehow their 
emotional value has been recorded and can be used to influence other processes 
(Morris et al., 1998a; Whalen et al., 1998). One way this could be possible is via a 
'fast' route, presumably subcortical, which allows the emotional value of stimuli to 
be encoded within the first few hundred milliseconds thus before or even without 
the need for, later, perceptual encoding (Adolphs, 2002). This "fast' encoding is also 
a feature often attributed to automatic emotional encoding (Eimer and Holmes, 
2002). 
The features described above are those most often ascribed to automatic 
emotional encoding and there is good evidence for these features either taken 
separately or in combination as directly measured or indirectly inferred in 
psychological paradigms involving emotional stimuli. However some researchers 
have conducted experiments where these features of automatic encoding are 
challenged, especially in the case of the preattentive hypothesis (Pessoa et al., 2002a), 
rendering the view of emotions as "automatic' still quite debateable. In the following 
sections we will review some of the evidence for the validity of these features of 
automatic emotional encoding and see how they might be compromised with a non- 
automatic view of emotional encoding. 
4.2.1 Time course of emotional encoding 
Of the available brain imaging techniques, the one typically used to 
investigate the 
temporal dynamics of brain processes is EEG, as this technique provides 
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measurements of the electrical changes over the scalp with a millisecond resolution. 
More specifically, using time-locking to stimulus onset, event-related potentials 
(ERPs) can be derived from the EEG recordings that allow the time course of brain 
activation elicited by the various stimuli over different brain areas to be analysed. 
The ERP studies exploring the time signatures of the processes evoked by emotional 
stimuli seem to support an early encoding of the emotional value of such stimuli. 
This is typically within the first 100-300 milliseconds from stimulus onset. Indeed 
one of the first such studies was by Pizzagalli and colleagues (Pizzagalli et al., 1999) 
who recorded the ERPs during hemifield presentation of 'disliked' and 'liked' faces. 
They found the ERPs to be modulated by the emotional stimuli as early as 80-116 
msecs after stimulus onset when stimuli were presented to the right hemisphere and 
140-160 msecs when stimuli were presented to the left hemisphere. More recently, 
several ERPs studies confirm the early modulatory effects of emotional stimuli 
using either emotional faces (Sato et al., 2001; Campanella et al., 2002; Eger et al., 
2003; Eimer and Holmes, 2002; Esslen et al., 2004) or emotional words (Ortigue et al., 
2004). An important finding reported in some of these ERPs studies is that the 
emotional value of the stimuli can be seen to be encoded before perceptual or 
categorical encoding of the stimuli themselves. Eimer and Holmes (2002) reported a 
frontoparietal positivity elicited by fearful faces within 120 msecs after stimulus 
presentation while structural face-specific encoding is known to be linked to the 
N170 component. Ortigue and colleagues (2004) reported activity of bilateral lateral- 
occipital origin related to emotional words in the 100-140 msecs post-stimulus 
period while semantic encoding of words is typically identified by the N400 
component. These results indicate that there exist networks (for different 
modalities) that encode the emotional value of stimuli and are dissociated from the 
networks that are responsible for the categorisation of these stimuli. Thus it appears 
that at least a crude emotional classification can be achieved very early on after 
stimulus onset giving credit to a 'fast" route theory. 
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4.2.2 Awareness of emotional stimuli 
As mentioned earlier another indication of the automatic nature of emotions is their 
ability to be encoded without conscious awareness of the emotional stimuli. most of 
the earliest evidence that exists of such unconscious emotional encoding comes from 
studies of affective priming whereby the emotional value of emotional stimuli not 
consciously perceived can influence subsequent emotional judgement while the 
emotional stimuli themselves remain unreportable. More recently, several brain 
imaging studies using the backward-masking methodology to restrict subjects' 
awareness of the emotional stimuli presented, have reported activation of the 
amygdala despite the subjects" lack of explicit knowledge that such stimuli were 
presented (Morris et al., 1998a; Whalen et al., 1998). It has been suggested that the 
amygdala's position and connectivity allows it to function as a crude, though rapid, 
registry of the emotional value of incoming stimuli as it receives input from low- 
level sensory cortices or even subcortically (Adolphs, 2002). Thus the amygdala can 
encode emotional value before or even without the need for the full-blown object- 
level perception of the stimuli arising in higher-level associative cortices that is 
required for conscious awareness of the stimuli to ensue. The ability of the 
amygdala to rapidly encode the emotional value of stimuli solely driven by low- 
level input has been challenged by Pessoa and colleagues (Pessoa et al., 2002a) who 
found that under conditions of an attention-demanding distracting task emotional 
stimuli do not cause the automatic activation of the amygdala as the standard 
theory suggests. The paradigm that they used and the corresponding results will be 
discussed further as well as simulated by means of the extended CODAM model in 
later sections of this chapter as they provide a novel reading of the way emotions 
are encoded and interact with the attentional system. 
A notable neurophysiological study in support of the fast subcortical route to 
the amygdala and its implication in nonconscious emotional processing is the one 
involving blindsight patient GY who has right hemianopia following left occipital 
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lobe damage (de Gelder et al., 1999). This study revealed that GY was able to 
discriminate at above-chance levels emotional facial expressions presented in his 
blind hemifield, a phenomenon called affective blindsight (de Gelder et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, in a more recent fMRI study GY's amygdala was preferentially 
activated by emotional faces presented in his blind hemifield (Morris et al., 2001a) 
suggesting a subcortical route to his amygdala was employed. Similar findings were 
reported in a study of a patient with visual extinction and spatial neglect after 
parietal damage where his amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex were seen to be 
activated by emotional stimuli even without awareness (Vuilleumier et al., 2002). 
Pessoa and colleagues (Pessoa et al., 2002a) have criticised the findings derived from 
patient GY's studies by suggesting that due to the early age GY's lesion occurred (8 
years old) collicular areas may have functionally adapted to visual cortical 
functionality to compensate for the failure of the latter. Alternatively, improper 
fixation or residual vision in his "blind" hemifield might explain those findings. 
4.2.3 Attentional demands of emotional information 
Perhaps the most crucial feature of automatic emotional encoding is that it can be 
carried out without requiring any attentional resources. As mentioned earlier the 
independence of any brain processes from attentional resources is deemed as the 
defining condition for automaticity especially by those cognitive scientists that focus 
on the study of attention. One of the traditional methods used to delineate the 
degree of dependence of any process from attentional recourse is the visual search 
paradigm and the corresponding relationship between the time to find a target 
embedded in an array of distractors and the total number of elements in that array. 
In particular, Treisman and Gelade (Treisman and Gelade, 1980) proposed that 
targets that are processed preattentively will 'pop out' of that array regardless of the 
number of elements in the array, whereas targets that require serial allocation, 
deallocation and reallocation of attention from one element of the array to the other 
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yield a monotonically increasing relationship between the time to find a target and 
the total number of elements in that array implying that such targets cannot be 
processed preattentively. Following this method Ohman and colleagues (Ohman et 
al., 2001) found that fear-relevant pictures (snakes or spiders) would "pop-out' in an 
array of fear-irrelevant pictures (flowers or mushrooms) as the time subjects took to 
locate the fear-relevant target pictures did not depend on the number of the fear- 
irrelevant pictures used as distractors. This finding suggests that fear-relevant 
stimuli can be processed preattentively. Arguably, the processing of fear-relevant 
stimuli may have been evolutionarily optimised due to the immediate relevance of 
such stimuli to survival. Eastwood and colleagues (Eastwood et al., 2001) tested the 
hypothesis that negative and positive emotional stimuli may yield different slopes 
for the search time-array size correlation. Indeed, they found that the slope for the 
negative emotional faces is shallower than that for positive emotional faces, a 
finding in support of the suggestion that negatively valenced stimuli are faster to 
process as they may pose an immediate threat to survival. 
In another behavioural study Vroomen and colleagues (Vroomen et al., 2001) 
used a dual-task method to examine whether integration of visual and auditory 
information about emotions requires limited attentional resources. In particular, 
subjects had to judge the emotional value of a voice that could be either happy or 
fearful while concurrently viewing distracting emotional faces. Moreover a task 
such as summing digits or counting zeroes in a serial presentation was imposed on 
the subjects thus increasing the cognitive load. The result of this experiment was 
that in fact the emotional quality of the distracting faces influenced the judgements 
of the emotional voices suggesting that the emotional cues conveyed by the faces 
were processed and integrated with those from the voices without occupying any 
attentional resources. Of course the assumption that distracting cross-modal tasks 
would draw on resources from the same attentional 'resource pool' as the main task 
is debateable and as the authors themselves argue cross-modal information 
processing may actually occur in parallel and independently mediated 
by 
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dissociable processing components and possibly drawing on different attentional 
'resource pools". 
Two recent fMRI studies examined whether emotional encoding depends on 
the engagement of attention to the emotional stimuli or not although they appear to 
take opposable positions on this. In one of these studies (Vuilleumier et al., 2001) 
subjects performed a matching task for pairs of stimuli at specified locations while 
task-irrelevant stimuli appeared at other locations. Faces (neutral or emotional) or 
houses appeared at either the relevant or irrelevant locations. The authors found 
that although fusiform gyri were activated differentially depending on whether the 
faces appeared at the attended or the unattended locations, activation of the 
amygdala was not affected by such attentional manipulations. These results indicate 
that emotional encoding mediated by the amygdala (see earlier discussion) does not 
require the direction of spatial attention to the location of the emotional stimuli. 
In contrast, Pessoa and colleagues (Pessoa et al., 2002b) found that when 
subjects were asked to attend to a demanding task while emotional faces where 
presented at a task-irrelevant location, the latter elicited significantly reduced 
amygdala activation compared to when the emotional faces were made task- 
relevant in an alternate condition. This result led the authors to propose that 
emotional encoding processes in fact have to compete with other operations to gain 
access to the attentional 'resource pool" and are thus not immune to interference 
from competing tasks. The authors' main point of criticism on the Vuilleumier et al. 
(2001) paradigm was that the latter was not as attention-demanding as their own 
and therefore the tasks that emotional processing was competing with did not 
exhaust the attentional resources leaving enough for emotional processing to 
successfully complete. On the other hand one point of criticism that could be made 
on the Pessoa et al. (2002b) results is that due to the slow time course of 
hemodynamic response (an intrinsic problem with fMRI) early amygdala 
activations reflecting 'automatic' emotional encoding may have been missed as later 
cognitive suppression of the emotional network occurred. As mentioned earlier the 
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paradigm used in this experiment will be further discussed and simulated later in 
this chapter. 
4.3 Guidance of attention by emotion 
So far we have reviewed the evidence for the existence of an automatic mechanism 
for the registration of the emotional value of stimuli presented to the sensory 
systems of the brain under the assumption that such a mechanism would be fast, 
possibly not requiring conscious awareness and presumably posing minimal 
demand for attentional resources. Given that such a mechanism exists we now turn 
to examine the evidence and possible mechanisms by which these automatically 
extracted emotional cues could preferentially influence the direction of selective 
attention. 
4.3.1 Evidence from neuroscience 
Several recent studies of attentional deficits have explored the possibility that the 
emotional charge emotional stimuli carry may be behaviourally beneficial in that it 
can provide a 'boost' to the representational strength of these stimuli thus helping 
them escape the deficit that neutral, non-emotional stimuli are doomed to. In one of 
these studies, Anderson and Phelps (Anderson and Phelps, 2001) employed a 
variant of the attentional blink paradigm whereby words were used as stimuli in the 
RSVP stream and, in particular, an emotional (aversive) word was used as the 
second target (T2). In a typical attentional blink experiment TZ's detection accuracy 
is ordinarily reported dropping significantly for the first few lags (see previous 
chapter). However in the Anderson and Phelps study the emotional T2 remained 
considerably more detectable than usual across the lags especially in the shortest 
lags where normally T2s detection accuracy is minimal. Moreover, in this study, a 
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patient with amygdala lesions did not appear to benefit from the emotional charge 
of T2, offering further support to the role of the amygdala in registering the 
emotional value of sensory stimuli. 
Apart from the 'natural' deficits of the attentional system, such as the 
attentional blink normally observed in healthy subjects, there are attentional deficits 
caused by brain damage such as unilateral neglect typically caused by right- 
hemisphere damage. Unilateral neglect patients fail to attend to the contralesional 
half of space. One of the phenomena unilateral neglect patients often exhibit is 
visual extinction whereby due to their inability to attend to stimuli presented in the 
contralesional visual field when stimuli are simultaneously presented in their 
ipsilesional visual field, the latter "extinguish' the former. Interestingly, Vuilleumier 
and Schwartz (Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001a) found that threat-related stimuli 
were detected more often when presented in the 'weak' or poorly attended left field 
of subjects with chronic unilateral left neglect after focal right parietal stroke than 
neutral stimuli. We have already discussed how threat-related stimuli might receive 
top priority and rapidly break through to awareness after evolutionary optimisation 
of the processing of stimuli that might pose an immediate threat to survival. 
However, the same authors replicated the results obtained using threat-related 
stimuli this time using faces with happy or angry expressions instead (Vuilleumier 
and Schwartz, 2001b). These findings suggest that the emotional charge of the 
stimuli provided the necessary 'boost' the stimuli needed to reach conscious 
awareness. 
Although it is evident from the Anderson and Phelps (2001) and the 
Vuilleumier and Schwartz (2001a; 2001b) experiments that some components of the 
limbic system, predominantly the amygdala, mediate this "boosting" that helps 
stimuli otherwise doomed to oblivion attain full representation and become 
reportable, it is not clear how this effect is achieved neurally. Is it the case that these 
limbic components drag attention to the emotional stimuli forcing the cognitive 
attentional system to allocate more resources to their processing or is it that this 
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limbic network can act as a controller itself modulating the representations of the 
emotional stimuli directly at the stimuli's associative sites? Several possibilities exist 
as to where the limbic network might receive input from and where it could feed 
back to which will be discussed further in the next section. We will also explore this 
issue through the simulations of the Anderson and Phelps (2001) paradigm later in 
this chapter. 
In another set of studies, event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded in response to 
emotional stimuli give a mixed picture of how the processing of emotional stimuli 
might interact with the attentional system. This is partly due to the difficulty of 
interpreting ERPs as they lack the localisation properties that fMRI for example 
possesses. Thus translating ERPs to underlying neural mechanisms becomes a very 
hard task. Carretie and colleagues (Carretie et al., 2004) recorded ERPs during an 
experiment based on a passive oddball paradigm with the oddball stimuli being 
either emotional or neutral. They found that emotional stimuli could capture so- 
called 'automatic' attention as early on as 105 msecs after stimulus onset. They also 
reported on a differential in time capture of 'automatic' attention by either negative 
or positive stimuli. In particular negative stimuli appeared to enhance P1 at 105 
msecs after stimulus onset and later also P2 at 180 msecs while positive stimuli 
appeared to start capturing 'automatic' attention at 180 msecs (P2) and retain 
capture until 240 msecs (N2) when also neutral stimuli appeared to come into play. 
The authors' take 'automatic' attention to mean the unconscious and stimulus 
driven attention often alternatively termed 'bottom-up". Whether the reported 
modulation of the early ERPs by the emotional stimuli reflects such attentional 
operations or the intrinsic activation of the limbic network itself is difficult to assess. 
Somewhat in conflict with the 'automatic' attention capture postulation Holmes and 
colleagues (Holmes et al., 2003) found that the early processing of emotional 
facial 
expression is in fact gated by spatial attention. This was 
based on the ERP 
recordings showing that while fearful faces elicited a greater 
frontal positivity 
starting at about 100 msecs after stimulus onset than the neutral ones when 
faces 
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were attended, when faces were unattended the emotional expression effect was 
completely eliminated. If emotional facial expression attracted attention 
automatically ERP responses to fearful versus neutral faces should not be affected 
by the spatial attentional focus. Another finding of this study is that the face-specific 
N170 was unaffected by the emotional facial expression but could be modulated by 
spatial attention. In another ERP study of emotional responses Sato and colleagues 
(Sato et al., 2001) reported that both fearful and happy faces elicited a larger negative 
peak at about 270 ms (N270) over the posterior temporal areas, which they suggest 
might be implemented by amygdalar re-entrant projections. Again whether these 
presumed projections act on the attentional system to shift toward the emotional 
stimuli or they act modulatorily on the stimuli's representations themselves is not 
clear. 
Another couple of studies of the interaction of spatial attention and emotion 
using aversive conditioning seem to contradict each other. Stormark and Hugdahl 
(1997) had subjects perform a go/no-go version of Posner's covert attention spatial 
orienting task after aversively conditioning the cues used for this task. They found 
that attention was moved away from the location of a cue faster when that cue was 
aversively conditioned thus yielding a reduced cost of processing targets invalidly 
cued by the aversively conditioned cues. In contrast, Armony and Dolan (2002) 
using a similar Posner-style task and fear conditioning of the cues found that fear 
conditioned cues captured subjects' attention making it even harder (and slower) to 
shift their attention to the correct location when those cues were invalid. The 
incongruent results of these two studies could be due to methodological factors 
such as conditioning duration (600 msecs vs. 50 msecs); nevertheless both studies 
show that a strong interaction exists between the orienting of spatial attention and 
stimulus emotionality. 
We have so far reviewed the literature on the guidance of the attentional system 
by emotional cues. We would like to close this section by discussing a study that 
investigated the reciprocal relationship that is the influence of selective attention on 
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emotional responses. Raymond and colleagues (Raymond et al., 2003) explored the 
possibility that the attentional condition of a stimulus (attended as a target vs. 
ignored as a distractor) could influence subsequent emotional judgement of that 
stimulus. Indeed they found that complex but meaningful patterns would be 
affectively devalued if they acted as distractors in a simple visual selection task 
compared to if they were the attended targets and also that this effect is robust for 
different emotional contexts and response scales. What underlying mechanism 
causes this affective devaluation is not obvious, as this phenomenon termed the 
'attention-emotion effect' has only so far been studied behaviourally leaving its 
neural substrate open to further investigation. It is plausible that distractors that 
obstruct and complicate the attentional selection process are registered as goal 
obstacles thus causing a negative emotional tag to be attached to them. However 
since the emotional evaluation of these distractors is performed some time after 
they've played their part in the selection task it is likely that a complex 
cognitive/emotional consolidation process is put into effect involving heavily the 
cognitive appraisal circuitry. Nevertheless this "attention-emotion effect" is strong 
evidence of the bilateral and reciprocal nature of the interaction between attention 
and emotion. 
4.3.2 Neural mechanisms 
After having presented the evidence from the neurosientific literature for the 
various manipulations of selective attention by the emotional charge that emotional 
stimuli possess we turn to discuss the possible neural mechanisms via which these 
manipulations are implemented. There appears to exist at least two ways emotions 
can influence attention: one is a direct one that clearly involves the amygdala 
feeding back to sensory cortical sites enhancing responses in a 'bottom-up' manner 
and the other a more indirect one involving the interplay between the cognitive and 
emotion-sensitive frontal cortical areas with the former holding the templates for 
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the task to be performed and the latter coding for the amendments that need to be 
made on those templates according to the emotional salience of incoming stimuli. 
We will review these two mechanisms separately in the following subsections. 
4.3.2.1 Amplification of sensory processing by amygdala-cortical connections 
We have discussed how attention operates on the sensory cortical sites through a 
combination of enhancement of responses for the relevant components of the 
sensory information stream and suppression of responses for the irrelevant 
components in order to allow those sensory cortical sites to cope with their 
processing task. We have also discussed how emotional salience can re-prioritise 
emotional stimuli making them immediately relevant and granting them access to 
extra processing resources. Indeed numerous neurophysiological studies have 
found increased activity in cortical visual areas when subjects were exposed to 
emotionally valenced images compared to when they were exposed to neutral ones 
(Lane et al., 1997; Lane et al., 1999; Paradiso et al., 1999; Simpson et al., 2000). In 
another study unpleasant words appeared to elicit enhanced responses in occipital 
cortical areas compared to neutral words (Tabert et al., 2001). Other studies have 
found increased activity in associative cortices such as the fusiform gyri in response 
to emotional faces (Vuilleumier et al., 2001) or fear-conditioned faces (Morris et al, 
2001b; Armony and Dolan, 2002). Studies in the auditory modality reveal similar 
emotion-driven sensory enhancement effects with one study finding enhanced 
tonotopic neural responses in the auditory cortex in response to aversively 
conditioned tones (Morris et al., 1998b) while increased firing of rats" auditory 
neurons were recorded in response to fear conditioned tones in another study 
(Quirk et al., 1997). A notable finding in one of the aforementioned studies (Lane et 
al., 1999) was that some areas of extrastriate visual cortex were modulated 
by both 
emotional salience manipulations and attentional load manipulations. 
This finding 
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indicates a similarity in the nature of emotional and attentional control insofar as 
they both have similar effects on sensory and associative cortical areas. 
A crucial feature of some of the studies mentioned above is that they implicate 
the amygdala as the arbitrator of the emotional modulation of the sensory and 
associative cortical activity as this modulation is found to be correlated with the 
modulation of the amygdalar activity (Morris et al., 1998b; Morris et al., 1998c; Tabert 
et al., 2001). The amygdala is known to possess robust reciprocal connections to 
sensory processing areas as well as being a crucial component of the limbic system 
responsible for the initial encoding of emotional value, as discussed earlier. Taken in 
total, the evidence seems to point to the amygdala as the generator of a 'boost' 
signal triggered by emotional salience and directed at the representational sites of 
emotional stimuli or events thus suggesting one likely mechanism of attentional 
amplification guided by emotion. 
4.3.2.2 Top-down control by frontal regions 
While the amygdala can modulate sensory and associative cortical responses to 
emotional stimuli through its direct projections to the sensory and associative 
cortices, some regions of the frontal lobes are also implicated in the modulation of 
responses to emotional stimuli by means of modification of the priority level or 
significance of the stimuli in processing. We have already discussed in previous 
chapters how the DLPFC is seen to play an important role in sustaining only task- 
relevant representations of stimuli chosen from a large set of available stimuli so 
that attention can be effectively directed to achieve the task goals. The 
representations maintained by the DLPFC can be emotional or unemotional as their 
selection does not depend (at least directly) on their emotional charge; rather it 
depends on their importance in the attainment of the behavioural goals. On the 
other hand, the ventromedial region of the frontal lobes (VMPFC) is suitably 
positioned to process emotional information as it enjoys reciprocal connections with 
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the amygdala (Barbas, 2000) and can therefore receive emotional information about 
the stimuli in processing from the amygdala as well as feedback to the amygdala to 
suppress or enhance emotional processing according to prefrontally determined 
priorities. The prefrontal cortex is heavily interconnected and so any emotional 
information registered in the VMPFC can influence the executive priorities coded in 
the DLPFC and ultimately alter the direction of attention or more generally modify 
the distribution of processing resources in a given context. The VMPFC can thus be 
seen as the bridge that conveys emotional information from subcortical limbic 
regions such as the amygdala to the higher cortical executive centres of the PFC. 
The VMPFC comprises areas such as the orbital cortex traditionally linked to 
emotional regulation and social cognition (Cicerone and Tanenbaum, 1997) perhaps 
through its capacity for coding stimulus-reward associations (Rolls, 2004). The 
VMPFC also includes the cingulate cortex with its more ventral portions now seen 
to be engaged in affect-related tasks whereas the more dorsal portions are involved 
in conflict resolution and response preparation (Bush et al., 2000). In a later section 
we will review the paradigms from the literature that report VMPFC activity in 
response to emotional stimuli as well as more general prefrontal activity under 
conditions that require the management of emotional responses 
(suppression/enhancement). We will first present a boxes-and-arrows model that 
encompasses the main aspects of the interaction of emotion and attention systems as 
described above. 
4.4 General model of attention/emotion 
interaction 
Brain imaging and deficit results in depressives (Mayberg, 1997) indicate the 
division of processing into: a ventral network (for emotion) and a 
dorsal one (for 
cognition), where imbalance between the two leads to reduction of 
the cognitive 
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activity and an excess of limbic activity. This leads to the question as to the nature of 
the interaction between emotion and attention: are they competing 'attention-type" 
systems, or is attention the main control system, but guided by emotional valence? 
To answer that we will develop an architecture for their interaction by extending the 
sensory-motor attention control model of chapter 2 and the discussion of the 
previous sections. 
We start with the amygdala, a particularly important site for fast valuation of 
stimuli. It is able to achieve that by being reciprocally well coupled to posterior as 
well as anterior cortical sites. Thus the amygdala can bias attention by added 
activation, in particular for stimuli with negative valence. A further important 
component is the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), which has been observed in 
interaction with dorsal PFC sites of endogenous attention. We take the model of 
Mayberg (Mayberg, 1997) to include an inhibitory interaction between these two 
components (OFC & DLPFC). 
The overall attention/emotion network can thus be constructed as shown in Fig. 
4.1. 




VENTRAL ATTENTION CIRCUIT 
AMYGDALA / LIMBIC CIRCUIT 
Figure 4.1. The overall attention/emotion network (from Taylor and Fragopanagos, 
2004). 
Following Corbetta and Shulman (2002) we divide the attentional system into a dorsal 
firontoparietal network (including frontal eyefields, intraparietal sulcus), responsiblefor 
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cognitive selection of senso-ry information and responses, and a ventral frontoparietal 
network (including temporoparietal junction, ventral frontal cortex), mainly responsiblefor 
detecting behaviourally relevant stimuli outside of thefocus of processing. In this sense, the 
ventral network serves as a "circuit breaker'for the dorsal network, in that it can interrupt 
ongoing cognitive activity and redirect attention to salient stimuli outside the currentfOcus 
of attention. Emotional stimuli activate the limbic and paralimbic structures (amygdala, 
orbitofrontal cortex) and are by definition highly salient. They can thus alter thefocus of 
attention via the ventral attention network 'circuit breaker' mechanism or by high-level 
interplay with the cognitive goals within the prefrontal cortex (DLPFCIOFC). This latter 
interaction between the DLPFC and OFC is bidirectional and can be either excitatory or 
inhibitory depending on the behavioural imperatives. 
We have delineated in Fig. 4.1 the two attention circuits discussed in chapter 2, 
as well as included the amygdala and OFC. Further modules (hypothalamus, 
striatal components) are also involved but their role is beyond this thesis. The 
question raised earlier can be rephrased in terms of the diagram of Fig. 4.1 as: Does 
the emotion-creating limbic circuit of amygdala and OFC have an independent 
control function of similar character to the ventral and dorsal attention circuits? A 
related question, still controversial, is as to the need for attention to an emotionally- 
laden stimulus to cause amygdala activation; presently it appears as if that is the 
case (Pessoa et al., 2002b). In other words, expression of the valence of a stimulus 
requires attention to it. 
4.4.1 The components of the model 
Let us look at the overall connectivity between the three circuits (dorsal and ventral 
attention and limbic circuits), using the results from these various experiments, to 
explore the architecture of Fig. 4.1 further: 
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AMYG is excitatorily reciprocally connected to cortex, so to both ventral 
and dorsal attention circuits. It has fast activation from posterior sites in 
stimulus processing, which may allow it's early sending of a valence tag to 
these sites, and to the ventral or dorsal sites of attention control IMCs in 
parietal lobes (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). There is also evidence on 
amygdala-based boosting of attention resources, as detected in the 
emotional attentional blink (Anderson and Phelps, 2001); a simulation of 
this effect was presented at IJCNN 2004 (Fragopanagos and Taylor, 2004); 
2. OFC is excitatorily coupled to the PFC component of the ventral attention 
circuit, but inhibitorily coupled to the dorsal partner (Yamasaki et al., 2002). 
With these additional features, together with results on depression from 
(Mayberg, 1997) we conclude that the bottom-level emotion circuit of Fig. 4.1 
normally functions as an additional valence tagging system for the ventral circuit, so 
leading to enhanced circuit-breaking of the dorsal attention control system. It 
achieves this, we propose, not only by activating the ventral components (especially 
the goal sites in ventral PFC) but it also reduces, by inhibition, cognitive goals 
present in DLPFC. In depression, cognitive goals are unable to be effective in 
normal situations, due to continued inhibition from the OFC hyper-activity. 
4.4.2 Qualitative review of experimental paradigms 
Let us now qualitatively discuss several experimental paradigms already used in 
constructing the architecture of Fig. 4.1, to check that the architecture is able to 
explain these findings. 
a. The first of these (Pessoa et al., 2002b) used fMRI to measure whole brain 
activity when subjects viewed pictures of fearful, neutral or happy faces 
under a difficult divided attention to either the face or by comparing the 
orientation of peripherally-placed bars (the faces were presented in the 
centre of vision, which was fixated by the subjects). Amygdala was only 
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observed active under attention to the emotionally-charged faces (with 
stronger effects in right amygdale from fearful than happy faces). The face 
ventral temporal lobe area was also activated by attention, again more 
strongly by fearful faces, as also occurred in the OFC/ventral PFC. They 
noted effects of modulation by amygdala on a number of these cortical 
sites: ventral PFC, OFC, and early visual cortex. The architecture of Fig. 4.1 
explains these modulation effects, provided there is a stronger coding of 
fearful faces in the right AMYG. 
b. The second study (Yamasaki et al., 2002) studied the effects of novel 
distracting scenes of different levels of emotional arousal. The results for 
the amygdala were already quantitatively modelled in a simplified version 
of the architecture of Fig. 4.1, only containing the AMYG in addition to the 
dorsal attention system (Taylor et al., 2003). We can qualitatively fit the 
different inferior (IFG) and middle frontal gyrus (MFG) activations by the 
extended architecture of Fig. 4.1. The lFG data show activation to the 
emotionally novel stimuli, as expected from the fast AMYG activation of 
the ventral attention goal systems, as well as the reduced activation from 
target (neutral) stimuli, coded as cognitive goals in the MFG inhibiting the 
IFG. Conversely the MFG has enhanced activity for the cognitive target 
stimuli, but reduced activity for the emotionally-valenced stimuli; this 
again arises from the proposed reciprocal inhibition between the OFC and 
IFG towards the MFG. 
C. The third case (Perlstein et al., 2002) gives further indication of the 
reciprocal inhibition between the DLPFC and the OFC. The paradigm used 
picture stimuli with an initial single picture cue and a later probe of nine 
pictures. In a working memory task a target to respond to in the probe by a 
button press was a picture contained in the previous cue. In DLPFC the 
signal intensity reduced increasingly between the pleasant, neutral and 
unpleasant stimuli during the delay period between the cue and the probe. 
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In OFC there variation was exactly the converse. This is exactly what 
would be expected from the architecture of Fig. 4.1, with mutual inhibition 
between OFC and DLPFC, and a larger strength of activity representing 
fearful as compared to neutral as compared to pleasant stimuli in either or 
both of these modules. 
d. The fourth paradigm (Armony and Dolan, 2002) used a divided attention 
condition to two fearful simultaneously-presented faces. One of the faces 
was conditioned by pairing with a burst of white noise, the other not. Brief 
presentation of the two faces side-by-side caused a significantly delayed 
response to a target dot on the side of the conditioned face, by about 20 
msecs. At the same time fMRl showed an enhanced activity to the 
conditioned face in amygdala and occipital and ventral temporal (face) 
regions. This is what is expected from the architecture of Fig. 4.1, with 
amygdala activation on the conditioned face causing an increased 
activation of the temporal face region and earlier occipital cortex. There 
was also an increased activity observed in OFC. Our explanation of the 
delayed response to the conditioned face is then based on the inhibition 
posited to then arise from OFC to the dorsal attention network, involved in 
response planning. 
e. The fifth condition (Beauregard et al., 2001) observed reciprocally active 
sites in DLPFC and amygdala and anterior temporal pole when subjects in 
fMRI were trying either to allow or inhibit emotional responses to erotic 
videos. Such reciprocity is expected from Fig. 4.1, since it is part of the 
inhibitory connectivity. The absence of amygdala activity in the 
emotionally inhibited case is a further indication of the need for attention to 
be directed, by suitable valence-directed activity; in this case that activity is 
inhibited by the dorsal attention network. 
In conclusion we can see that the architecture of Fig. 4.1 qualitatively explains 
the results of a set of 5 important experimental paradigms on the effectiveness of 
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emotionally-valenced stimuli to break through into dorsally-controlled attention, 
using the ventrally-controlled attention circuit as well as direct inhibition from OFC 
to DLPFC. The qualitative explanation needs to be followed by a more careful 
quantitative set of simulation results; those are begun in the paper of Fragopanagos 
and Taylor (2004). Finally a model of the creation of emotional feeling has been 
attacked through the attention control approach by identifying the sources of 
ownership and content of awareness as arising from the Corollary discharge and 
Sensory working memory modules respectively. The source of content for feeling 
would then be in the limbic component of Fig. 4.1, in addition to feedback effects 
from physiological changes in the body and over cortical regions from amygdala 
modulation (Taylor et al., 2003). 
4.5 Simulations of attention/emotion 
experimental paradigms 
4.5.1 Yamasaki et al. 
The paradigm of Yamasaki and colleagues (2002) had various types of stimuli 
presented to subjects lying in the bore of the magnet in an fN4RI machine. Standards 
consisted of squares of varying sizes and colors, targets consisted of circles of 
varying sizes and colors and emotional distractors consisted of aversive pictures 
that included unpleasant themes of human violence, mutilation, and disease. 
Finally, neutral distractors consisted of pictures of ordinary activities. The task was 
to press a button with the right index finger for any target (circle), and with the right 
middle finger for any other input. 
The behavioural results, which we will focus on here, showed that subjects took 
longer to respond to emotional distractors than to the targets or neutral stimuli by 
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'k , _. Ihuout 50 msecs. This effect is illustrated in table 4.1 where a summary of the 
behavioural results is given. 
Table 4.1. Reaction Times for the paradigm of Yamasaki et al. (2002). 
Type of Input Description of Input Frequency of Input RT (ms) 
Standards Squares of various sizes 
& colors 
84% 536 
Targets Circles of various sizes 
& colors 
-8% 691 
Emotional Unpleasant pictures 4% 728 
Neutral Neutral pictures 4% 680 
We assume that the standards are being processed automatically as encouraged 
by their preponderance. In other words, it is easy for a subject to always to press the 
index finger unless they notice a non-target. The explanation of emotional slowing 
is, we propose, caused by inhibition of the goal signal, for attention to speed 
analysis of the input, being inhibited by the emotional salience of the input 
activating the ventral prefrontal salience circuit. This is achieved by the architecture 
of Fig. 4.2, with the unpleasant stimuli activating the AMYGD-ORB module, which 
then inhibits the goal modules. In line with the discussion above we assume that the 
aversive pictures carry a heavy emotional load which is quickly registered by the 
amygdala and then conveyed to the orbitofrontal cortex. Thereby, the aversive 
pictures become salient and interfere with the cognitive goals in the PFC as well as 
with the motor goals that prepare appropriate responses to incoming stimuli. 
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Figure 4.2. Simulink architecture used for the simulation of Yamasaki et al. (2002). 
The AMYGD-ORB module receives inputfrom the emotional stimuli and thenfeeds 
inhibitorily back to the visual and motor goal neurons responsiblefor the emotional stimuli. 
The architecture and parameters shown in fig. 4.2 are identical to that used for 
the simulations of visuomotor paradigms of chapter 2 with the addition of the 
AMYGD-ORB module that comprises only one neuron which receives input from 
the emotional stimuli very quickly (50 ms) and then feeds inhibitorily back to the 
visual and motor goal neurons responsible for the emotional stimuli. The AMYGD- 
ORB module is directly activated by the emotional inputs coded in the INPUT 
module by the EMT node. The resulting inhibition then produces a slowing of 
response, by about 50 ms, to the unpleasant stimuli. 
4.5.2 Pessoa et al. 
We consider the paradigm of Pessoa et al. (2002b). This used fMRI to measure whole 
brain activity when subjects viewed pictures of fearful, neutral or happy faces under 
a difficult divided attention to either the face or by comparing the orientation of 
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peripherally-placed bars (the faces were presented in the centre of vision, which was 
fixated by the subjects). Amygdala was only observed active under attention to the 
emotionally-charged faces (with stronger effects in right amygdala from fearful than 
happy faces). The face ventral temporal lobe area was also activated by attention, 
again more strongly by fearful faces, as also occurred in the OFC/ventral PFC. They 
noted effects of modulation by amygdala on a number of these cortical sites: ventral 
PFC, OFC, and early visual cortex. The architecture of Fig. 4.1 explains these 
modulation effects qualitatively, provided there is a stronger coding of fearful faces 
in the right AMYG. 
We now turn to a more detailed quantitative analysis of the paradigm of Pessoa 
et al. (2002b). The model used for the simulations of Pessoa et al. (2002b) is based on 
the engineering control-theoretical principles described in chapter 2. It uses an 
Inverse Model Controller (IMC) of attention which is biased by the Goals (the rules 
of the task) in order to achieve suitable modulation of the Input signals as they reach 
the Object Map (plant). More specifically for the paradigm of Pessoa et al. (2002b) 
there are two sets of Goals, IMCs, and Object Maps, one for the orientation of the 
bars and one for the gender of the faces. According to the paradigm there are two 
conditions which are used on alternate trials during the experiment: one is to decide 
whether the two bars presented peripherally (at the two opposite top corners of the 
display) are of similar or dissimilar orientation (attend bars) and the other is to 
classify the gender of the face presented centrally (attend faces). Note that all stimuli 
are presented at all trials with only the (attentional) condition changing. There are 
two types of interesting results from this experiment which we will try to account 
for: one is the behavioural results and the other the fMRI data. 
The behavioural results indicate that performance for the attend bars condition 
is much worse than that for the attend faces condition (64% vs. 91% correct) and also 
responses were much slower for the attend bars condition. How does our model 
explain this feature? Fig. 4.3 shows a Simulink implementation of the model for the 
attend bars condition. According to this each of the two bars projects directly to the 
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correct bar-orientation node in the Object Map as well as to the wrong one with 
equal strength. Only when the IMC sends an amplificatory signal to the correct 
projection is the balance changed in favour of the correct bar-orientation node and a 
correct classification is possible. However, because there are two bars and attention 
has to be divided between them, there is a rapid noisy switching of the two Goal 
nodes (for the left and right bar) that disallows both IMC nodes to simultaneously 
boost the corresponding bar-orientation nodes. This process results in an ambiguous 
situation where one of the two bars is usually not clearly classified often leading to 
random guessing. This accounts for the poor performance in the bar orientation 
match or mismatch condition. On the other hand, because there is only one face 
whose gender needs to be classified and therefore no attention timesharing is 
necessary, performance is almost perfect in the attend faces condition. 
Figure 4.3. Simulink block diagram of the Pessoa et al. attend-bars model. 
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Figure 4.4. Simulink block diagram of the Pessoa et al. attend-faces model. 
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The parameters for the individual neurons in the attend-bars and attend-faces 
Simulink models are as those of the neurons used in the visuo-motor simulations of 
Chapter 2 whereas the delays between the various modules and the weight of their 
connections are given in the Appendix. 
The most important finding of the experiment is reflected in the fMRI data: the 
amygdala which is well-known to be active when emotional stimuli are presented 
(such as the fearful and happy faces in this paradigm) is found to be inactive during 
the attend bars condition. This led the authors of Pessoa et al. (2002b) to the 
conclusion that activation of emotion-responsive areas (such as in limbic) requires 
some attention to the emotion-evoking stimuli. Another finding of the experiment is 
that the right fusiform. appears to respond differentially to the valance of the faces 
presented, leading to the suggestion that such object coding areas (as the fusiform 
for faces) have a recurrent connectivity with valence coding areas such as the 
amygdala. This has already been discussed in section 4.4 and illustrated in Fig. 4.1. 
This second finding has inspired the architecture of the model for the attend faces 
condition (shown in Fig. 4.4 in its Simulink implementation). 
In order to understand and account for the amygdala inactivity during the face- 
unattended trials we must turn to the interaction of the two systems (one for the 
bars and one for the faces) and in particular how attention is used to enhance the 
stimuli that are relevant for a specific condition and suppress the irrelevant and 
distracting ones. We therefore suggest that the IMC performs a dual task; that is 
apart from carrying out gain modulation that acts additively on the applicable 
stimuli it also gain-modulates inhibitorily the irrelevant stimuli. We know this to 
happen for example in cross-modal attention when the stimuli of one modality are 
interfering with the stimuli of the other modality while only one modality is 
required to be attended (Fu et al., 2001). We hypothesise that in the face-bars 
paradigm a similar mechanism operates. More specifically, in the attend-faces 
condition only the face-Goals are activated that bias the face-IMC which in turn 
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amplifies the projections from the input to the face-gender map and attenuates the 
projections from the input to the bars-orientation map. The amplified face 
representations in the face-gender map feed into the amygdala (according to 
valence) which in turn feeds back to the face-gender map to boost the emotional 
faces' representations. The inhibition caused by the face-IMC on the bars-orientation 
map nodes means that the bars do not carry enough activation to drive the 
corresponding working memory nodes and therefore do not reach awareness. 
Conversely, in the attend-bars condition only the bars-Goals are activated that guide 
the bars-IMC to boost the signals from the input to the bars-orientation map and 
dissipate the signals from the input to the face-gender map. The interaction of the 
two systems in the attend-faces condition and the attend-bars condition is 
illustrated in the block diagrams of Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6 respectively. 
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Figure 4.5. Block diagram showing the interaction of the two systems in the Pessoa 
et al. attend-faces condition. 
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Figure 4.6. Block diagram showing the interaction of the two systems in the Pessoa 
et al. attend-bars condition. 
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The bars-IMC generated inhibition on the face-gender map causes annihilation 
of any activity in it and consequently leaves the amygdala without any input from 
the emotional faces rendering it effectively inactive. Note that because the signals 
from the bars-IMC and hence the inhibition onto the face-gender map are noisy the 
face-gender map activity is not completely wiped-out. This allows for some activity 
to leak to the amygdala giving a small positive activation (reflected in the simulated 
BOLD signals that follow). In the experimental data the amygdala does not show 
any activation in the attend-bars condition; the observed amygdala activation 
depends on the threshold applied to the fMRI BOLD signals set for the experiment. 
Thus the simulation results and the experimental data are consistent. 
Finally we present our results in the form of simulated BOLD signals that were 
obtained by convolving the simulated membrane potential of the applicable 
neurons with a Poisson distribution with a delay parameter of 6 secs. The choice of 
the membrane potential is justified by a recent fMRI signal analysis (Logothetis et 
al., 2001) that shows that the BOLD signal correlates most highly with the local field 
potential (LPF) which in turn reflects changes in the membrane potential of the 
neurons. We should note that the amygdala module shown in the Simulink 
implementations of Fig. 4.3 & Fig. 4.4 contains two sets of fearful, happy and neutral 
nodes, one set for the part of the amygdala that lies on the left hemisphere and one 
for the part that lies on the right. This division of the amygdala was mainly 
introduced to better reproduce the results of the paper that show some variation of 
the activations of the left and the right amygdala. These differential activation 
results were reasonably accurately reproduced by means of differentiating the 
weighting of the connections between the object map and the left and right 
amygdala under the assumption that the sensitivity of amygdalar populations to 
emotional stimuli varies from its left to its right parts. Simulated BOLD signals 
showing attention and valence effects in the left amygdala, right amygdala and right 
fusiform are shown in Figures 4.7,4.8 and 4.9 respectively. 
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Figure 4.8. Simulated BOLD signals showing attention and valence effects in the 
right amygdala. 
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Figure 4.9. Simulated BOLD signals showing attention and valence effects in the 
right fusiform. 
4.5.3 Emotional attentional blink 
The addition of the amygdala module extends the attentional blink model into the 
realm of emotions and offers an opportunity to study the intrinsic features of the 
cognitive and emotional circuits of the human brain and their interaction. The 
behavioural data of Anderson and Phelps"s article (Anderson and Phelps, 2001) 
show that when the second target (T2) is charged with sufficient emotional load it 
escapes the AB deficit in normal subjects but not in amygdala patients. This implies 
that the amygdala is activated by the emotional stimuli and in turn interferes with 
the cognitive processing of the stimuli by means of amplification, thus overcoming 
the limitations imposed by the cognitive stream. The amygdala is known to be 
highly connected with several cortical and sub-cortical areas (Adolphs, 2002) 
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thereby opening a range of possibilities for the connections to the cognitive modules 
that could achieve this emotional boosting of T2. Input to the amygdala might come 
from a crude but effective early signal from extra-striate cortex and/or it could come 
later as feedback from high-level semantic maps (eg. in temporal cortex). After the 
amygdala is turned on it can then feed back to the semantic maps to boost the 
representation of the stimulus and/or to the IMC as a late bias for the allocation of 
attentional resources to that stimulus. Although different connections might result 
in similar amplification of the working memory buffer activity for the stimulus and, 
thus, allow it to emerge into awareness, there are variations in the earlier stages of 
processing that could be tested by means of brain imaging experiments. Simulations 
were ran using the architecture and parameters of the generic attentional blink 
model as in chapter 3 with the addition of a single-node amygdala module activated 
only by the emotional T2 and connected as indicated in the captions of the following 
figures. Figures 4.10,4.11,4.12 and 4.13 show how the ERPs change for T2 in Lag3 
according to the amygdala connectivity chosen. In all cases however the boosting of 
the emotional T2 node leads to the shallowing of the typical AB curve as reported in 
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Figure 4.10. ERPs for T2 in Lag3 when amygdala is not active (non-emotional T2). 
. ....... .. 
1,1 172 (1 .1 &1 M, 't 
, /I t'k, a-, ', ýi the 'iva; n t7n, -, c. omp,,.,, tfzt; o; zal modell, , o'ahc tioniand cmobo i, 




0 ORViNG MEMORY (P3) RVjNG MEMORY (P3) 
C (N2/P2) 
,, 013JECT (N400) 
ý 
C9 Luoa ýR , -CPýROCLARYPISCHARGE(Q/P2) 
----------- 
0 500 1 GOO 
time (ms) 
1500 
Figure 4.11. ERPs for T2 in Lag3 when amygdala is receiving its input from early 
extra-striate cortex and feeding back to T2s object map representation. 
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Figure 4.12. ERPs for T2 in Lag3 when amygdala is receiving its input from T2's 
object map node and feeding back to T2's IMC node to further bias its processing. 
Note the increased IMC and corollary discharge activation. 
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Figure 4.13. ERPs for T2 in Lag3 when amygdala is receiving its input from T2s 
object map representation and feeding back to the same site (recurrence). 
Note the late increase in the object map activation. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have investigated the interaction of emotion and attention 
through a careful review of the psychological and neuroimaging literature as well as 
through explicit modelling of various attention/emotion paradigms by means of a 
model developed by extending the CODAM model for attention to include limbic 
and paralimbic structures. More specifically, we presented evidence from the 
literature supporting the notion that the emotional value of stimuli or events 
presented to the respective processing systems of the brain can be rapidly and 
possibly preattentively registered by a circuit whose principal component is the 
amygdala. We then continued to examine how the emotional information extracted 
can be used to modify the focus of attention; this can be achieved either directly by 
the amygdala acting as a separate controller of attentional focus similar to the 
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standard control system of cognitive attention, so by enhancement of those 
representations that have been registered as emotional and, thus, salient, or by 
dragging the cognitive attentional system towards emotional representations by 
modifying the cognitive goals through a complex ventromedial and dorsolateral 
interactive process. 
We then presented a boxes-and-arrows model of the global cognitive and 
emotional networks based principally on Mayberg"s depression model but also on 
all the knowledge extracted from the literature on emotions and attention. This 
model was then used to qualitatively account for the results reported in various 
attention/emotion experiments with a particular focus on the reciprocal relationship 
of the ventromedial and dorsolateral sections of the PFC and its role in 
attention/emotion interaction. Finally, we presented an explicit computational 
implementation of the global cognitive/emotional model as an extension of the 
CODAM model of attention. This was successfully employed to approximate 
quantitatively the results of a series of attention/emotion paradigms including the 
Pessoa and colleagues paradigm that challenges the standard view of automatic 
coding of emotional charge. 
4.7 Appendix 
4.7.1 Values of constants for Pessoa et al. Simulink models 
Table 4.2. Values of constants for Pessoa et al. Simulink models. 
Constant Description Value 
_ 
dIN Delay between the input and the modules it 
connects to. 
50ms 
dGOAL-IN Delay between the input and the GOAL modules. 25ms 
dimC-GOAL Delay between the goal and the IMC modules. 25ms 
dOBI-GOAL Delay between the IMC and the OBJ modules. 25ms rdow-IN 
Delay between the input and the OBJ modules. 120ms 
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gimc Lateral inhibition strength for all IMC modules. 0.6 
gOBj Lateral inhibition strength for object module. 0.8 
Connection strength between input and correct gOBJ-IN-straight 
corresponding object node. 
0.5 
Connection strength between input and incorrect gOBI-IN-cross 
corresp nding object node. 
0.5 
gOBJ-IMC Connection strength between IMC and OBJ. 1.0 
Connection strength between OBJ and the left gL-AMG-HAPPY 
amygda a happy node. 
0.3 
Connection strength between OBJ and the left gL-AMG-FEARFUL 
amygdala fearful node. 
0.3 
Connection strength between OBJ and the left gL-AMG-NEUTRAL 
amygdala neutral node. 
0.14 
Connection strength between OBJ and the right gR-AMG-HAPPY 
amygdala happy node. 
0.25 
Connection strength between OBJ and the right gR-AMG-FEARFUL 
amygdala fearful node. 
0.3 
Connection strength between OBJ and the right gR-AMG-NEUTRAL 
amygdala neutral node. 
0.14 
Connection strength between the amygdala happy gF-OBJ-AMG-HAPPY 
node and the female OBJ node. 
0.5 
Connection strength between the amygdala happy gM-OBJ-AMG-HAPPY 
node and the male OBJ node. 
1.0 
Connection strength between the amygdala fearful 1 0 gF-OBI-AMG-FEARFUL 
node and the female OBJ node. . 
Connection strength between the amygdala fearful 1 0 gM-OBJ-AMG-FEARFUL 
node and the male OBJ node. . 
Connection strength between the amygdala neutral gF-OBJ-AMG-NEUTRAL 
node and the female OBJ node. 
0.1 
Connection strength between the amygdala neutral 1 0 gM-OBJ-AMG-NEUTRAL 
node and the male OBJ node. . 
Inhibition strength from bars IMC module to faces 2 4 gBARS-IMC-FACES-OBJ 
OBJ module. . 
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Emotion recognition 
5.1 Introduction 
As computers and computer-based applications become more and more 
sophisticated and more and more involved in our everyday life whether it be on a 
professional or a personal or a social level, it becomes ever more important that we 
are able to interact with them in a natural way, similar to the way we interact with 
other human agents. The most crucial feature of human interaction that grants 
naturalism to the process is our ability to infer the emotional states of others based 
on covert and/or overt signals of those emotional states. This allows us to adjust our 
responses and behavioural patterns accordingly thus ensuring convergence and 
optimisation. of the interactive process. This chapter is based on the theoretical 
foundations of and the work carried out within a collaborative EC project called 
ERMIS (for Emotionally Rich Man-machine Intelligent System), in which we have 
been involved recently, and that is coming to fruition at the time of writing. The aim 
of ERMIS is the development of a hybrid system capable of recognising people"s 
emotions based on information from their faces and speech. The project website is: 
wwwjrngig 
Following through some of the ideas of Chapters 3 and 4 we have created an 
emotion recognition system based on the attentional control architectures as well as 
the principles of attention/emotion interaction explored in those chapters. It is 
important to do this if the powers of emotion-attention interaction in the brain are to 
be explored and exploited. 
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The literature on emotions is rich and spans several disciplines often with no 
obvious overlap or consolidating outlook. Our view of emotions has thus been 
shaped by the philosophy of Rene Descartes, the biological concepts of Charles 
Darwin and the psychological theories of William James only to mention a few of 
the gurus of human sciences. Such theoretical concepts should be used as guidelines 
in putting together an automatic emotion recognition system (such as ERMIS) 
provided that they are shown to be relevant to more recent knowledge on emotions 
such as that stemming from the modern neurosciences. Indeed recent technological 
advances have allowed us to probe the human brain and particularly the emotional 
circuitry that is involved in recognising emotions yielding a more detailed 
understanding of the function and structure of emotion recognition in the brain. 
Synchronously, technological advances have significantly improved the signal 
processing techniques applied to the analysis of the physical correlates of emotions 
(such as the facial and vocal features) thus allowing efficient multi-modal emotion 
recognition interfaces to be built. 
The possible applications of an interface capable of assessing human emotional 
states are numerous. One of the uses of such an interface could be to enhance 
human judgement of emotion in situations where objectivity and accuracy are 
required. Lie detection is an obvious example of such situations although improving 
on human performance would require a very effective emotion recognition system. 
Another example is clinical studies of schizophrenia and particularly the diagnosis 
of flattened affect that so far relies on the psychiatrists' subjective judgement of 
subjects" emotionality based on various physiological clues. An automatic emotion- 
sensitive system could augment these judgements thus minimising the dependence 
of the diagnostic procedure on individual psychiatrists' perception of emotionality. 
More generally along those lines, automatic emotion detection and classification can 
be used in a wide range of psychological and neurophysiological studies of human 
emotional expression that so far rely on subjects' self report of their emotional state 
which often proves problematic as will be discussed later in this chapter. In a 
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professional environment, enriching a teleconference session with real-time 
information on the emotional state of the participants could provide a substitute for 
the reduced naturalism of the medium thus again assisting humans in their 
emotional discrimination capacity. 
Another use of an emotion-sensitive system could be to embed it in an 
automatic tutoring application. An emotion-sensitive automatic tutor can 
interactively adjust the content of the tutorial and the speed at which it is delivered 
based on whether the user finds it boring and dreary or exciting and thrilling or 
even unapproachable and daunting. It could even recommend a break when signs 
of weariness are detected. Similarly, emotion-sensitivity can be added to automatic 
customer services, call centres or personal assistants mainly to help detect 
frustration and avoid further irritation with the options to pass the interaction over 
to a human or terminate it altogether. One could even think of an emotion- 
responsive car that can alert the driver when it detects signs of stress or anger that 
could impair their driving abilities. 
The most obvious commercial application of emotion-sensitive systems is the 
game and entertainment industry with either interactive games that offer the 
sensation of naturalistic human-like interaction, or pets, dolls and so on that are 
sensitive to the owner's mood and can respond accordingly. Finally, owing to the 
shared basis of human emotion recognition and emotional expression, 
understanding and developing automatic systems for emotion recognition can assist 
in generating faces and/or voices endowed with convincingly human-like emotional 
qualities. This can in turn lead to a fully interactive system or agent that can 
perceive emotion and respond emotionally thus taking human-machine interaction 
a step closer to human-human interaction. 
In the sections that follow we will briefly review some of the prominent theories 
of emotions and the issues that arise from them. We will then turn to the more 
modem theoretical advances and experimental evidence and discuss issues that 
arise separately on the side of the sender and on the side of the receiver. After that 
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we will explore the nature of the emotional features from the various modalities and 
discuss the available data for training and testing. We will focus on the datasets 
generated in the ERMIS project by means of a paradigm called SALAS that allows 
for natural emotion elicitation. The ground truth for the SALAS datasets was 
provided by human assessors that assessed the emotion elicited by the participants 
of the SALAS paradigm. Thus, recognition of emotion could be taken to reflect the 
experience of emotion in the assessors' minds. Finally, we will present an artificial 
neural network architecture for fusing emotional information from the various 
modalities under attentional modulation and present the results obtained in the 
ERMIS framework through this neural network. 
5.2 The psychological tradition 
In our effort to construct an automatic emotion recogniser it is important to examine 
the ideas proposed on the nature of emotions insofar as they shape the way 
emotional states are described. These ideas can guide us in determining what an 
emotional state is and what the relevant features are that distinguish it from others. 
It is also crucial to delineate the nature of the mapping of these relevant features to 
the state's internal representation so that effective models of this mapping can be 
built. Looking back in the history of emotional theories we could mention Aristotle 
who classified emotions into opposites and explained the physiological and hedonic 
qualities associated with emotions. Later Rene Descartes introduced the idea that a 
few emotions (or passions) underlie the whole of human emotional behaviour. After 
studying the relationship between emotions and facial expressions and bodily 
movements Charles Darwin drew the conclusion that emotions are strongly linked 
to their survival value. He also suggested that emotions have been inherited from 
animal precursors. During the 1880's, the American psychologist William James and 
the Danish physiologist Carl G. Lange independently reached the conclusion that 
emotions are perceptions of the physiological state after closely examining the 
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peripheral components of emotions such as somatic arousal. Avery extensive review 
of these classic theories as well as more contemporary ones can be found in Solomon 
(2003). 
More recently Arnold (Arnold, 1960) and Lazarus (Lazarus, 1968) introduced 
the cognitive appraisal theory of emotions by proposing that emotions arise when a 
stimulus, event or situation is cognitively assessed to be carrying a personal 
meaning. This personal meaning is determined by personal goals and concerns and 
shaped by past experiences. Moreover, depending on the outcome of this cognitive 
appraisal an appropriate emotional response is generated. In this way appraisal 
theorists bring together the high-level cognitive components of emotional 
processing and the more low-level limbic and somatic response components that 
together form a complex circuitry that allows us to experience emotions even in the 
absence of explicit awareness of the emotion-arousing episode. 
5.2.1 Issues arising from psychological studies 
The theories of emotions mentioned so far have inspired many researchers to 
continue the theoretical investigation of emotions in one direction or the other thus 
making available a wide spectrum of ideas and concepts that taken together can 
capture the main aspects of the nature of emotions. However through such 
investigation several issues of contention have arisen that are crucial to be 
addressed and begin to resolve in order to design suitable automatic emotion 
recognition architectures. 
5.2.1.1 Basic emotions and their universality 
Following a long tradition going back to Descartes and Darwin that supports the 
existence of a small, fixed number of discrete (basic') emotions, 
Silvan Tomkins 
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proposed in 1962 (Tomkins, 1962) that there exist 9 basic affective states (2 are 
positive, I is neutral and 6 negative), each indicated by a specific configuration of 
facial features. This assumption has been perpetuated by many researchers who 
followed (Izard, 1971; Ekman et al., 1972; Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987) with each 
researcher producing their own list of basic emotions that neither converges on the 
number nor the type with the others' lists. This disparity is to say the least confusing 
in trying to understand the characteristics of the internal representations of the 
various emotional states being most crucial for the development of an automatic 
emotion recognition system. Furthermore, while one would expect a set of basic 
emotions to be consistently recognised across cultures -in other words, being 
universal- evidence suggests that there is minimal universality at least in the 
recognition of emotions from facial expressions (Russell, 1994) although this view 
has been challenged in Ekman (1994a). Rather than engaging in this irresolvable 
dispute on the number and type of basic emotions, we have opted for a more 
flexible solution to the problem of the representation of emotional states by 
adopting the continuous 2D space of activation and evaluation as an emotional 
representational map. We will discuss the nature of this map in detail later on. 
5.2.1.2 Evolutionarily hard-wired vs. socially learned emotions 
Another long-standing debate in emotion theory, which persists to date, is whether 
emotions are innate or learned. At one extreme, evolutionary theorists believe in the 
Darwinian tradition that evolution has crafted emotions in the brain as a result of a 
long environment-driven adaptation to better serve the behavioural imperatives of 
our ancestors (Neese, 1990; Tooby and Cosmides, 1990; Ekman, 1994b; Izard, 1992). 
High differentiation within the limbic system lends some support to this approach 
although this high differentiation need not necessarily be genetically hard-wired or 
discrete emotion-specific. Indeed at the other extreme, many theorists take the social 
constructivist approach (Averill, 1980; Ortony and Turner, 1990) which emphasises 
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the role of higher cortical processes (such as those involved in complex social 
behaviour) in differentiating emotions. This camp does not accept that the high 
differentiation in the limbic system is innate; rather it is conceivable that the limbic 
system contains areas that are differentially sensitive to the arousal level (activation) 
and the valence (evaluation) of stimuli or events that it is exposed to in a non- 
emotion-specific way. This would allow for social influence to shape emotional 
responsiveness and would justify the emotional variance reported to exist across 
different cultural populations. At the same time it would suggest that people from 
within the same social population should perceive emotion coherently. 
5.2.1.3 'Primary' vs. 'secondary' emotions 
Finally we turn to discuss the division of emotions into two categories: 'primary" 
and 'secondary' emotions. What Damasio (1994) calls 'primary' emotions are the 
more primitive emotions such as startle-based fear, as well as innate aversions and 
attractions. These are said to arise automatically in the low-level limbic circuit. On 
the other hand, 'secondary' emotions are more subtle and sophisticated in that they 
require the involvement of cognitive processing to arise. These are likely to involve 
high-level cortical processing and require conscious awareness. This division of 
emotions directly relates to the issues discussed above; thus the primary emotions 
are equivalent to the basic emotions more so even since theorists that support the 
latter usually also argue that they are evolutionary crafted in the limbic system. The 
secondary emotions would be argued by the supporters of innate basic emotions to 
be a blend of basic emotions much in the way that different colours can be created 
by the mixture of red, green and blue. On the other hand, the social constructivists 
would argue that secondary emotions are social constructs built on a set of 
rudimentary emotions such as startle and affinity/disgust. It is crucial to fully 
appreciate this division of emotions as it is the secondary emotions that we are more 
concerned with in the design of human-computer interfaces. 
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5.3 Input- and output-specific issues 
Before proceeding to review the technical literature on the signs that indicate 
emotions we should raise some more general issues regarding the input to the 
automatic emotion recogniser, i. e. the information transmitted by the emotion 
sender, as well as issues relating to the output of the automatic emotion recogniser, 
i. e. the information captured by the emotion receiver. 
5.3.1 Input-specific issues 
Display rules 
Evidence suggests that people learn to voluntarily inhibit spontaneous emotional 
expression in order to comply with culture, gender and group membership. This 
phenomenon was termed 'display rules' (Ekman, 1975). For instance, in most 
cultures expressions of anger and grief are considered unsociable and are 
discouraged, often being replaced by an attempted or 'fake' smile. An automatic 
emotion recogniser has to be able to go beyond the obvious signs of archetypical 
emotions to cope with these situations. 
5.3.1.2 Deception 
Another issue that automatic emotion recognisers have to deal with is deception. 
Often people deliberately misrepresent their emotional states usually in an attempt 
to conceal information about themselves that can be embarrassing or incriminating. 
This can be overcome by the use of physiological measurements such as those used 
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in lie detection, for instance, but this is not often an available option especially in 
friendly human-machine interaction. Besides, deception is part of human social 
interaction and doesn't always serve malignant purposes. 
5.3.1.3 Systematic ambiguity 
Often similar configurations of the features typically used to extract emotional 
information, such as the facial and vocal features, correspond to different 
behavioural states and not necessarily emotional ones. For instance lowered 
eyebrows may indicate anger as well as concentration depending on the 
behavioural context. Environmental context also influences the way we alter those 
features to convey information that could be misleading if context is not taken into 
account. For instance shouting could signify anger but it could also be a 
requirement of communication in a noisy environment. This systematic ambiguity 
of individual signs of emotions presents a challenge to an automatic emotion 
recogniser and makes intelligent fusion of all available modalities and context an 
imperative. 
5.3.2 Output-specific issues 
5.3.2.1 Category labels 
The output of an automatic emotion recogniser is the emotional state recognised 
after processing the features from the available modalities. However an emotional 
state is an abstract notion which needs to be explicitly represented in order to be of 
use in any application. The most natural way to achieve this is by assigning a label 
to each emotional state from the armoury of emotional labels provided by everyday 
language. Restricting the choice of labels to what we called basic or primary 
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emotions before, such as fear, disgust, anger, sadness, happiness and so on, would 
not be an effective solution to the problem as these emotions are rarely experienced 
in their pure form in realistic situations. Not to mention the lack of convergence 
with respect to number and type that burdens the concept of basic or primary 
emotions. Thus inclusion of secondary emotions is deemed essential to begin to 
efficiently describe the wealth of possible emotions experienced. There are two ways 
of achieving this inclusion. One is a straightforward extension of the list of labels to 
include those that describe more subtle emotions. For instance, Whissell (1989) lists 
107 words describing emotional states while Plutchik (1980) lists 142. Another way 
to describe secondary emotions is by mixing and matching the basic emotional 
labels as if in a palette of primary colours. Although the former way to deal with 
secondary emotions is more explicit, it places a heavy load on the automatic 
classification system rendering this an intractable method. Besides that, the problem 
of deciding on a definitive list of secondary emotional labels persists still. The latter 
way by mix and match of primary emotional labels is simply too awkward to 
explicitly represent emotional states, certainly so for any human inspection of the 
results. 
5.3.2.2 Activation-evaluation space 
An alternative solution to the problem of representing emotional states is using a 
continuous two-dimensional space onto which emotional states are mapped on. One 
dimension of this space corresponds to the valence of the emotional state and the 
other to the arousal or activation level associated with it. Cowie and colleagues 
(Cowie et al., 2001) have called it activation-evaluation space. This bipolar affective 
representation approach is supported in the literature (Russell and Barrett, 1999; 
Carver, 2001) as well being well founded through cognitive appraisal theory. An 
emotional state is "valenced", Le. is perceived to be positive or negative 
depending 
on whether the stimulus, event or situation that caused this emotional state to ensue 
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was evaluated (appraised) by the experiencer of the emotional state as beneficial or 
detrimental. This appraisal process that assigns the positive or the negative sign to 
the emotional state is a key idea in cognitive appraisal theory (Ellsworth, 1994). The 
arousal effect of emotion on the other hand goes back as far as Darwin who 
suggested that emotion predisposes us to act in certain ways. More recently from an 
appraisal-theoretic point of view, Frijda (1986) proposed that emotions equal action 
tendencies. Thus rating an emotional state on an activation scale, i. e. the strength of 
the drive to act as a result of that emotional state is an appropriate complement to 
the valence rating together yielding a robust while flexible solution to the emotional 
state representation issue. It is also possible to relate the explicit categorical labelling 
of emotional states to the activation-evaluation space by representing the emotional 
labels themselves as points on this space. In such a translation basic emotional labels 
would not map on the activation-evaluation space uniformly. Rather they tend to 
form a roughly circular pattern which has inspired Plutchik to suggest that this may 
be an intrinsic structural property of emotion. So he describes emotion using an 
angular measure ranging from acceptance (0) to disgust (180) and from apathetic 
(90) to curious (270), as well as the distance from the centre which defines the 
strength of the emotion. More generally speaking, although the activation- 
evaluation space is a powerful tool to describe emotional states, there will always be 
some loss of information from the collapse of the structured, high-dimensional 
space of the possible emotional states to a rudimentary 2D space and, moreover, 
different results can be obtained through the different ways of collapsing in this 
way. 
5.3.2.3 Time related categories 
Aside from emotions in their narrow sense, emotional states can be related to other 
structures that have similar affective qualities but quite different time courses. 
Moods, for instance, have a longer life than emotions and can therefore affect 
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behaviour on a larger time scale. Moreover, moods are not generated 
instantaneously in response to a particular object like emotions so they are usually 
experienced in a more global and diffused fashion. Nevertheless, in language the 
same emotional word might describe a short-lived emotion or a more protracted 
mood. For instance, the word 'sad' can be used to describe an emotion in response 
to some disappointing news but can also be used to describe the mood of a griever. 
Emotional traits have an even longer life as they reflect enduring inclinations to 
enter certain emotional states. Again the word-label 'happy" can be assigned to an 
emotion, a mood or a trait equally well. Thus it is clear that an automatic emotion 
recogniser would benefit from the use of more than one temporal scale of analysis of 
the signs of emotional states. This way the emotional states recognised at each 
instant can be attributed to the appropriate cause (emotion, mood, trait and so on) 
and mixed effects can be disentangled. 




Speech carries a significant amount of information about the emotional state of the 
speaker in the form of its prosody or paralinguistic content. We take prosody to 
mean the way words (or non-verbal utterances) are spoken as opposed to the actual 
words which is the linguistic content of speech. Prosody can 
be quantified by the 
values (and the changes of those values in time) of acoustic properties such as 
the 
pitch, the amplitude or intensity and the spectral content of speech. 
Indeed there has 
been ample research on the way such acoustic properties correlate with 
different 
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emotional states. For instance, studies have shown that anger and happiness/joy are 
generally characterized by high mean pitch, wider pitch range, high speech rate, 
increases in high frequency energy, and usually increases in rate of articulation 
(Murray and Arnott, 1993). Sadness but also boredom is characterized by decrease 
in mean pitch, slightly narrow pitch range, and slower speaking rate (Murray and 
Arnott, 1993). These are but a few of numerous empirical observations that relate 
the acoustic properties of speech with the emotional state of the speaker. In fact due 
to their empirical nature these observations tend to have a certain degree of variance 
or even disparity depending on the researchers and the material used for the 
studies. A limitation however that seems to consistently manifest in most studies of 
speech prosody and emotion is that prosody can only really provide information 
about the arousal or activation level of the speaker and not the valance of their 
emotional state. This is evident from the examples given above where anger and joy 
share the same vocal characteristics while being quite opposite in valence and 
similarly for sadness and boredom. A very extensive examination of the relationship 
between prosody and emotion can be found in Cowie et al. (2001). 
4 
5.4.1.2 Computational studies 
Several computational studies have been carried out that aim to automatically 
extract prosodic variables and, based on them, classify the emotional state of the 
speaker. We will only outline two of the most promising ones. The ASSESS system 
(Cowie et al., 2001) extracts the pitch contour, the intensity and the spectral content 
of speech as well as detecting the number and duration of pauses and then performs 
extensive statistical calculations that results in a large number of statistical moments 
of various orders of those variables. The pause detection is an important operation 
as it allows for meaningful segments of speech (tunes) to be defined as the portion 
of speech lying between two pauses. These tunes can then provide a unit of analysis 
for the study of the fluctuations of the extracted vocal variables. Thus, the output of 
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ASSESS is a large set of statistical moments of the basic features extracted by means 
of signal processing and can be delivered on a tune-by-tune basis or on a larger 
chunk basis. The ASSESS output can then be used as input to any statistical analysis 
tool or neural network. ASSESS was actually used for ERMIS and the output was 
put through a brain-inspired neural network (ANNA) which we will introduce in a 
later section as well as show and discuss the relevant results. Another important 
computational study was carried out by Scherer"s group (Banse and Scherer, 1996) 
who also used the basic speech features (fundamental frequency, energy, speech 
rate and spectral measures) as well as some statistical moments of those features 
and then performed discriminant analysis to match speech samples to specific basic 
emotional states. Classification was of the order of 50% correct which is about the 
same order of classification by human judges. 
5.4.1.3 Neural sites 
Turning to the neural sites that appear to be involved in the recognition of emotions 
from prosody we are confronted with a wealth of findings mostly from lesion 
studies that indicate that these neural sites are distributed between the left and right 
hemispheres with an emphasis on structures in the right hemisphere, and in 
particular the right inferior frontal regions. These latter regions work together with 
more posterior regions in the right hemisphere and the left frontal regions as well as 
subcortical structures to achieve emotion recognition based on the various auditory 
features. A review of recent studies that support the above neural allocation of 
prosodic processing can be found in Adolphs et al. (2002). In the same study the 
authors tested 66 patients with focal brain damage against 14 control subjects in 
their ability to recognise emotion from prosody. The main conclusions drawn based 
on their findings were that firstly primary and high level auditory cortices are 
involved in the extraction and perceptual processing of the various prosodic cues. 
Secondly, the amygdala and the orbital and polar frontal cortices appear to be 
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responsible for translating these prosodic cues to emotional information regarding 
the speech source. Thirdly, following emotion categorisation, a simulation of the 
associated bodily response ensues mediated by motor and premotor structures. 
Finally, somatosensory structures are responsible for transforming the simulated 
bodily responses back to somatic and sensory representations thus giving the 
sensation of the emotion conveyed by the speech source. 
5.4.2 Faces 
5.4.2.1 Features 
Facial expression is a fundamental carrier of emotional information and is used 
widely in all cultures and civilisations to express as well as perceive emotion. In an 
automatic emotion recognition system the task is to extract those features from a 
face that are most indicative of a person's emotional state. These include but are not 
restricted to the eyes, the brows, the mouth and the nose. Also the extracted features 
can be analysed statically (usually at the apex of an expression) or dynamically by 
monitoring and measuring the variation of these features in time. By apex of an 
emotional expression we mean the point at which the emotional expression is fully 
developed as in a smile that starts to form gradually from the neutral expression 
into a fully developed smile (the apex of the smile). Much of the recent research in 
the field focuses on the latter. Most of the techniques developed to analyse facial 
expressions are based on the seminal work by Ekman and Friesen (1978) who 
developed the so-called Facial Action Coding System (FACS). FACS is predicated 
on human facial anatomy and introduces the concept of 'action units" (AUs) as 
causes of facial movement. An AU is an assembly of several facial muscles that 
generate a certain facial action by their movement. The mapping between action 
units and muscle units is not one-to-one as the same muscles can elicit a series of 
... . ....... . ...... -. 1 - ............. ................ ........... .......... 
leordi(Y. 71 and coll"PotatiOnal niodellin,, ofath:., ution iiýi the bram, 191 
.......... .................. hip. R. " Output ................................... ................ I .......................... .4 ............................... .-......................... p ............... .......... I .......... ....................... . ......... -4 ... ........ 
action units (or effectively of facial expressions). The work by Ekman and Friesen 
was original based on the assumption that there exist a set of basic emotions, so 
most research in extracting emotional information from the faces has also been 
based on this assumption often with very high classification performance. However, 
we have already discussed in previous sections how the notion of basic emotions 
can be limiting as it does not allow for the full spectrum of emotion to be 
represented and consequently used for realistic emotion classification beyond the 
archetypical emotions. 
5.4.2.2 Computational studies 
The first task to be performed in any facial expression analysis approach is face 
detection or tracking. This can be based on colour used as a clue to disentangle the 
face from its background or on a set of given templates in the form of gray values, 
active contours, graphs or wavelets. Pose estimation is also an important aspect of 
face detection or tracking as different viewing angles cause substantial change in the 
appearance of the face. Following face detection or tracking, two major approaches 
exist for the mapping of facial features to emotions. One is the target-oriented 
approach whereby facial expression analysis is conducted statically at the apex of 
the expression ('mug-shot') with the aim to detect the presence of static cues such as 
wrinkles as well as the positions and shapes of facial features. This approach has 
proven cumbersome and few techniques based on this approach have been 
successful. The other approach to facial expression recognition is gesture-oriented. 
This approach requires a set of successive frames of a facial expression as it involves 
measurements of image properties on a frame-by-frame basis so that gradients and 
variances can be extracted. One of the gesture-oriented approaches is based on 
optical flow whereby dense motion fields are computed in selected areas of the face 
and then mapped to facial emotions by means of motion templates extracted as 
sums over a set of test motion fields. Another gesture-oriented approach is based on 
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feature tracking whereby prominent features such as edges, comer-like and high- 
level patterns (e. g. eyes, brows, nose, mouth) are firstly extracted for each frame of a 
sequence followed by motion analysis by means of relating the features from one 
frame to another. A third gesture-oriented approach aligns a 3-D model of the face 
and head to the image data so as to extract object motion as well as orientation. Our 
ERMIS partner, the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA), uses a feature 
tracking approach which is based on the extraction of the MPEG-4 compliant Facial 
Definition Parameters (FDPs) which are in turn used to calculate the Facial 
Animation Parameters (FAPs). We will show in a later section how the latter have 
been used as input to ANNA for emotion classification in ERMIS. 
5.4.2.3 Neural sites 
The first stage of processing emotional faces is a feed-forward sweep through 
primary and higher level visual cortices ending up in associative cortices (temporal) 
and more specifically the fusifurm gyri that are known to be especially active during 
the processing of faces. Even at the early phases of this sweep a crude categorisation 
of the faces into emotional or not can ensue based on the structural properties of the 
faces. In the event of an emotional face being detected projections at various levels 
of the visual and the associative cortices to the amygdala can alert the latter of the 
onset of an emotional face. It was mentioned in the previous chapter that some 
scientists believe that even a subcortical route presumably via the superior 
colliculus can carry similar crude emotional information very fast up to the 
amygdala. The issue of how early and from how low-level sources the amygdala 
can be activated is still open to debate. Nevertheless once the amygdala is alerted of 
the onset of an emotional face it can in turn draw attention back to that face so as to 
delineate the categorisation of the face in detail. It can do so, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, either by employing its direct projections back to the visual and 
associative cortices to enhance processing of this face or via activation of the 
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orbitofrontal cortex that can in turn initiate a reprioritisation process of the salience 
of this face within the prefrontal goal areas and drive attention back to the face. 
Finally the amygdala can also generate or simulate a bodily response through its 
connections to motor cortices, hypothalamus and brainstem nuclei which can then 
be transformed back to somatosensory representations providing effectively a 
simulation of the other person's emotional state. This is a possible mechanism by 
which we experience empathy. For a more extensive review of the neural correlates 
of emotion recognition from faces see Adolphs (2002). 
5.4.3 Words 
Extracting emotional information from the words used by a speaker using an 
automatic system is not a trivial task. Often some of the words we use carry a strong 
and clear emotional charge. More often though we convey emotionality on a higher 
level through socially learned semantic schemata. We will first review the existing 
approaches to automatic emotional content extraction from words and then proceed 
to present the relevant system we developed for ERMIS. So the existing approaches 
can be classified into 4 classes: 
1. Keyword spotting 
2. Lexical affinity 
3. Statistical natural language processing 
4. Hand-crafted models 
We will not consider the fourth class here since it is not very general, and we 
will only concentrate on the first three. 
5.4.3.1 Keyword spotting 
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This is the most direct approach, involving a simple look-up table from a given 
lexical entry to an emotional value, be it of one or a number of categories of 
emotions or of emotional dimensions. Thus Ortony's Affective Lexicon provides an 
often-used source of affective words, grouped into affective categories. Similarly 
Elliot's Affective Reasoner watches for 198 affect key words like "distressed" or 
'enraged", plus affect intensity modifiers, like 'extremely' or 'somewhat'. The 
Whissell dictionary transforms any word into a pair of values, one for activation, the 
other for evaluation. Thus this can give a finer descriptor than can the Affective 
lexicon, which can only produce emotional categories. The weakness of all of these 
systems is that they have poor recognition of affect when there is negation, and only 
surface features are involved. Thus a lot of sentences convey underlying meaning 
rather than a surface one. Thus the sentence 'My husband filed for divorce and he 
wants to take custody of the children' has very strong emotional content, which is 
not detected at the surface level by the affective transform systems. 
5.4.3.2 Lexical affinity 
This approach is an extension of the keyword spotting technique in the sense that 
apart from picking up the obvious emotional keywords, it assigns a probabilistic 
"affinity"' for a particular emotion to arbitrary words. These probabilities are often 
part of linguistic corpora, that gives this approach one of its disadvantages, namely, 
that the assigned probabilities are biased toward corpus-specific genre of texts. 
Another disadvantage of this approach is that it misses out on emotional content 
that resides deeper than the word-level that this technique operates on. For 
example, the word "accident", having been assigned a high probability of 
indicating 
a negative emotion, would not contribute correctly to the emotional assessment of 
phrases like "I avoided an accident"' or I met my girlfriend 
by accident"'. 
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5.4.3.3 Statistical natural language processing 
Statistical natural language processing approaches operates by combining features 
of keyword spotting and lexical affinity techniques not only analysed on a word-by- 
word basis but on the basis of the statistics of these features taken over some 
significant portion of text. Various methods, such as latent semantic analysis (LSA), 
have been used for the emotional assessment of texts but they all suffer from a main 
drawback; namely, the unit of text over which statistical analysis is run needs to be 
rather large to be effective (in text terms, paragraph-level and above), rendering this 
methodology inappropriate for use on a sentence-level and below. Nevertheless, 
given the restrictions for use, statistical natural language processing yields good 
results for affect classification as it can notably even detect some underlying 
semantic context in the text. 
5.4.3.4 Comments on existing approaches 
Overall the various methods all suffer from incorrect description of deeper 
emotional content since they are only able to capture the surface emotional content, 
be that for a long sequence of text or not. But we consider that the word-spotting 
method, possibly enhanced by further context-driven assistance, can provide a 
useful component in a multi-modal approach to emotion recognition. Such multi- 
modality is not considered in the analyses above. 
5.4.3.5 Text Post-Processing module for ERMIS 
Various parameterisations and coordinates systems have been proposed in 
literature for the quantification of the emotional content of words. We have adopted 
the 2-dimensional emotional space of activation and evaluation. Activation values 
indicate how dynamic an emotional state is, i. e. how active or passive it makes the 
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person at that state. Evaluation (or pleasantness) values designate the 'sign' of an 
emotional state; in other words, how positive or negative the person feels. This set 
of parameters is a good global descriptor of an emotional state and has been used by 
Prof. Whissell of the Laurentian University to compile the 'Dictionary of Affect in 
Language". This dictionary comprises around 9000 words and their corresponding 
activation and evaluation values as rated by students at her university. The 
dictionary also includes the values of a parameter called "imagery" which 
corresponds to how strong an image an emotional state ensues, but we will not be 
concerned with this. Notably, statistical analysis of the dictionary terms has 
confirmed statistical independence of all three parameters (insignificant cross- 
correlations). 
The speech recognition engine that precedes the Text Post-Processing module 
converts the speech audio signal to text. Next, the words in the extracted text are 
passed on to the Text Post-Processing module where they are mapped to the 2D 
activation-evaluation space, thus, forming a trajectory that corresponds to the 
movement of emotion in the speech stream. An example of such trajectories is 
demonstrated in the following figure where the emotionally contradictory phrases 'I 
am very happy' and 'I am very angry' are shown next to each other. 
happy 
, U. ý -W, 
am 
Von 
Figure 5.1: Emotional trajectories of emotionally contradictory phrases. 
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The most crucial feature of the Text Post-Processing module is the window over 
which the statistics of the 2 values for each word will be calculated. These 
calculations will then be used as features to be fused with the other features 
produced by the prosodic and the facial analysis and, finally, output the best 
estimate of the emotional state. Further tests need to be done to define the length 
and type of this window, i. e. how many words will be contained and by which 
criteria these sets of words will be chosen. This is expected to crucially affect the 
performance of the Text Post-Processing module. In what follows we will refer to 
the activation-evaluation values produced by the Text Post-Processing module as 
DAL values after Whissell"s emotional lexicon which is the core of the Text Post- 
Processing module. 
5.4.4 Training and Testing material 
An automatic emotion recognition system that employs learning architectures (e. g. 
neural networks), such as the one developed for ERMIS, requires sufficient training 
and testing material. This material should contain two streams: an input stream and 
an output stream. The input stream would comprise the extracted relevant features 
from the various modalities (prosody, faces, words and so on) and the output would 
comprise the emotional class or category or more generally the emotional 
representation of the episode for which the input features were extracted. By 
episode we mean any piece of text, audio, video or multimodal combinations of 
these that was used for analysis. There exist many databases of such episodes from 
different scenarios and contexts developed in academia or industry for the purposes 
of emotional classification studies. An overview of these databases can be found in 
Cowie et al. (2001), while a more up-to-date and detailed report on these databases 
can be found in deliverable D5c of the European Network of Excellence HUMAINE 
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We will only mention a couple of points with respect to those databases and then 
proceed to discuss the database that was developed for ERMIS. 
Most of the existing databases of uni or multimodal emotional material have 
been generated by actors acting one emotion or another. It is empirically apparent 
that acted emotion is quite different to natural emotion as it measures significantly 
differently on the various analytical tools (as well as by human judgement). 
Furthermore, actors tend to over-act the emotion they are supposed to portray thus 
restricting the available material to "full-blown' emotions. Therefore, although the 
use of actors to generate databases of emotional material appears to be an easy 
solution and thus obviously attractive, one should be very cautious about using 
such material and not assume that the results obtained with acted emotion would 
also apply with accuracy to natural emotional expression. Another limitation of the 
existing databases is that the output stream mentioned above is often missing or 
expressed in the space of basic emotions. We have already stressed how limiting the 
space of basic emotions is to describe the full range of emotional expression. 
Therefore it is crucial that the 'ground truth" for an emotional episode that is used 
for training or testing should be described in a flexible and comprehensive way such 
as the activation-evaluation space described above. 
For ERMIS we developed a scenario, called SALAS, where emotion would be 
naturally elicited by users while being recorded on audio and video and then rated 
by humans on the activation and evaluation space. The SALAS scenario is a 
development of the ELIZA concept introduced by Weizenbaum (1966). The user 
communicates with a system whose responses give the impression of sympathetic 
understanding, and that allows a sustained interaction to build up. In fact, though, 
the system takes no account of the user's meaning: it simply picks from a repertoire 
of stock responses on the basis of surface cues extracted 
from the user's 
contributions. In the case of SALAS, the surface cues involve emotional tone. 
In a 
'Wizard of Oz' type arrangement, a human operator identifies the emotional tone, 
and uses it to select the sub-repertoire from which the system's response should 
be 
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drawn. A second factor in the selection is that the user selects one of four 'artificial 
listeners' to interact with at any given time. Each one will try to direct the user 
towards a particular emotional state - 'Spike' will try to make the user angry, 
Tippa' will try to make him or her happy, and so on. 
SALAS took its present form as a result of a good deal of pilot work. In that 
form, it provides a framework within which users do express a considerable range 
of emotions in ways that are virtually unconstrained. The process depends on users' 
co-operation - they are told that it is like an emotional gym, and they have to use 
the machinery it provides to exercise their emotions. But if they do enter into the 
spirit, they can move through a very considerable emotional range in a recording 
session or a series of recording sessions: the 'artificial listeners" are designed to let 
them do exactly that. 
After obtaining the input stream of the training/testing material in the form of 
audiovisual recordings of several SALAS sessions we generate the output stream by 
having human subjects assess the emotional content of the input material. This is 
achieved through the use of a program called FEELTRACE which tracks in real-time 
the movement of a pointer (driven by a computer mouse) around a 2-D activation- 
evaluation space projected on a computer monitor while subjects view the material 
to be assessed. We thus obtain a stream of x, y coordinates in the activation- 
evaluation space that is synchronised with the input stream and can serve as the 
'ground truth' or "supervisor' in neural networks terms during the training of our 
learning system. Taken together the two streams comprise a fully usable 
training/testing data collection. 
5.5 Extracting artificial neural network 
architectures: ANNA 
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5.5.1 The architecture 
One of the most important effects of emotion is their ability to capture attention 
whether it is 'bottom-up' attention directed to stimuli or events that have been 
automatically registered as emotional or it is 'top-down' attention reengaged to a 
stimulus or event that has been evaluated as important to the current needs and 
goals after cognitive appraisal mediated by a complex emotional/cognitive network. 
This emotion/attention interaction has been extensively discussed in the previous 
chapter and forms the theoretical basis for the artificial neural network architecture 
we have developed for ERMIS. The input of this neural network comprises features, 
from various modalities, that correlate with the user"s emotional state. These 
features are fed to a hidden layer (EMOT), representing the emotional content of the 
input message. The output is a label of this state (FEEL). Attention acts as a feedback 
modulation onto the feature inputs, so as to amplify or inhibit the various feature 
inputs, as they are or are not useful for the emotional state detection. The basic 
architecture is thus based on a purely standard feed-forward neural network, but 
with the addition of a feedback layer (IMC) modulating the activity in the inputs to 
the hidden layer (EMOT). This feedback is taken to be of sigma-pi form for reasons 





Figure 5.2. Information flow in ANNA. 
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5.5.2 The leaming rules 
The equations that govern the responses of the neurons in the various layers of 
ANNA are as follows: 
Assuming linear output: 
OUT = Eajyj 
i 
Hidden layer (EMOT) response: 
Yi = PZ CoijXj 11 +Y Aik -k 
1) (2) 
ik 
Feedback layer (IMC) response: 
Zk f (Y Bkiyi) (3) 
i 
, wheref is a sigmoidal function. 
The following figure illustrates the connectivity in ANNA as described in 
equations (1) - (3): 
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Figure 5.3. The connectivity of ANNA (note gain modulation of inputs to EMOT 
layer by feedback from IMC layer) 
Before starting training ANNA we need to have obtained for each input xj the 
set of asymptotically converged yj's and z, s by running the network until these 
values have converged to a suitable value. So if we combine the ANNA equations 
(2) & (3) in one iterative equation for the y, 's we get: 
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We iterate (4) Vi until some global convergence criterion (e. g. 
Yi (t + Yi (t)12 < .5) is satisfied. This way we obtain the yj (oo) "s and z, (oo) 's. 





" where t denotes the target output, based on the training set 2,, 
ýxj('), OUT(') I 
j,,,, with m 
denoting the pattern. 
The training rules are: 
A9 c9E , 
for 9= fajlWijýAjk, Bkj 1 
a9 
Where if we define . 5"' = OUT(m) - t(m) and 


















= 1] 6(m) I (') ( )(00) 
yi( 
-I)ikff(ý) O)kl Z 
aA aA d -, Yk (-) 
X, 
,, 
kin mi kin mi 
t9E (M) 






"': (5ir - 
fyf, 
(-) (,, 0) 
Coij Xj AjkBkr 
(10) 
kk 
The derivation of the partial derivatives of equations (7), (8) and (9) with respect 
to the weights can be found in the Appendix. 
In the ERMIS framework ANNA is being used to fuse features that can predict 
the user's emotional state while belonging to different modalities such as linguistic, 
paralinguistic (prosodic) and facial. It is precisely this sort of application where one 
has an input vector comprising highly uncorrelated and diverse features that 
ANNA was designed for. These features need to be appropriately amplified or 
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attenuated to reveal an optimal strongly predictive subset of the original set. 
Therefore it is not only the ERMIS framework that ANNA is suitable for; rather any 
application requiring similar cross-modal integration would benefit immensely 
from the unique attentional feedback feature that characterises ANNA. This leads to 
an adaptive recurrent "sigma-pi' ANN whose training laws are given in detail. 
ANNA is relevant to any situation in which attention feedback could improve 
processing, such as in complex scenes or with complex inputs (as in auditory 
channels, for example). 
5.5.3 ERMIS results obtained through ANNA 
A selection of SALAS sessions was analysed by the respective ERMIS partners who 
extracted the relevant features from the voice, faces and word stream. These 
sessions were also evaluated as to their emotional content by 4 subjects using the 
FEELTRACE program. The resulting streams of input and output data were in turn 
analysed by use of ANNA. The results are shown below in the table, which gives 
the full set of ASSESS-FAPs-DAL training results, as well as the testing results. 
To explain what has been done to assess the value of the different modalities 
towards emotion recognition (text emotion content through DAL, prosody through 
ASSESS feature analysis, and facial characteristics through the 17 FAP values), we 
note that there are seven combinations of the three sets of input features: each one of 
the three input separately, the three pairs used together, or all three input feature 
sets used simultaneously. These seven possible combinations are shown 
successively going down the table, there being four separate data entries, one for 
each of the four viewers used to give a running estimate by FEELTRACE of the 
emotional state of the particular subject being observed in the data-base (the viewers 
are denoted by their initials (JD, DR, EM, CC). There has also been a choice made of 
output to be used, as either denoted by 'A" for activation value, 'E" for evaluation 
value, or 'A+E' to denote the full 2-dimensional activation-evaluation co-ordinates 
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arising from the FEELTRACE assessment by each of the viewers. We also note that, 
assuming random responses, ANNA would achieve a 50% success rate when 
considering the positive or negative values of the A or E one-dimensional outputs; 
the corresponding random level for quadrant matching in the A+E case will be 
expected to be 25%. As we can see, the results imply considerably better success 
rates than a purely random level. We discuss the results in more detail in the next 
sub-section. 
Before that, we give some details of the training process itself. More specifically, 
the results were obtained from ANNA on 500 training epochs, 3 runs for each 
dataset, the final results being averaged (with associated standard deviation 
calculated). In all training sessions 5 hidden layer (EMOT) neurons and 5 feedback 
layer (IMC) neurons were employed while the learning rate was fixed at 0.001. Also 
of each dataset 4 parts were used for the training and I part was used for testing the 
net on 'unseen" inputs. In the table that follows Input space stands for the type of 
features used; Out stands for the output dimension used for training (A=Activation, 
E=Evaluation); FT stands for the particular FeelTracer used as supervisor; AVG 
denotes the average quadrant match (for 2D-space) or average half-plane match for 
(11)-space) over 3 runs and S. D. denotes the standard deviation for the above 
average. We also add that PCA was used on the ASSESS features so as to reduce 
from about 500 input features to around 7-10 as describing most of the volatility of 
the over time series. 
Table 5.1. Results from training ANNA on the SALAS dataset. 
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DAL A+E JD 0.51 0.04 
DAL A+E DR 0.39 0.02 
DAL A+E EM 0.58 0.03 
DAL A+E cc 0.32 0.01 
ASSESS+FAPs A+E JD 0.51 0.01 
ASSESS+FAPs A+E DR 0.44 0.04 
ASSESS+FAPs A+E EM 0.65 0.05 
ASSESS+FAPs A+E cc 0.35 0.04 
DAL+FAPs A+E fD 0.51 0.04 
DAL+FAPs A+E DR 0.35 0.04 
DAL+FAPs A+E EM 0.71 0.04 
DAL+FAPs A+E cc 0.33 0.07 
ASSESS+DAL A+E JD 0.57 0.01 
ASSESS+DAL A+E DR 0.37 0.02 
ASSESS+DAL A+E EM 0.61 0.07 
ASSESS+DAL A+E cc 0.49 0.07 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL A+E JD 0.47 0.07 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL A+E DR 0.41 0.01 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL A+E EM 0.67 0.01 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL A+E CC 0.011 
11 lj, ý I.;: 1 
Mlý 
ASSESS A JD 0.82 0.02 
ASSESS A DR 0.62 0.03 
ASSESS A EM 0.86 0.01 
ASSESS A cc 0.64 0.05 
FAPs A JD 0.82 0.03 
FAPs A DR 0.63 0.04 
FAPs A EM 0.88 0.02 
FAPs A cc 0.54 0.02 
DAL A JD 0.85 0.03 
DAL A DR 0.66 0.01 
DAL A EM 0.98 0.01 
DAL A cc 0.75 0.08 
ASSESS+FAPs A JD 0.78 0.00 
ASSESS+FAPs A DR 0.60 0.02 
ASSESS+FAPs A EM 0.89 nc; 0.05 
ASSESS+FAPs A cc 0.63 0.05 
DAL+FAPs A JD 0.86 0.03 
DAL+FAPs A DR 0.53 0.02 
DAL+FAPs A EM 0.95 0.02 
DAL+FAPs A cc 0.73 0.07 ) 
ASSESS+DAL A TD ) 
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ASSESS+DAL A DR 0.61 0.02 
ASSESS+DAL A EM 0.98 0.01 
ASSESS+DAL A cc 0.73 0.02 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL A JD 0.87 0.03 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL A DR 0.63 0.05 










ASSESS E DR 0.64 0.03 
ASSESS E EM 0.59 0.03 
ASSESS E cc 0.77 0.02 
FAPs E JD 0.64 0.04 
FAPs E DR 0.57 0.05 
FAPs E EM 0.59 0.03 
FAPs E cc 0.59 0.03 
DAL E JD 0.64 0.03 
DAL E DR 0.62 0.02 
DAL E EM 0.72 0.01 
DAL E cc 0.60 0.08 
ASSESS+FAPs E JD 0.69 0.03 
ASSESS+FAPs E DR 0.65 0.03 
ASSESS+FAPs E EM 0.69 0.01 
ASSESS+FAPs E cc 0.60 0.04 
DAL+FAPs E JD 0.56 0.09 
DAL+FAPs E DR 0.67 0.03 
DAL+FAPs E EM 0.66 0.05 
DAL+FAPs E cc 0.60 0.04 
ASSESS+DAL E JD 0.67 0.03 
ASSESS+DAL E DR 0.65 0.05 
ASSESS+DAL E EM 0.77 0.02 
ASSESS+DAL E cc 0.66 0.01 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL E JD 1 0.61 0.01 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL E DR 0.67 0.04 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL E EM 0.71 0.1 ol 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL E cc 0.67 0.04J 
We will now turn to analyse the results from the above table. We note first the 
smallness of the standard deviations for all the results, indicating considerable 
stability across the various trained networks used to calculate this parameter. This 
. ........ . .... 208 
............. , ......... ..... ................. ............. .................. ............. ............................... -- ...................... . ....................... .............. ............................... » ............................... ................. ............................... . ............................... 
gives more confidence in the results, although more effort could be spent on 
analysing in more detail convergence speed and optimising on neural architecture 
using standard neural information processing methods. However the results have 
enough stability to indicate that these results from the training of ANNA can be 
accepted as a reasonable approximation to what can be achieved in trained 
recogni ion systems. 
Next we note that the results for classification using the A output only are 
relatively high, in three cases up to 98%, and with two more at 90% or above. In 
particular we note the effectiveness of the data coming from the FeelTracer EM, 
with the average success rates of 86%, 88%, 98%, 89%, 95%, 98%, 98% for the A 
input. A high level of success is obtained with Feeltracer JD, although not at quite 
such a high level. There are consistently lower values for the FeelTracer DR, all in 
the 60-66% band, and CC, who varies more across the modalities used, with values 
of 64%, 54%, 75%, 63%, 73%, 73%, 73%. 
Let us now consider the effect of different input combinations on the success 
rate, when we use only the output A. From the table we see that there is not a 
significant difference between the input combination choices of DAL+FAPs, 
ASSESS+DAL, ASSESS+FAPs+DAL, and DAL on its own. 
The E output leads to considerably lower success rates, with not so much 
disparity across the FeelTracers. On the other hand the A+E output also has EM as 
the best FeelTracer to model, with success rates of 61%, 60%, 58%, 65%, 71%, 61%, 
67%, all well above the chance level of 25%. The best successes arise from the input 
combinations ASSESS+FAPs+DAL, ASSESS+DAL, ASSESS+FAPs and DAL. 
Finally there is more difficulty to reach a similar assessment with the A+E 
output full FeelTrace, due to the considerable variation across the FeelTracers. For 
EM the optimal choices of input combinations are DAL+FAPs (71%), 
ASSESS+FAPs+DAL (67%), and ASSESS+FAPs (65%) - so especial added value from 
the FAPs. However for CC the optimal inputs are ASSESS (48%), ASSESS+DAL 
(49%) or ASSESS+FAPs+DAL (43%). This implies that added value for CC arises 
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especially from the ASSESS features. Different combinations adding value do not 
arise so clearly for the other two FeelTracers: for JD the results are very similar 
across all input combinations, with success levels 48%, 52%, 51%, 51%, 51%, 57%, 
47%, while for DR these values are 37%, 31%, 39%, 44%, 35%, 37%, 41%. 
The results presented above lead to the conclusion that different FeelTracers 
may be using different modalities on which to judge the emotional state in which a 
particular subject presently finds themselves. We use here in this discussion only 
the A+E output results as relevant, since that is what each FeelTracer is trying to 
produce from their viewing of the emotional states of the subject. For EM, then, the 
most important cued modality would be that from facial structure, for CC it would 
be from prosody, while for the other two, JD & DR, there was no clear 
preponderance of modality from which cues were being extracted. 
5.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we introduced the framework of the EC project ERMIS in which I 
have recently been involved. The aim of this project is to build an automatic 
emotion recognition system able to exploit multimodal emotional markers such as 
those embedded in the voice, face and words spoken. We discussed the numerous 
potential applications of such a system for industry as well as in academia. We then 
turned to the psychological literature to help lay the theoretical foundation of our 
system and make use of insights from the various emotion theories proposed in 
shaping the various components of our automatic emotion recognition system such 
as the input and output representations as well as the intemal structure. We thus 
looked at the different proposals with respect to the size (basic emotions hypothesis) 
and nature (discrete or continuous) of the emotional space as well as its origin 
(evolution or social learning) and hierarchical structure (primary, secondary). We 
then proceeded to discuss several issues that pertain to emotion recognition as 
suggested by psychological research. These were explored separately 
for the input 
.......... ........... . .......... ........ ýýI.. ...... ----- -- I ........ . -------------- ----- )ii f-m"' 210 
Jnotiorl, rec t. i () ri ! Alvend 
i"', 
.............. ..... ....... ........ ................ ...... ....... I...... 
..... . .......... 
and the output of the automatic recognition system. The input-related issues 
involved inconsistencies in the expression of emotion due to social norm, deceptive 
purposes as well as natural ambiguity of emotional expression. The output-related 
issues pertained to the nature of the representation of emotional states (discrete and 
categorical or continuous and non-categorical) as well as the time course of 
emotional states and the implications of different time scales for automatic 
recognition. We then proceeded to examine the features that can be used as 
emotional markers in the various modalities as well as the computational studies 
carried out based on those features. We also looked at the neural correlates of the 
perception of those features or markers. With respect to the word stream we 
reviewed the state-of-the-art in emotion extraction from text and presented our 
system developed for ERMIS. We then presented an artificial neural network called 
ANNA developed for the automatic classification of emotional states driven by a 
multimodal feature input. The novel feature of ANNA is the feedback attentional 
loop designed to exploit the attention-grabbing effect of emotional stimuli to further 
enhance and clarify the salient components of the input stream. Finally we 
presented the results obtained through the use of ANNA on training and testing 
material based on the SALAS scenario developed within the ERMIS framework. 
5.7 Appendix 
5.7.1 Derivation of the partial derivatives for the learning rules 
Yi =f(10)ijXj['+Y-AjkZkl) 
ik 
ANNA equations (reference): 
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5.7.1.2 Partial derivatives with respect to A's 
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5.7.1.3 Partial derivatives with respect to B's 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
6.1 General conclusions 
The work presented in this thesis validates our engineering control theoretical 
approach to modelling the human attentional system. We have shown that the 
formalism of engineering control theory can effectively describe the operations, 
processes and mechanisms that underlie the function of attention. Engineering 
control theory has also proven to be a very flexible tool in that we were able with it 
to model analogous but distinct attentional systems (visual and motor), as well as 
the more low-level motor control system, within a unified visuomotor control 
model. The latter was successfully employed to reproduce the behavioural results of 
two visuomotor paradigms (requiring visual as well as motor attention), one of 
which is notably a motor variation of the Posner benefit paradigm. 
The control model of attention (CODAM) was also successfully employed to 
model the intricate phenomenon termed the 'attentional blink'. We were able to 
reproduce a number of behavioural results obtained through the numerous 
experimental studies of the attentional blink. Moreover, we were able to replicate 
the basic electrophysiological measurements under the assumption that our 
neurons' activation levels correlate with the observed electrical activity over the 
scalp of the subjects participating in the experiments. The mechanisms we propose 
give rise to the attentional blink offer a novel interpretation of the limited capacity 
of the attentional system. We declare our attentional model to be the most successful 
to date in that it reproduces a series of features observed experimentally while being 
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consistent with brain imaging findings concerning the activations of different areas 
of the brain during the blink as well as the time course of these activations. CODAM 
is also generally consistent with the type of attentional control suggested in the 
literature. 
We have shown in this thesis that CODAM is also flexible enough to be 
extended beyond the cognitive function of attention by the addition of limbic and 
paralimbic structures known to comprise the emotional circuitry in the brain. The 
overall architecture of this extended attention/emotion model as well as the 
individual components have good support from the psychological literature as well 
as the brain imaging literature. We were thus able to make a qualitative account of 
the results from a number of experimental paradigms involving the interaction of 
attention and emotions. Moreover, we were able to successfully simulate 
behavioural and neuroirnaging results from a set of those paradigms, notably, even 
those that challenge the more traditional view of automatic emotional encoding. 
Finally, as part of the work carried out for the EC project ERMIS we explored 
thoroughly the question of human recognition of emotions in an effort to reproduce 
it as part of an automatic system. Therefore, issues that complicate the clear 
perception of emotions as sent by the transmitter as well as problems in the actual 
transmission of emotions were investigated and solutions were proposed where 
possible. More general issues concerning the emotional space (nature, size, 
hierarchy) were discussed and considered in the construction of the automatic 
emotion recogniser. We also looked at the relevant features from the various 
modalities that can be useful in assessing the emotional state of the feature carrier as 
well as their extraction techniques and their neural reception sites. An artificial 
neural network architecture (ANNA) was proposed that uses a 
feedback loop 
reflecting the attention-grabbing effect of salient stimuli (such as emotional stimuli). 
This neural network was subsequently used to transform the multimodal 
feature 
input into a two-dimensional emotional space output and the relevant results are 
given. 
... ................ 
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There is a large number of studies of learning motor tasks that we believe involve 
such systems as the visual and motor attention systems and that we would be able 
to simulate effectively using our visuomotor model of Chapter 2. One imminent 
extension of this model is the addition of the full armoury of control components 
such as the forward model, the observer, the state estimator and so on that have 
already been successfully used for the attentional blink model. This extension we 
think will make the visuomotor model more versatile and we will ultimately be able 
to simulate more complex paradigms like for instance those that explore the 
difference between explicit and implicit motor learning. 
There are processes and structures that we have so far represented in only a 
rudimentary way in our visuomotor model and that we need to elaborate on. For 
instance, the sensorimotor transformations that are performed without explicit 
engagement of attention should be modelled in more detail. We could draw on a 
number of sophisticated models of such sensorimotor transformations that have 
been proposed in computational studies of movement direction and reaching 
(Burnod et al., 1999; Baraduc and Guigon, 2002; MSc thesis by loana Marian at 
I. i. ttp: //coi. ýtex. cs.. i. ii. ay. ie/t. heses/```i(ý)LiLiýi.. -L, 'ILil-ia. n. /ýýýioan, ). master. htn1j. ). 
Moreover, models of frontal lobes including subcortical regions, such as the 
ACTION net (Taylor and Taylor, 2000), should be incorporated in our visuomotor 
model. We need also to include cerebellum as an error-leaming network such as in 
the model by Mauk and colleagues (Mauk et al., 2000). This should be able to allow 
the development of automatic responses after learning through attended control. 
With regard to the attentional blink there is still a wealth of features to be 
considered and reproduced as well as numerous variations of the classical 
attentional blink paradigm to be tackled. It was noted in the beginning of Chapter 3 
that the literature of the attentional blink contains many variations of the paradigm 
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using different stimulus types (words, digits, symbols, pictures) and targets" spatial 
locations as well as different timing and procedures (number and type of inter- 
target and post-target items (masks), task difficulty and so on). However, to be able 
to capture and simulate such, often, subtle variations we need to also include more 
low-level processing structures such as early and higher-order visual cortices and 
even subcortical structures. This will be possible by implementing CODAM in a 
neural simulator platform that allows the use of populations of integrate-and-fire 
neurons with user-defined connectivity and learning rules. This will also allow us to 
apply CODAM to modelling visual search paradigms that have been extensively 
investigated by others theoretically as well as computationally. Finally and most 
importantly, a series of deficit studies using the attentional blink paradigm have 
been carried out (e. g. schizophrenia, Alzheimer's, ADHD, depression and so on). 
These studies are most crucial to be explained and simulated as they can provide 
tremendous insight into the workings of the human brain (normal or diseased). 
We have only begun to tackle the issue of emotion/attention interaction through 
the work presented here. Much is yet to be understood in terms of the underlying 
mechanisms that mediate the cognitive/emotional interplay and predictions be 
made by means of computational modelling. Part of the immediate plans is to 
simulate quantitatively the paradigms that were only qualitatively addressed in 
Chapter 4. We will also explore further the emotional attentional blink as part of a 
research project we are now involved in and is funded by the Biological Sciences 
Research Council (BBSRC) under the 'Integrative Analysis of Brain and Behaviour" 
(IABB) initiative -the website for this project is currently: 
l. ittp: //w, ww. j. -. nth. kc'].. ac. ii. k/reseaj-cl. i/`ýýcns-/--b-[)src/ýýiabb. htm 
In this project emotional and neutral faces will be used as stimuli for the paradigm 
while behavioural and neuroimaging measurements will be made 
by the 
experimental partners of the project (Kimron Shapiro and Jane 
Raymond, 
University of Wales, Bangor (behavioural); Kia Nombre, University of Oxford 
(fMRI); Martin Eimer, Birbeck, University of London (ERP)). Moreover, part of the 
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Futurework 
................. 
plans for this research project is the exploration of the 'attention-emotion' effect 
mentioned also in Chapter 4 whereby the attentional condition of a stimulus (target 
or distractor) influences subsequent judgement of the emotional value of that 
stimulus. We expect this phenomenon to involve heavily higher-level structures 
(such as in the frontal lobes) and processes that are known to mediate cognitive 
appraisal. 
Furthermore, in order to fully tackle the issue of what motivates human 
behaviour beyond emotions (as well as what it is that is actually coded as emotions) 
we need to relate emotional value maps to reward maps and explain how it is that 
prediction of rewards can drive the sensorimotor system to a state that maximises 
the expected reward. It is suggested that neurochemical systems such as the 
dopamine system mediate the representation of reward values in the various 
reward-components (such as in limbic and paralimbic structures) but the detailed 
architecture of the reward system is still to be delineated. 
Regarding ANNA and the ERMIS work, we are delighted that the ERMIS 
partnership enriched with a plethora of outstanding European universities has 
organised a Network of Excellence called HUMAINE (httL)-/Ieniotioti-research. net) 
through which further investigation of emotions (recognition, experience and so on) 
will be carried out. This will allow us to continue our work of developing the 
automatic recogniser by further training of ANNA on new training/testing material 
that will be produced through this Network of Excellence. 
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